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job

BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 82-276
Dirks v. SEC
Jim

March 21, 1983

I.

Question Presented

Did the CADC err in finding that a recipient of nonpublic information concerning ongoing fraud within a corporation violates the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by transmitting
that information to other persons, including persons who may use it
in making investment decisions, when there is no element of misappropriation in transmitting or using the information?

2.

I I.

.Facts

Petr was an officer of a registered broker-dealer.

He special-

ized in providing investment advice about the insurance industry,
primarily to institutional investors.

Petr was not directly compen-

sated for his advisory services, but benefited when those whom he
advised directed their brokerage business to the firm by which he
was employed.
employee
of America, the securities of which were

In March 1973, petr received information from a

----""'. ., .

of Equity .Funding Corp.

for~r

traded on the NYSE, to the effect that the assets of that co. were
vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent internal corporate
practices.

As a result, petr examined and analyzed publicly avail-

able data, sought confirmation of what he had been told from
in the investment community, and solicited information from then
present and past officers and other employees of the co.

While petr

was investigating the matter, he was in contact with a number of
investors and analysts with whom he candidly discussed the progress
of his investigation and the information he had obtained.

Some of

those to whom he spoke sold their Equity .Funding securities.
III.
A.

SEC.

Proceedings Below

The SEC charged petr with violating the antifraud

provisions of the federal securities laws based on his selective
revelation of information about Equity .Funding before making some
general public disclosure.

.Following an administrative hearing, the

SEC found that petr had "tipped" nonpublic information concerning
Equity .Funding in violation of these provisions.

It observed that

"Dirks received the information from inside corporate sources.

.From

y... h

WAA..JL sl-~

3.

the nature of the information, the inference must have been obvious
that his sources had received it during · the course of their corporate duties, and that the company intended that it should be kept in
confidence."

The SEC added:

In tipping potential traders, [petr] breas hed a du ty w~ch ~J~
he had assumed as a result of knowingl y rece1v1ng conf1~
dent i a i info r mation from [Equity Funding] insiders....
~
Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary dut1 which he assumes ~?
from the insider when the t i ppee know i ng y transmits the
•
information to someone who will probably trade on the
basis thereof.

ev:r

co~~ ion

The SEC reached that

even though it recognized that

5~~~i ~ informants ~ntitled to
~
~d in or~~ring it to light
~ .j}; '!b"y.;;e spite its finding of a

~ensure
played

on petr.

~

B.

~~ opinion,
~·
..

violation, the SEC imposed only
is clear that [petri

/J,...r-

role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive

s;6C

fraud to light, and [that]

~ in

and its perpetrators to

I t observed that "[i] t

~~rtan :_

[Equity Funding's]

disclose the [Equity Funding]

.•• he reported the fraud allegation

auditors ~d

to ~~~~

sought to have the information

The Wall Street Journal."
CADC.

The CADC entered a judgment without accompanying

denying "for the reasons stated by the Commmission in its

opinion" petr's petn for review of the SEC's censure order.

..,(-

The

. -~ judgment stated that petr "breached his duty to the Commission and

~ ~~c

not to

~use

pensated for so doing."

insider information and that he was com-

Judge Tamm dissented from the judgment.

Subsequently, the CADC issued an opinion written by Judge

5~~

LYP·

~Wright.

Judge Robb concurred in the result, and Judge Tamm dissent-

ed; neither filed a separate opinion.

Judge Wright stated that

petr's censure should be affirmed on the theory expressed by the SEC

X:-' C:./IJJ-L
k

~~A, ·~~~

Plu_ ~Y-

.

'"._1

!./

4.
that petr and his tippees had assumed the "disclose-or-abstain" obligations of their insider sources.

Judge Wright added that, as an

employee of a broker-dealer, petr breached ethical duties not to
assist his "clients [in] dump[ing]

fraudulent securities on an unin-

formed public."
IV.
A.

Petr.

Summary of the Parties' Contentions

The CADC's holding is inconsistent with the Court's

decision in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
J.).

(POWELL,

/

In Chiarella, this Court held that under the antifraud provi-

sions of the securities laws a duty to disclose nonpublic informaa relationship between the person

assessing

and those purchasing or selling the securities.
This Court held that such a duty does not arise as a result of the
mere possession of such information.

Even the dissenting Justices

in Chiarella agreed that mere possession of such information may
give rise to a duty of disclosure only where it is illegally obtained, id., at 243 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting), or where it is not
legally available to others in the investment community, id., at 251
(BLACKMON, J., dissenting).
"Tippee" liability exists only where the recipient of the information improperly acquires it through a breach of a corporate
insider's duty to the company and thereby himself acquires duties as
a participant in the breach.

See 445 U.S., at 230 n. 12.

The SEC

conceded, however, that petrs' sources breached no duty iri talking
to him.

Nor did petr misappropriate or illegally obtain the infor-

mation from the co.

5.

Indeed, rather than violating a duty to Equity Funding or its
shareholders, or to the market in general, petr's activities brought
'

to light a massive fraud at Equity Funding and informed the market
of the true state of affairs at the co.

But for petr's efforts, the

fraud might well have gone undetected altogether.

By misapplying

controlling precedent, the CADC reached a result that is entirely
contrary to public law enforcement policy and that will have a substantial negative impact throughout the securities industry.

The

SEC's suggestion of a duty to disclose and its "disclose or refrain"
rhetoric may make sense where those in possession of the information, such as corps. or managers of corps., are in a position to
make disclosure on behalf of the co.; but applying the "disclose or
refrain" rhetoric to an outsider like petr who is investigating allegations of management fraud which will never be voluntarily disclosed by the management and who cannot persuade the press to publish a story will result only in discouraging independent investigation of such allegations.
B.

SEC.

Petr inherited the duty of the source of his informa-

tion, Secrist, not to defraud purchasers of Equity Funding securities.

Secrist had a duty to disclose the co.'s true condition to

investors before trading with them.

That duty rests upon the

common-law fiduciary relationship between a corp. insider and the
stockholders of the corp. rather than upon the separate and distinct
duty of the insider to the corp. to preserve the confidentiality of
corp. information.
At common law, an officer or director is "a quasi trustee" of
the shareholders in his transactions in the shares of the co.

He is

6.

required to inform his shareholders of the corp.'s true condition
before trading with them in the corp.'s , stock, and his failure to do
so is fraud.

See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 435 (1909).

The

character of the information, whether a legitimate corp. secret or
evidence of crime, is irrelevant to this disclosure duty.
Because corp. officers and directors are forbidden by their
trust relationship from using undisclosed corp. information to the
disadvantage of their shareholders, they may not give such information to outsiders for the same improper purpose.

"Tippees" who

knowingly participate with the insiders in such a breach of fiduciary duty are "as forbidden" from taking advantage of shareholders as
the insiders themselves.

The disclosure obligation of tippees rests

upon the disclosure obligation of the insider to individual shareholders rather than any duty of silence or loyalty to the corp., and
therefore the corp.'s right to preserve information as a secret is
not a prerequisite to the tippee's liability.
V.

Discussion

The parties dispute whether the information constituted "material facts" for purposes of the disclose-or-abstain rule, but the
CADC, the SEC, and the ALJ all so held, and there is no reason to
view this material as otherwise.

I recommend assuming the material-

- -------------------------------

ity of the "facts" for the purposes of this case.

Furthermore, the

......

SG is correct that Judge Wright's alternative theory of liability
based on petr's status as a registered broker-dealer is not before
the Court under SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
H

Thus, the narrow question before the Court is whether a tippee
of inside information on fraudulent conduct within a corp. violates

-

~~.J.~~7. a__

.I

~~~~
the federal securities provisions by usingt?tfie 1 nformation for his ~
personal gain.

In Chiarella, the Court

. assu ~ ,

at least for pur-

poses of analyzing Chiarella's case, that there is a federal ban on
insider trading, largely because Chiarella apparently did not argue
~

that there is not such a ban.

~holding
'~hat
,..-

1,)

there is such a ban, and I

that there is none.

-

I read your opinion as carefully not

tlhi~ you ~uld

say here

A considerable distortion of language underlies

any holding that trading in a market without issuing a press release
is "fraud" or "deceit."

If an insider is selling, the market for

the stock will move down--the direction the stock should be going;
if the insider is buying, the market will also move in the appropriate direction.

And although the business-property rationale re-

stricts insider trading when secrecy is necessary to preserve the
value of information to the firm that created the knowledge, this
~

rule would mean that insider trading should be permitted to the extent the firm that created the information desires such trading.

In

other words, if insider trading is undesirable to shareholders and
to firms, why do not firms voluntarily curtail the practice?

See

Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev.
1, 45-47

l

(1980).

-

Finally, §16 of the Securities Exchange Act has a

provision explicitly dealing with some insider trading, and it is
not a disclosure rule at all.

One could argue, with fair support

-------~--------------

for ad-

the structure of the statute,
dressing insider trading.

Se

Insider Trading, Secret

Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information,
1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 317-320.

I would think that you would find

this latter approach attractive.
~------------~

J J/.t,

L;v

~ ~

~ &f--d~
~~~·

8.
Despite the above, there may be reasons to impose a federal
"disclose-or-abstain" obligation on insiders who are in an inherently unequal information position with shareholders, and you may feel
obligated to do so after writing Chiarella.

Assuming a federal ban

on insider trading, the Court's theorv supporting such a ban must be
that Congress intended in 1934 that any fraud "touching" a sale of
securities is unlawful under federal law, even if the fraud had
nothing to do with the existence or price of the sale.

It is a

"fraud" for insiders to trade on material inside corp. information

~

that might have some effect on the market price of the corp.'s
shares.

Because it is a fraud, thev have a dutv not to trade on

this information without disclosure.
This fraud rule inevitably would lead to a rule banning all
dealing on the basis of special knowledge, but for the fact that the
Court has backtracked by stating that a trader must disclose only
when he has a "duty" to do so.

The Court announced in Chiarella

that duties do not arise simply from unequal possession of informa-

--

.....

tion, 445

u.s.,

at 228 n. 10; they come, rather, from prior dealings

of the trader as a fiduciary, id., at 229, from a "relationship of
trust and confidence," id.

Chiarella had no duty to those from whom

he bought, because he had no prior dealings with them.
It is not clear to me what the Court meant by duty, but the SEC
uses it in a conclusory way: People who ought not to trade have a
duty not to do so.

This case, in my opinion, shows the absurn lim-

its to which the SEC's "duty" not to trade on inside information has

--

been extended.

The SEC's position is that "Dirks--standing in [the

former employees'] shoes--committed a breach of the fiduciary duty

9

0

which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he passed the information on to the traders."
The SEC's "duty" is the common-law duty that an officer or director has to his shareholders: He is required to inform his share--------~.........____.

........,

holders of the corp.'s true condition before trading with them in
the corp.'s stock.

As I noted before, it takes some stretching to

--

call this fraud; rather, the duty must rest on some notion of
fairness--that it is unfair for one person to trade with another
unless the two are equally knowledgeable about the subject of the
deal.

As the briefs point out, however, the Justices of this Court

unanimously agr~d in Chiarella that there is no general duty to

!

make disclosure before trading with or tipping material nonpublic
information.
Even assuming that insiders should not trade on inside corp.

information, I think it is an open issue whether federal securities
law bans tippee trading.

The Court seems to have left ' open the sta-

tus of "tippees" in a footnote.

See id., at 230 n. 12.

I would end

the case on this basis: the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws were not meant to impose a duty on tippees to disclose
or abstain.

When the firm is entitled to secrecy, the person who

passes out a tip is the wrongdoer.

He can be penalized appropriate-

ly, by his employer if not the courts.

But when the release of in-

formation was not wrongful--and certainly the former employees of
Equity Funding did no wrong in telling petr about the

fraud--~re

is no justification for barring the use of the information.
It is not necessary, however, to create here such a broad rule
for all tippees, because this case is much easier.

Not only is

10.
there little wrong with trading on inside information in most cases,
here it is beneficial.

This case presents a classic example of a

situation where the legal rules should not penalize someone for investigation.

Assuming that insider trading is bad, it is necessary

here to reward investigation.

As Professor Easterbrook stated in

commenting on this case:
[Petr] did everyone a service. The sooner frauds are
discovered--and the more costs a defrauder bears in deferring disclosure--the fewer frauds there will be.
[Petr] 's
efforts were costly. He had to have a network of contacts, many of which would never pay off.
(After all,
most employees have no news of similar importance to disclose.)
The investigation following the tip was costly
too. While courting contacts and following up leads,
[petr] could not sit around soliciting clients' trades and
earning commissions. The ability to pass secret informa- /
tion to clients enabled [petr] to profit from his investigation, which redounded to everyone's benefit.
1981 S. Ct. Rev., at 337.

See Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5,

Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 801, 818 (1980)
I

~

("Weakest of all is the case for applying an antitrading rule to a
situation where some outside person or firm has invested in obtaining, not mere trading foreknowledge, but socially useful information.

[T]he SEC's Equity Funding position is a boon to the success-

ful commission and prolongation of corporate fraud.

It is to be

hoped that it will not survive Chiarella.").
VI.

Summary

I recommend that the Court reverse the judgment of the CADC.
would find that petr had no duty to disclose or abstain.
duty" could be grounded on a rule that:
on insider trading;

This "no

(i) there is no federal ban

(ii) there is no federal ban on tippee trading;

or (iii) there is no federal ban on tippee trading where the tippee
uses socially useful information, such as knowledge of fraud.

I

lfp/ss 03/21/83
82-65 Dirks v. SEC
In Chiarella, the Court's opinion said:
"On who fails to disclose material information •
• . cornrni ts fraud only when he under a d..l.l.t.Y_ to
do so.
And the du ry- to disclose arises when a
party has information 'th at t he other party is
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other
similar relation of trust and confidence between
them.'"
(This is SEC language from its opinion in Cady,
Roberts), 445

u.s.,

at 228.

"
• liability [under lOb-5] is premised upon
a duty to disclose arising from a relationship
of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction." p. 230.

~

"[a
] of corporate insiders . . • have
a duty not to profit from the use of insider
information that they know is confidential, and
know or should know it carne from a corporate
insider".
(This is a quote from fn. 12, p. 230,
taken from a CA2 opinion.)

Chiarella,

reversed CA2 because of two defects

in its reasoning:
"First,
not
every
instance
of
corporate
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under
§10 (b).
Second, the element requireGt to make
silence fraudulent - a dut ~ t Q <Ji s Qlose - is
absent in this case.
No-du y could ari se from

...

petitioner's relationship with the sellers of
the target company's securities. • • . He was
not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was
not a person in whom the sellers had placed
their trust and confidence.
He was, in fact, a
complete stranger.

...
'

lfp/ss 03/21/83
82-276 Dirks v. SEC (All dates are 1973)
March
from Secrist, a
three

hours

detail.

following

7

phone

call

preceding

day

former employee of Equity, Dirks met for

with

Secrist

Secrist said

who

described

the

fraud

in

regulatory agencies had

failed

to

act on charges made by other Equity employees.
(Note:
the

eight

Petitioner's brief,

specific

allegations

of

p.

8,

says that of

fraud,

three

were

essentially correct and the remainder false).

March

12

-

Dirks

.Francisco bureau chief of

telephoned Herb

Larson,

San

the W/S Journal.

He did

not

reach Larson, but left a message.
advised

an officer of

Also on the 12th, Dirks

the Boston Company

(a client)

of

what he had heard from Secrist.

March 15-16 with Dirks,

Boston sold

first sales) .

.. .

.,

...

following a

further conversation

$1.2 of Equity

securities

(the

2.

March

Dirks

19

reached

Journal's San Francisco chief,
story.

Larson,

the

W/S

and told him the Secrist

Larson agreed to have a reporter investigate.

March

Dirks,

20

in

Los

Angeles,

met

with

Harper, a former Vice President of Equity, who said only
that he was highly suspicious of Equity's books.
Following his talk Hooper
got

in

touch

with

Boston,

and

it

(Harper), Dirks again
sold

some additional

Equity securities.

~-~~
rvrEquity,

-

~ ~f
~

~

k

all

books.
that

March 21 - Dirks met with Goldbloom, Chairman of
who called the allegations preposterous in light

the

regulatory bodies

Goldbloom and other Equity employees told Dirks

insurance examiners

~~~ng doin:~so

~wf
~

MV{D tbH(1
IJ'I<-- :z:; -

current

~~

on

the

from three states had found no

21st,

Dirks

met

personally

with

Blundell of the Journal.

~

-/

that had checked Equity's

March 23 - by this date, Dirks had spoken to one
and

six

former

Equity

agreed to the fraud generally.

~~

~·

employees,

all

of

whom

Dirks then advised Dreyfus

3.

that held Equity securities.

Dreyfus checked some of its

own sources, and sold Equity securities on March 26.

March

26

-

Dirks

advised

another

holder

that

liquidated its Equity securities.
But also on the same day, March 26, Dirks again
got in touch with Blundell and urged him to publicize the
fraud charges.

He met with Blundell for several hours.

March 27 - meanwhile the stock exchange - since
March 22- had been hearing rumors,

and on March 27

it

halted trading.

April
article,

and

2

the

Journal

three

days

later

finally
Equity

published

petitioned

an
for

bankruptcy.

* * *
Note:
the

full

The foregoing

extent of Dirks'

summary does not indicate

investigation -

that included

talking to Equity's accounting firm that merely passed on
to Equity what Dirks had said.

lfp/ss 03/21/83
82-276 Dirks v. SEC
The

parties'

positions

in

this

case

are

as

follows:
The SEC
Secrist - even though a former employee - had a
duty to disclose the company's true condition to investors
before

trading

with

This

them.

is

the

common

law

fiduciary relationship between a corporate insider and the
stockholders of the corporation.

This is a separate duty

from that of an insider to the corporation

~

to preserve

confidential information.
The

SEC's

brief

(p.

17)

states

that

"Dirks

inherited the duty of Secrist not to defraud purchasers of
Equity's securities" (emphasis added).
The SEC distinguishes Chiarella on

the ground

that here, Secrist was an insider of Equity and had a duty
that Chiarella did not have.

Nor did Chiarella "inherit"

any duty from an insider.

The SG's Position:
This

is an interesting case because the United

States (SG) disagrees with the SEC.

lfp/ss 03/21/83
82-276 Dirks v. SEC
The

parties'

positions

in

this

case

are

as

follows:
The SEC
Secrist - even though a former employee - had a
duty to disclose the company's true condition to investors
before

trading

with

them.

This

is

the

common

law

fiduciary relationship between a corporate insider and the
stockholders of the corporation.

This is a separate duty

from that of an insider to the corporation

~

to preserve

confidential information.
The

SEC's

brief

(p.

17)

states

that

"Dirks

inherited the duty of Secrist not to defraud purchasers of
Equity's securities" (emphasis added).
The SEC distinguishes Chiarella on

the ground

that here, Secrist was an insider of Equity and had a duty
that Chiarella did not have.

Nor did Chiarella "inherit"

any duty from an insider.

The SG's Position:
This is an interesting case because the United
States (SG) disagrees with the SEC.

2.

/

The SEC,
principles

relying on Chiarella, argues that its

"establish

that

petitioner

had

no

disclose or abstain from trading or tipping.

duty

to

He was not a

fiduciary with respect to the security holders of Equity
funding.
He

took

He was a complete stranger to those investors.
no

action,

directly

or

indirectly,

that

would

induce them to repose trust or confidence in him." p. 10.
Dirks

"engaged

in

no

dishonest

conduct

that

would justify the imposition upon him of the duties of a
constructive trustee".
It is important to recognize, as apparently the
SEC and CADC recognized, that:
"Petitioner's informants (Dirks and numerous
others) acted lawfully when they imparted their
information to him, and petitioner used that
information in precisely the manner that his
informants expected."

My view in this case:
It

is

not easy

to

identify

any

wrongdoing

in

this case.
Surely

Secrist,

and

others

who

gave

Dirks

information, were not wrongdoers when they reported fraud.

They

had

unsuccessfully

attempted

to

interest

the

California Commission.
It is important to ask, therefore, what fraud or breach of duty - can Dirks be charged with?
an insider.

He was not

He acted far more responsibly than reasonably

could have

been

expected of him.

He could have simply

conveyed the initial information to clients of his firm.
Instead,

he

including

made

a

repeated

Journal

to

Secrist

that

remarkably

efforts

disclose.
the

to

thorough
persuade

Moreover,

regulatory

he

investigation,

the Wall Street

had

been

authorities

in

told

by

California

refused to investigate.
In these circumstances, it defies credibility to
say that Dirks became a "fiduciary" with a duty not only
to

stockholders

of

Equity

but

also

to

prospective

purchasers of Equity's securities.
What,
___...
Arguably,

may

ask,

should

Dirks

he

had

Indeed,

no

idea

in

the

whether
end

only

the

done?

the Wall Street Journal

information

some

specific allegations proved to be true.
to have

have

he should have gone directly to the SEC.

initially,
correct.

one

of

But
was

Secrist's

Dirks endeavored

investigate.

And

even

after he had talked to Equity's top executives and to its

....

accountant, he had no confirmation of the information.

He

pursued the investigation.
As the brief for the United States says:
"The
Commission's
erroneous
imposition
of
liability in this case has serious consequences
for federal law enforcement, which frequently
depends
upon private initiative to uncover
criminal conduct . . . . Petitioner accomplished
what regulatory authorities were unable to do".
p. 11

* * *
Tailpiece:
The Wall Street Journal reporter, Blundell, was
nominated

for

a Pulitizer Prize

for

his coverage of the

Equity funding scandal, while petitioner was charged with
violating

the

antifraud

securities law." P. 8.

provisions

of

the

federal
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To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276

I still have considerable doubts that federal securities law
should ban any insider trading.

You asked me, however, to set forth

a theory for upholding insider liability and tippee liability to the
extent necessary to protect the ban on insider trading.

You also

indicated that you wanted to reverse the judgment in this case.
I am convinced that there is no satisfactory compensatory rationale
for regulating insider trading.

There is no evidence that insider

trading causes direct harm to investors or, even assuming that it
does, that the extent of injury warrants the costs of regulation.
The Court then must create its theory around indirect harm.

Delay

in publication to permit insider trading appears to be infrequent
and short-lived, thus insider trading has little or no effect on the
allocational efficiency of the market.
Market confidence is probably the more promising rationale.
Insider trading indirectly injures investors by reducing their
welfare.

The Court could support its ban on insider trading by

stating that the 1934 Act was intended to promote fairness in market
transactions, and insider trading, by permitting one party to gain
an unfair advantage over other parties, is contrary to this purpose.
I have doubts, however, whether this rationale survives your opinion
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425

u.s.

185 (1976), and the Court's

.
>

.

2.
'

opinion in Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430

u.s.

462 (1977).

Your

opinion in Chiarella also casts this rationale into disfavor.
Your concern, I think, is with the status of defts in rule lOb5 cases.

In Texas Gulf Sulpher, the defts were forbidden to trade

on nonpublic information because they were officers and oirectors.
The courts have unanimously held that corporate officers and
directors are subject to insider trading restrictions.

Tippees

acquire the same status derivatively because their ultimate
information source is a bona fide insider.
This unanimity concerning trading by insiders must be based on
a belief that abstention from insider trading is a condition of the
agency relationship between management insiders and the corporation.
Insider trading is, in many respects, simply a form of secret
compensation.

There is also a moral side to this compensation:

Insider trading is indulging one's self-interest to the point of
dishonesty.

Professor Dooley has characterized the agency rationale

well:
Any agency relationship is characterized by a
divergence between the interests of the principal and the
agent. Accordingly, the agent's self-interested actions
may reduce the principal's welfare, as in the cases of
shirking, overconsumption of perquisites, or
misappropriation.
If it could be accomplished without
cost, a principal would prefer that his agents behave
selflessly and never deviate from pursuit of the
principal's interest .... Thus, serious consequences
generally attach when an agent embezzles even a modest sum
of money because this behavior manifests a willingness to
deviate too far from generally accepted standards of
conduct in the pursuit of self-interest. Persons
exhibiting these tendencies are "dishonest" and not to be
trusted.
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev.
1, 40-41 (1980).

Thus, insider trading is in the same line as

3•

"payola."

We do not expect fiduciaries ' to engage in such

activities.

{_

~~9(~/-.Jv ~.a.vj

In the end, I think this is the real objection to insider
.1\

trading.

The shareholders cannot complain that the insider

misappropriated something that belongs to them because the value of
the information to the corporation is, if anything, only to keep it
secret: that the insiders are glad to do.

Although shareholders

might prefer to reduce the direct compensation of agents who profit
on inside information, they are more likely to object to the
practice on the ground that those who do it are too little concerned
with the corporation's welfare and too willing to act dishonestly to
gain advantage.
Presumably, to the extent there is this "dishonesty," outside
investors can appropriately discount their valuation of companies in
which insiders trade, but investors, of course, presumably cannot
distinguish between companies that trade on inside information and
those that do not (I emphasize "presumably" because §16(a) requires
some disclosure for some managers).

This distinction is difficult

to make not only because insider trading is difficult to detect, but
also because the opportunities for insider trading are dependent on
the fortuitous occurrence of significant events and are therefore
distributed randomly throughout the market.

Accordingly, the

rational outside investor assumes that every investment of
comparable risk presents the same risk of insider trading.

If one

assumes that outside investors prefer but cannot identify the
securities of those companies that forbid insider trading, the
practice can be perceived as involving a loss of welfare.

There is

4.
a loss of market confidence.

Arguably, this assumption satisfies

the legal requirements of §lO(b) because it presupposes both
investor injury (loss of welfare) and deception (a dishonest act
that induces investors to enter into or remain in a relationship
that they would prefer to avoid).

Because insider trading is

perceived to be morally reprehensible, some corporate managers will
also find it repugnant and will refuse to engage in it.

These

"ethical" managers will bear the agency costs of insider trading,
but derive no utility from it, because, as I noted earlier, it is

~o

distinguish shares of companies that present the risk

of insider trading from those that do not.

Because it is, however,

~

in their self-interest reduce the risk to do so, ethical managers
~

will seek to reduce the agency costs of insider trading by incurring
bonding costs to signal the market of their abstention from the
practice.

By increasing the marginal costs of insider trading by

attaching legal sanctions to it, this cost is diminished.

In other

words, the cost of insider trading is shifted to companies that
permit such activity, and the costs of policing the activity are
borne by society rather than the individual firm.
Enhancing

th ~u ~~ lationship

by reducing agency costs

is the only justification I can see for regulating insider trading
under the existing statutory scheme.

The legal rules that the Court

should develop, assuming it wishes to enter this area, should be
consistent with that principle, and not the many others that are
offered.
II

What rules could be developed from this priniciple of fiduciary
~'

duty on the part of insiders.

Your opinion in Chiarella is a good

(7

5.

first step: a duty to disclose or abstain must be premised on a

----

fiduciary relationship.

Directors and officers are easy, of course.

The tippee's status is more problematical: he does not have a
fiduciary relationship with the company or its shareholders.
Recognizing that your rule endangered tippee law, you specifically
reserved the question of tippee liability ._
in n.' - -12, and your
'--

footnote is instructive as to what to do in this case:
"Tippees" of corporate insiders have been held liable
under §lO(b) because they have a duty not to profit from
the use of inside information that they know is
confidential and know or should know came from a corporate
insnfer.~•• The tippee's obligation has been viewed as
arising from his role as a participant after the fact in
the insider's bre~ of a fiduciary duty.
That second sentence does considerable damage to the SEC's case
against Dirks.

--------.

If, as the sentence suggested, an alleged tippee

like Dirks violates Rule lOb-5 only when his source breaches a
fiduciary duty, the Dirks' liability

~ould

depend on a finding that

the former Equity Funding employees who told him of the fraud
'
b :,eac h e d • th
~r

-

b~o

~ ncy

'
h 1p
' w1,.tu
1 +-H d-...
~
re 1 at1ons
"'t h e corporat1on.

4

·

Thus, the "duty" issue in this case is simple:
A basic principle of Chiarella is that duties to disclose
or abstain do not materialize from thin air; they grow out
of relationships of trust and confidence. A complete
outsider like Dirks has no independent relationship with
the company and its stockholders, so it would seem that he
cannot be guilty himself of a violation of the discloseor-abstain rule unless he is implicated in a breach of
~
duty by an insider informant.
~
~
Chazen, "'Dirks' Presents Unique Corporate, Social Issues," Legal -

.~

--

Times 14, 18 (March 14, 1983).

Dirks should not be considered

~

a ~

participant after the fact in a breach of fiduciary duty by his
informants.

Employees who help uncover a corporate scandal breach

6.

no agency relationship or duties to the company by simply disclosing
such wrongdoing.
A breach of a fiduciary relationship is not the end of the
inquiry.

In Chiarella, you noted that in Cady, Roberts & Co. the

SEC emphasized the duty to disclose or abstain arose from the
existence of a relationship and "the unfairness of allowing a
corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading
without disclosure."

This same rule should, of course, apply to

tippees, because their fiduciary duty is purely derivative.

Often

the tip and trade are the functional equivalent of trading on the
inside information by the insider followed by a gift of the profits
recipient.

To make out a tipping case against an insider, it
to prove that the insider exploited confidential

in violation of his fiduciary duties to the corporation.
lOb-5 claim

~gainst

an alleged tippee would have to

based on the theory that he knowingly assisted the insider in
exploiting the confidential information, i.e., that he was an aider
and abetter.

This view of tipping is consistent, I think, with your

statement in Chiarella that the tippee's obligation to refrain from
trading arises from "his role as a participant after the fact in the
insider's breach of fiduciary duty."
~~...,

~

In this case, there was

~~ ·

~

"exploitation" by the insiders.

informants received no monetary benefit for revealing Equity

~~ Funding's secrets, nor did they have any apparent desire to make a

~~
~

of valuable information to Dirks.

The informants may have had

a duty not to trade on inside information without disclosure, but
they did not.

Therefore, even if Dirks' informants did violate a

,..
-,

I •

duty to the company by disclosing, their conduct did not have one of
the essential elements of breach of the agency relationship: the
~--~

,.

I

•

~.:z:-----The situations we are

We both

u

concerned with are where ~ ecurities analysts interview employees

... =

o::=='

= =- -

seeking information: is there liabilty?

~·~~

~ ~

n <~ c~-

If the breach of an

employee's duty alone is enough to establish tippee liability,

t~
..?

securities analyst will be chilled from using any of the information
he gets.

If, on the other hand,

~ xploitation of confidential

'':'\

information by insiders is a prerequisite to tippee liability,

----------~-------------------~--------------------

securities analysts will be encouraged to seek information from
corporate employees.

I will not emphasize the obvious benefits of

protecting the information-gathering duties of a securities analyst.
There is no reason to treat securities analysts much different
from reporters in general.

-----

To allow the use of material nonpublic

information under the limited circumstances that I have suggested
will not harm public confidence in the securities markets.
has no special access to confidential information.

Dirks

As long as he

-

does his job, he is ok; when the insider tries to use the analyst
1

1

1l

for his benefit, that is when there is breach of the agency
re ratTO nship.
_J~~

p~~

As set forth above, tippee liability depends on the purpos;

the insider's disclosure.

0

f

The subjectivity of this approach is
(i) the relationship between the informant

and the recipient (did the informant expect something in return?);
(ii) who initiated the disclosure.

The informants initiated the

disclosure here, but they could have little or no expectation of

'=:::-"

8.
benefit from the disclosure.

A strong 'nonfinancial motive for

providing the information would almost always be determinative.
There are hard cases:
1.

Cocktail party conversations.

Bragging by corporate

executives, or loose talk, is not enough to create any financial
benefit for the insider.

I would say dissemination of that

disclosure would not create any tippee liability.
2.

Top executive/security analyst.

This conversation may

involve hard-to-detect favoritism, but where it is to build up the
corporation's good will, I guess I see nothing wrong with it.

I

would think liability requires some personal incentive on behalf of
the insider (personal exploitation).
In summary, an insider would always be liable for insider
trading.

A tippee would be liable where he acted as a confederate

with the insider to exploit inside information.

Thus, liablity for

tippee trading requires the presence of two elements:

(i)

fiduciary

duty (some relationship with a insider); and (ii) exploitation that
benefits the insider.

The scienter requirement, of course, protects

a deft who was unaware that he was receiving or passing on tipped
information.

. ..

?Vo
f;!i>·:-'fil

I'

~-

,,

t.·
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MEMO FOR CONFERENCE:
This

case

securities markets.
Sulphur

came

down

respect

to tippee

has

wide

the oral

been

in

1968,

the

questions

liability have

arguments -

identified.

for

the

As has been evident since Texas Gulf

litigation and uncertainty.
by

ramifications

resulted

arising
in

with

increasing

It is evident - as evidenced

that no limiting principle has

The chain

of

1 iabil i ty

appears

to be

endless.
Necessity of a duty
We made an important point in Chiarella.

It did

not involve a tippee, but it did establish that liability
cannot be

imposed in the absence of a

disclose before trading.
to tippees

is

in

fn.

12.

fiduciary duty to

The only reference in Chiarella
The critical sentence in this

note says:
"The tippee's obligation has been viewed as
arising from his role as a participant after the
fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty."
Thus,
fact",

where the
he

tippee becomes a

shares whatever

·.

duty

"partie ipant after

the

insider

breached

the
by

conveying

the

information.

case easy to decide.
that

the

former

This

analysis

makes

Dirks'

His liability depends on a finding

Equity

Secrist was only one -

Funding

employees

of

who disclosed the fraud,

'

which

breached

their fiduciary duty to Equity Funding.
But
breach

of

disclosing
interest.

even

duty.

the
None

fraud.

They

Therefore,

SEC
of

concedes
these

acted

Dirks

~~as

there

employees

strictly
not a

was

no

such

profited

in

the

by

public

participant after

the fact in anyone's breach of duty.

Two Categories of Cases
Deciding this case without identifying a general
principle would accomplish very little.
Let me make clear the -type
the

principle

would

be

applied.

o!f--situatio~to
This

case

which

does

not

involve a Texas Gulf Sulphur situation where an officer or
director

of

a

corporation

information for personal gain.
-who to benefit a
on

which

the

himself

trades

on

inside

Nor do we have an insider

friend- discloses inside . information

friend

profits.

The

law

is

fairly

settled with respect to these straightforward cases.

well

The
case

much

broader,

the

necessity

concerns

available

for

underlying
of

problem

information

in

this

being

made

the health of the securities markets.

In

this case, the SEC's opinion stated:
"In the course of their work, analysts actively
seek
out
bits
and
pieces
of
corporate
information not generally known to the market
for
the express purpose of analyzing that
information and informing their clients who, in
turn, can be expected to trade on the basis of
the information. The value to the entire market
of these efforts cannot be gainsaid:
market
efficiency in practice is significantly enhanced
by such initiatives to ferret out an analyze
information, and thus the analyst's work redowns
to the benefit of the investors."

If
securities

we

sustain

analysts

out" information.
the

uncertainty

whether

the

its

will be

opinion

far

less

in

this

liable

to

case

"ferret

They will be concerned constantly with
of

law

information

suits,

with

juries

determining

circulated was confidential and

should not have been disclosed.
Thus,
types

of

situations:

cases; and
both

broadly

(ii)

corporate

information.

speaking,
( i)

the

there

Texas

are

Gulf

two general
Sulphur

type

the secu r i t i es market ty p e c ases in which
e xecu t ives

an <'I

analysts

provide

....

for

the

latter

~situation:

should depend on the purpose or

A

tippee's

0

liability

intent of the

insider's

disclosure.
Thi s
rule.

is

in

one

sense

a

subjective

But I t hin k it is a principled and practical one.
The

question

of

"purpose"

(intent)

will

be

e..-/l ~~ ~frz-L,
determined - as it is so often in the law~
b yV th~ f~

1[

~..w... ts~

These include:
( i)
the

recipient

The

relationship

(e.g.,

respective purposes?

the

between

analyst)~

the
what

insider
were

and

their

Particularly, did the insider expect

to profit himself or to benefit a

friend rather than to

inform the market generally?
( i i)

Who initiated t ,h e disclosure?

Typically,

I

the analyst seeks out the corporate executive commonplace.

this is

Equally commonplace, executives brief large

meetings of analysts.

The circumstances of the disclosure

are relevant - as in this case.

It must be remembered that the recipient of the
information becomes a

fiduciary only derivatively:

that

•

is) if

there

has

been

a

breach of duty by the

insider.

This we established in Chiarella, and this is not denied
by the SEC.
Of

course,

there

will

be

close

deciding them is the way judges make a living.

·.

cases,

but
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law
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latter
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should depend on the purpose or

A

tippee's
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This
rule.

is

in

one

sense

a

subjective
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The

question

of

"purpose"

(intent)
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determined - as it is so often in the law - by the facts.
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(i)
the

recipient

The
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analyst);
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what

insider
were
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to profit himself or to benefit a
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inform the market generally?
(ii)

Who initiated the disclosure?

Typically,

the analyst seeks out the corporate executive commonplace.

this

is

Equally commonplace, executives brief large

meetings of analysts.

The circumstances of the disclosure

are relevant - as in this case.

It must be remembered that the recipient of the
information becomes a

fiduciary only derivatively:

.··

that

is

if

there

has

been

a

breach of duty by the

insider.

This we established in Chiarella, and this is not denied
by the SEC.
Of

course,

there

will

be

close

deciding them is the way judges make a living.

.
.'

.

cases,
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Jim

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

May 2, 1983

82-276 Dirks v. SEC
You are to be commended for completing a draft
opinion so promptly, particularly with everthing else you
have had to do.

Although the "bottom line" in this case

has been easy for us, sorting it all out in an opinion is
not easy.
I
that will
long,

begin
not

with

surprise

some
you

general
is

that

observations.
the

and with more footnotes than I

opinion

like.

is

One
too

In comments

below, I indicate where some cutting can be done.

As you

rework the draft I hope you will find other opportunities.
As you know by now, I do not like to write "textbooks" or
"articles"
primary

as
and

Court

opinions,

secondary

nor

cite

authority.

every
In

marginal

this

case

particularly where rationales differed among the Justices
we may have more than the usual difficulty in getting a
Court.

I

therefore want to say no more than a lean and

tightly reasoned opinion would include.

2.

I

now

make

some

observations

on

each

of

the

Parts of the draft.
Part I
Apart from an occasional marginal suggestion on
the draft, this looks fine.
Part II
Much of this seems unnecessary, as indicated in
my marginal notes and editing.

I would start with Cady,

Roberts,

the

and

move

directly

to

present

situation -

eliminating marginal material and repetition.
It is not clear to me that Cady, Roberts simply
restates the common law rule.

At the beginning of Part

II, I gather that the "majority" rule was to the contrary.
But compare n.

7 on p.

8 and n.

9 on p.

10.

I do not

think we need to get into this.
Part III (pp. 13-17)
This looks good to me, subject to my editing and
occasional inquiry.
few

sentences

reasoning.

that

It may be that we could eliminate a
are

unnecessary

to

the

flow of

I did not specifically identify any.

the

3.

Subpart III-A (pp. 18-23)
Apart
questions,

from

minor

editing

and

a

couple

of

I have no problem with the substance of pages

18-21.
I
condensed

would
version

through 23)

however,

like,
of

the

for

discussion

you

(bottom

draft
of

p.

a
21

of the market role of professionals, and the

weighing of advantages and disadvantages.
19

to

I agree with n.

(p. 21), but suggest you cut back materially n. 20 and

n. 22.

For the most part what we are talking about is not

seriously

questioned.

Perhaps

there

is

some

helpful

language even in the SEC's brief.
The
the

proper

difficulty

disclosing

is

and

in drawing
use

of

the

information

proscribed by the Securities Acts and rules.
it

is

customary

convey

for

supplemental

"chumming"

the

management

of

information

market)

primarily in two ways:

to

listed

required

Similarly,
filings

stockholders

that

companies

people

analysts.

This

call
is

to
in

done

talks to, and questions and answer

information

with

meetings

and

As you know,

(some

sessions with, large groups of analysts meetings.

line between

the
where

not

SEC
most

in effect, open

available

often
of

through

is

given

at

the

stock

is

4.

represented by proxies, and news coverage may be scant and
uninforming.

The

more

gathering -

difficult

purposes

is where

-

difficult

type

of

information

in terms of line drawing for our
the analysts will visit corporate

headquarters and confer with senior officers.

The analyst

is likely to be a specialist in the particular business.
When he returns to his firm, often he will circulate "buy"
or "sell" recommendations to clients and persons whom the
firm would like to have as clients.

These recommendations

are backed up by a report on the

interview.

The line

drawing problem is one that impacts directly on both the
corporate officers and the analysts.

Neither can be quite

sure when the "line" is crossed.
The

foregoing

mentioned in our opinion.
have said,

is

an

important

truth

to

be

I do not disagree with what you

but would like for you to cut it back some.

Rely primarily on what

the SEC

itself and others have

said, but include the "line drawing" problem as one the
Commission and courts should bear in mind.
The importance of our opinion will lie primarily
in preventing too zealous scrutiny of information obtained
by professionals as above described.

There will be few

5.

cases

where

the

analyst

uncovered

fraud

of

market

significance.

Subpart III-B
This brief section of the draft
critical to our opinion.

(pp.

24-27)

I have done some editing.

of us will have to look at every word with care.
little or no authority for

is
All

We have

the rule we create, but this

perhaps is why we took the case.
the best points made by Chazen.

I suppose you have used
I thought his article was

on target.

Part IV
I have no trouble with Part III, pp. 27-30.
Part V
Although
substantially.

well

written,

try

reducing

it

We do not want to philosophize any more

than is directly relevant to the case.

* * *
A couple of points not mentioned above:
1.

In n. 18, p. 19, you refer to the Commission

having said that a tipee need not have "actual knowledge"
of a breach of duty of the tipper.

I would be inclined to

6.

leave this out.
to

infer

I do not wish to encourage the Commission

knowledge

suspicion.

or

Elsewhere

claim
in

constructive

the

opinion,

I

knowledge__on

think

you deal

with this adequately.
2.

Consider whether it would be helpful to have

a definitional footnote near the beginning of the opinion.
The

draft

now

uses

"stockholder/shareholder",
"SEC/Commission".
word

interchangeably

"corporation/company"

and

Perhaps it would suffice if we used the

shareholder consistently,

terms as you have them.

leaving

use of

the other

As a former editor-in-chief of a

law review, what do you think?

* * *
Jim,
second

draft.

do

not

Unless

feel
the

any

pressure

assignments

to

rush

(expected

to

a

this

afternoon) impose unexpectedly heavy burdens on all of us,
I

think you can concentrate on the quality of the opinion

rather than an early second draft.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 05/14/83
DIRKS
Memorandum to Jim and LFP:
The

purpose

of

this

memo

is

to

consider

the

structure of our opinion.
There is no problem with Parts I and II.
are excellent.

I am primarily interested in a close look

at the structure of Part III.
III

sets

forth

andprinciples
Chiarella's

They

very

well

that are
holding

to

that

be
the

From p. 10 to p. 14, Part
the

analytical

applied,

with

tippee's

background
emphasis on

duty

is

merely

"derivative", and therefore there must be a breach of duty
by

the

tipper.

I

have

suggested

a

revision

of

the

concluding paragraph (p. 14) in my rider A for that page.
Subpart
restructuring.
position.

III-A

It

(p.

commences,

I have a question,

14-19)

may

properly,

need

some

the

SEC's

with

indicated in the margin on

p. 15, as the quote from respondent's brief (?)
state our

rule rather

pp.

are

14-16

quite

SEC's open-ended
material
obligation.

rule

nonpublic

than the SEC's.
good

in

stating

seems to

Apart from this,
and

rejecting

the

that mere possession knowingly of
information

creates

a

fiduciary

2.

Commencing on the last line of p. 16, the draft
devotes the remainder of Subpart III-A to a demonstration
of the undesirable consequences of the SEC's rule.
is emphasized also in notes 19-21.

This

Incidentally, I would

omit n. 22.
It
that

this

is

addressing
Perhaps

seems
not

the

tome,
the

subject to discussion with Jim

proper

place

consequences

it would be better

of

in

the

the

to move

opinion

SEC's

this

for

position.

into the final

substantive section of the opinion (i.e.Part IV).
If

this move

were made,

III-A at the bottom of p. 16.

we would

end Subpart

Having rejected the SEC's

rule, we would move directly to the substance of what is
now Subpart III-B
articulate

a

tried

familiar

19-23).

standard

important part of
have

(p.

a

in

that

lOb-5

law.

IV applies our
does

is where we try to

liability.

the opinion.

revision

concept

of

This

In

a

focuses

It

is

the

most

separate rider,

I

on

a

scienter

(Am I missing something

reasoning to the facts of

it very well.

For

reasons

now would omit reliance on Chazen.

I.

I

will

3.

Part IV (p.
its present form.

26)

is not particularly helpful in

It seems to me, subject to discussion,

that we could move to this part the substance of what we
now have on pp. 17 and 18 with respect to the consequences
of

the SEC's position on market efficiency.

give us a stronger ending to the opinion.
Jim and I can discuss all of this.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

This would

lfp/ss 05/14/83
DIRKS
This will be a rough "shot" at revising some of
the language in our critical Subpart III-B (p. 19).
B

As

we

have

shown,

a

tippee's

liability

is

derivative from a breach of duty by the insider tipper of
which the tippee has notice.

Thus, in order to make out a

tipping case against an individual, it is first necessary
to

establish

information

that
in

shareholders.
had

notice

difficult

the

insider

violation

of

disclosed
his

confidential

fiduciary

duty

to

It is then necessary to show that the tipee
of

such

factual

a

violation.

issues.

determined whether the

At

the

These

can

outset,

it

present
must

be

information was both confidential

and material, questions that arise in every tipping case.
When

these

remains

are

answered

whether

the

violation of duty.

affirmatively,

disclosure

itself

the

question

constituted

a

It is clear under our Rule lOb-5 cases

that liability is imposed only when one acts with scienter
(cite

cases).

There

corporate

executive

disclosed

the

would

be

no

inadvertently

information

relied

breach of
or

even

upon.

duty where
negligently

The

critical

2.

question,

therefore,

is whether

there was

an

intent or

purpose to disclose material nonpublic information to one
who could

trade

shareholders.
but

this

there

a

There

justify

familiar
are

inferences

may

information to the detriment of

Ascertaining

is

courts.

on the

be

a

facts
of

intention may

question
and

often

purpose.

exists

difficult,

confronted

circumstances

wrongful

relationship

be

that

For

the

by

often

example,

insiderand

the

recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or
an

intention

to

benefit

the

recipient.

Also,

such

an

inference may arise where the disclosure was made at the
initiative of

the

insider

rather

than

by

the

recipient

tipee.
Where a breach of fiduciary duty by the insider
is established, liability may be imposed on the tipee only
when he has notice of such a breach.

See supra, at

Again, this is a question of fact that must be resolved in
light

of

all

relevant

circumstances.

A

securities

analyst, making a study of a particular corporation that
includes

interviews

with

its

officers,

acquires

information that may form the basis of a market letter to
clients.
involves

This

is

a

typical

participants

situation,
who

and

customarily

understand

'

.

their

3.

responsibilities and adhere to them.
of course,

where the

facts -- and

But there are cases,
inferences reasonable

drawn from them -- demonstrate the requisite scienter on
the part of both the tipper and the tipee.

This is not

such a case.

(Jim:
will

have

to

appropriate
unnecessary
followed

by

If we adopt the foregoing approach, you
write

it

out

documentation.
elaboration.
your

Part

more
I

This
IV

carefully,

would

avoid,

subpart

III-B

with

limited

and

however,
would

changes.

example, the first sentence in IV would be omitted.)
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

with

be
For

job 05/20/83

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Dirks v. United States, No. 82-276

In my opinion, Mark has been very helpful in his editing and
has done an excellent job.

You will see some new thoughts and some

old thoughts formerly discarded, but I think this represents our
collective judgment on how to write this opinion.

I do not comment

on the editing in great detail, but include Mark's drafts for your
use.
I did want to respond specifically to two notes you wrote to
me on the third draft.

First, Prof. Loss wrote his book before

Cady, Roberts, although his supplement came out in 1969.
please examine n. 25 with care.
addresses your concerns.

Second,

I hope that the new material there
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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Friday, May 20, 1983

Santa Fe International Lobbyist to Plead
Guilty in Insider-Trading Options Cdse
By RoBERT E. TAYLoR
Staff Reporter of THEW ALL STREET

JOURNAL

,In its court filing, the government said
Mr. Tatusko told SEC investigators that he
overheard some unidentified men talking
about a planned takeover of Santa Fe in a
Washington bar. In sworn statements to the
SEC, other brokers said they either didn't
know the source of the tip, or that It was
only a vague rumor, the papers said. The
government said some brokers supported ,
Mr. Tatusko's story, and one claimed he
was at the bar when Mr. Tatusko allegedly
'
t '
overheard the tip.
The government also said Mr. Pe?-cock
supported the bar-tip cover story by swearing that he invested after Mr. Tatusko told
him of the tip. But the SEC staff contends
that Mr. Peacock couldn't have visited Mr.
Tatusko's offices on the morning of Oct. 1 to
get the tip, as he claimed.
According to the charges, Messrs. Peacock, Tatusko and nine other brokers bought
options Oct. 1 for a total of $8,687. Trading in
the stock was halted Oct. 2 for an announcement of the takeover proposal. After trading
resumed, the government said, the brokers
sold their options, mostly on Oct. 6, for a total of $911,039.
This was only a part of the alleged Santa·
Fe insider trading. The SEC has charged
other people with making i insider-trading
profits of $8.5 million on investments of less
than $540,000.
I
·
Mr. Miller said his client Mr. Nugent "realizes he made a serious mistake" when he
"accidentally told a friend," Mr. Peacock,
about the planned takeover. According to
the government, Mr. Nugent concedes "he
wanted to do his friend a favor by giving
him a tip about a good stock prospect;" but
Insists he had no intention of sharing in the
profits. Mr. Miller claims Mr. Nugent even
refused an offer from Mr. Peacock to buy
some shares for Mr. Nugent,
According to Mr. Miller, his client testified falsely before the SEC only after others
had done so, "to protect his family, his job
and a person he thought at the time .was a
close friend."
·

WASHINGTON-Lobbyist John M. Nu·
gent agreed to plead guilty to a charge of
aiding illegal trading based on inside information about the October 1981 takeover of
Santa Fe International Corp. by Kuwait Petroleum Corp.
'
Mr. Nugent, who resigned May 5 as a
vice president of Timmons & Co. a lobbying
firm here, will enter his -plea in federal
court today, according to his lawyer, Warren L. Miller. Mr. Nugent, 39 years old, has
been cooperating with government investigators in the case since January, and is "the
key to breaking the case wide open," Mr.
Miller said. In a news release, the U.S. at. torney's office here called the case "the
most significant insider trading case ever,'-'
and said more court actions are expected.
Santa Fe International isn't related in
any way to Santa Fe Industries Inc.
The government, in papers filed with the
charge against Mr. Nugent, indicates that at
least nine Washington, D.C., stockbrokers
and one of their clients made more than
$900,000 by trading options on Santfi Fe
stock. The government contends that their
purchases resulted from Mr. Nugent's tip.
And the papers say that the continuing criminal grand jury investigation is focusing on
whether some of the brokers gave false testimony or attempted to obstruct the inquiry
into the case by the Securities and Exchange CommiSsion and the grand jury itself. /
In its court papers, the government
claims Mr. Nugent learned of the planned
takeover Sept. 28, 1981, the. day Santa Fe's
lawyers here in the process of retaining
Timmons to lobby Congress and the Reagan
administration in Javor of ·the expected
merger.
According to the government, Mr. Nugent told a friend, Thomas A. Peacock, a
vice president for government and public affairs of International Coal Refining Co.,
which is a subsidiary of Wheelabrator-Frye
' Inc. Mr. Peacock then told his broker, Ste' .! --------~'--------::
ven R. Tatusko, at the Washington firm o(
Bellamah, Neuhauser & Barrett Inc., the
government claims, and Mr. Tatusko passed
the tip to eight other brokers at the -firm and
one at a second brokerage house. ·
Michael R. Klein, Mr. Peacock's attorney, said he couldn't comment on the allegations. "That is the subject of discussions between us and the government," he said.
Mr. Tatusko and Winthrop Securities
couldn't be reached for comment.
Frederick J. Bellamah, a senior partner
in the firm, said he would question whether
any of his brokers knew they were trading
on inside informaton. "I'm convinced in my
own mind that nobQdy in this firm knew this·
was valid informaton," he said. "It was a
tip or a rumor to them." Mr. Bellamah said
none of the firm's brokers knew the information came from Mr. Nugent. He said
some of them may have known that Mr.
Peacock was a source of information, but
noted that Mr. Peacock wasn't connected to
Santa Fe.
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CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

May 31, 1983

Re:

No. 82-276 - Dirks v. SEC

Dear Lewis:
I shall try my hand at a dissent in this case in
due course.
Sincerely,

~

~

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference
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C HAMBERS OF

,
/

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 1, 1983

Re:

82-276 - Dirks v. Securities & Exchange
Commission

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 1, 1983

Re:

No. 82-276-Dirks v. Securities and Exchange
Commission

Dear Lewis:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

,ju.vrtmt <!fltlttt ttf tJrt ~tb ~bdtg
._.ulfhtghm. ~. <!f. 2ll~~.;l
C HAMBERS O F

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 1, 1983
Re:

No. 82-276

Dirks v. SEC

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.:ittpumt C!}aurl af tltt ~tb' .:itldt.&'
~~n.~.C!}. 20~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 2, 1983

Re:

82-276 - Dirks v. SEC

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
cc:
cpm

The Conference

j\n.vrtmt <!}ltltrf cf t4t 'Juittb j\tatt%'
'Jfa,g4iugtcu, ~. <!}. 2llgt~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

June 7, 1983
No. 82-276

Dirks v. SEC

~~

Dear Lewis,

~·

I am sorry that I have not gotten back to
on this case.
I assure you that my delay was occasioned
more by the chaos of May than by anything in your draft!

Let me say that I think that you have done a fine job
with your opinion, and with some changes that I do not think
will affect your basic approach, I am prepared to join it
even though I originally preferred another approach.
My
view was that irrespective of the limits of any proscription
on insider and tippee trading, the information tipped by
Seer ist and Dirks in this case could not have come within
that proscription because it was information concerning a
crime, rather than a legitimate corporate matter. Although
the nature of the information might not matter to the
affected shareholders, I had thought that when the social
and economic good was weighed against possible shareholder
harm, the balance tipped in favor of dissemination of
evidence of a crime.
I was very concerned not to send any
signal that would discourage future "detective" work on the
part of those interested in uncovering corporate fraud.
As I understand your view, it focuses on the purpose of 1
the insider in communicating to the tippee, and not on the 1
character of the information that is communicated.
Unless
the insider acts from an "improper purpose" in communicating
the information, the insider does not breach its fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of the corporation.
If the tippee
does not have some independent fiduciary duty not to trade,
then he is insulated from liability for further tipping or
trading because he cannot be an after-the-fact participant
in the insider's breach of duty. The key is the motivation
of the insider, and from p. 15 of your draft, it appears
that motivation is measured by the subjective good faith of
the insider.
I have two
imary difficulties with the approach as it
now stands.
Firs , I am concerned that the opinion not be
read to preclu
our later holding that information about a
crime cannot be inside information.
I realize that your

..

2.

footnote 23 may be read as reserving this question, but I
would feel more comfortable with an exelici t statement to
this effect, appended to the end of footnote 23.
Perhaps ~'j.u.k4.
you could add something like:
"We do not decide whether the}
./_j /_
information
communicated
was
'material,'
or
whether 4
~~~z-~~~~
information
concerning
corporate
crime
is
properly
characterized as 'inside information.' "
This will make
clear that the Court does not hold that there is insider and
tippee
liability
depending
on
purpose
even
if
the
information communicated concerns crime.

My(ico~nd='xHff icul ty goes to the "e_urpose" test that
you set
~~- !4-lG of the draft. As lt now reaas, the
fact-finder is required to determine the subjective state of
mind of the insider, and liability may be imposed only when
the insider has an improper purpose, or the tippee has some
independent duty not to trade. Although there may be rules
of thumb, e.g., the one you suggest concerning relationship
between the parties, that are used to help determine
subjective intent, it nevertheless appears that the focus of
the inquiry is subjective motivation.
Your focus on j ~~subjective purpose is consistent with, and very much like,
ctyour approach in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185 ~r
{1976), although that opinion is not cited in your draft.
~
The subjective purpose requirement is an inherently
difficult determination to make.
It requires that the
tippee "predict" what is going on in the mind of his tipper.
Although the SEC currently requires a tippee to make an
assessment about whether information is material, that
assessment requires only that the tippee determine whether
"there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote." TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
{1976).
I would imagine that most tippees have a better )
"feel" for whether a shareholder would consider information
important than whether an insider subjectively possesses a
prohibited purpose.
In addition, the purpose test might
prohibit the dissemination of the information in this case.
If Secrist's motivation was proven to be a desire for
vengence against Equity Funding, and if the SEC determined
tnat this was a prohibited purpose, Secrist and Dirks would
violate the securities laws.

j·

~

It seems that the "purpose" discussion rna be omitted ~ '?-1...c:l
without altering your bas1c approach. T en the focus wou d
be on whether Secrist breached a fiduciary duty.
Rather
than offering a general discussion of purpose, one could say

3.

that Secrist simply owed no duty not to relate information}~ t.4.J
concerning fraud
(even if the information were considered
"inside information" under TSC). Since Secrist could not owe
~
a fiduciary duty, there was no duty for Dirks to inherit.
~
to retain a broader a roach, it might be
ene 1 , rather than purpose. That is,
you suggest that if the insider benefits from his tipping,
that may show improper p ur po se .
As I read Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 u.s. 462 (1977), In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), and In re Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968),
the focus is more on whether the insider derives a direct or
indi >ec t. J:>enefit from his disclosure, a rlo th at bene fi t is
pr i mar il:y o f'
pecuniary nature.
An emphasis on benefit
differs from your approach only insofar as it establishes a
more objective indicia of liability.
If, as a factual
matter, the insider did not benefit from his disclosure,
then I am not inclined to be concerned with a further
inquiry into his motivation.
I am not sure about what will
be gained from an inquiry into intent, but from my past
experience on the bench, I know that a great deal of time
will be lost!

a

I am interested to know your thoughts on these points.

Sincerely,

Justice Powell

·,

.

~

~

June 9,

82-276 Dirks v. SEC
''

Dear Sandra:
I have now had an opportunity to get back to I'i rk.s
in light of your letter. AA you know, with your approval
and min~, Gary and Ji.m Browninq have workec'f out some changP.s"
that I hnvn reviewed this morning.
~hey have ~one well.
It seems to me that your
sugqestions have been incorporatPd into the opinion clearly,
and that they "fit" vPry well.

Tn a more ~undamental sense, T am qrat~ful to you
for suggesti0ns that ! think are quite constructive.
I wiJJ need to keep the ot~er "joins", hut cannot
there wil.l be. any obtection.
Sincerely,

'·

.:rustic£> O'Connor:

lfp/ss

,.,

,,
t-'f.-;.c"*'

,.

."

4'

,.;-:~'-Cl!Ju•.--·· ·

John:
As vou have been good enough to ioin me in this
case, · r write this note to say that the only changes in this ''
second draft (other than stylistic) have resulteti from my
conversations with Sandra.

<)., Th·e reasoning of the opinion is not chanqed. Sa~-::
dra ihought my r~ference to the "purpose" of the insider
~
(see pp. 15-17 of first draft) \'las unnecessarily subjective. ·
She prefers using the more objective term: "benefit" to the
insider, direct or indirect (see po. 17, 18 seconn draft).
As the Chief has not voted, Sandra's vote
will ~ssure a Court. I al.so heliev~ the change~ are
constructive.

!

'l

•.

J.\,

I am circulating the second draft, and will assume
your approval unless I hear to the contrary,
Sincerely,

,Just ice
Justice
Justice

'j,

..

"

.r

,,

~~rtmt
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 10, 1983

Re:

No. 82-276

Dirks v. SEC

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 14, 1983

Re:

No. 82-276, Dirks v. Sec

Dear Lewis:
I join.
egards,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 24, 1983

Re: No. 82-276 - Dirks v. SEC
Dear Lewis:
Because of the time pressure, I give you herewith a
xerox copy of the dissenting opinion I have formulated in
this case.
Sincerely,
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A'he Court today

tect~
ions provided

Act of
(1980)

34.

still

investors by §lOi b) of the .

''-13

the pro-

~ec}l riti~
Exchange

(l/-/18~~

~~k'")

See Chiarella v. United States, 445 u . • 222, 246

(dissenting opinion).

The device employed in this case

engrafts a special motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty
doctrine.

This

violation of

innovation

an

excuses

insider's duty

a

knowing

to shareholders

does not ?Ct from a motive of personal gain.

and
if

intentional
the

insider

Even on the ex-

traordinary facts of this case, such an innovation is not justified.
I

As the Court recognizes, ante, at 11, n. 17, the facts here
are unusual.

After a meeting with Ronald Secrist, a former Equi-

ty Funding employee, on March 7, 1973, App. 226, petitioner Ray-

1 see, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
u.s. 723 (1975); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 u.s. 222 (1980); Aaron v. SEC,
446 u.s. 680 (1980).
This trend frustrates the congressional
intent that the securities laws be interpreted flexibly to protect investors, see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
u.s. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. Cap1tal Ga1ns Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 u.s. 180, 186 (1963), and to regulate deceptive practices
"detrimental to the interests of the investor," S. Rep. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1934); see H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d
Cong. , 2d Sess. , 10 ( 1934) • Moreover, the Court continues to
refuse to accord to SEC administrative decisions the deference it
normally gives to an agency's interpretation of its own statute.
See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 u.s. 132 (1982) •

.'

- 2 mond

Dirks

found

himself

in

possession

of

material

information of massive fraud within the company.2

nonpublic

In the Court's

words, "[h]e uncovered ••• startling information that required no
analysis or
Ante,

exercise

at 11,

n.

of

judgment as

In disclosing

17.

to

its market relevance."

that

information to Dirks,

Secrist intended that Dirks would disseminate the information to
his

clients,

those

clients

would

unload

their

Equity

Funding

securities on the market, and the price would fall precipitously,
thereby triggering a reaction from the authorities.

App. 16, 25,

27.
Dirks

complied

with

his

informant's

wishes.

Instead

of

reporting that information to the Securities and Exchange Commission

(SEC or Commission)

or to other regulatory agencies, Dirks

began to disseminate the information to his clients and undertook
his own investigation.3

One of his first steps was to direct his

2 unknown to Dirks, Secrist also told his story to New York
insurance regulators the same day.
App. 23.
They immediately
assured themselves that Equity Funding's New York subsidiary had
sufficient assets to cover its outstanding policies and then
passed on the information to California regulators who in turn
informed Illinois regulators.
Illinois investigators, later
joined by California officials, conducted a surprise audit of
Equity Funding's Illinois subsidiary, id., at 87-88, to find $22
million of the subsidiary's assets missing.
On March 30, these
authorities seized control of the Illinois subsidiary.
Id., at
271.
3 In the same administrative proceeding at issue here, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Dirks' clients--five
institutional investment advisors--violated §17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77q(a), §lO(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 u.s.c. §78j(b), and Rule lOb-5, 17 CFR
§240.10b-5, by trading on Dirks' tips.
App. 297.
All the clients were censured, except Dreyfus Corporation.
The ALJ found
that Dreyfus had made significant efforts to disclose the inferFootnote continued on next page.
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associates at Delafield Childs

to draw up a

clients holding Equity Funding securities.

list of Delafield
On March 12, eight

days before Dirks flew to Los Angeles to investigate Seer ist' s
story, he reported the full allegations to Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., which on March 15 and 16 sold approximately $1.2 million of Equity securities. 4

See id., at 199.

As

he gathered more information, he selectively disclosed it to his
clients.
"hard"

To those holding Equity Funding securities he gave the

story--all

the

allegations;

others

received

the

"soft"

story--a recitation of vague factors that might reflect adversely
on Equity Funding's management.

See id., at 211, n. 24.

Dirks' attempts to disseminate the information to nonclients
were feeble, at best.
Lawson,
nal.

On March 12, he left a message for Herbert

the San Francisco bureau chief of The Wall Street Jour-

Not until March 19 and 20 did he call Lawson again,

outline the situation.

and

William Blundell, a Journal investigative

reporter based in Los Angeles, got in touch with Dirks about his

mation to Goldman, Sachs, the purchaser of its securities. App.
299, 301. None of Dirks' clients appealed these determinations.
App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2, n. 1.
4 The Court's im£ lj cit sugg est i on that Dirks' did not gain
by this selective d l:Ssemination of advice, ante, at 2, n. 2, is
inaccurate.
The ALJ found that because of Dirks' information,
Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., directed business
to Delafield Childs that generated approximately $25,000 in commissions.
App. 199, 204-205.
While it is true that the exact
economic benefit gained by Delafield Childs due to Dirks' activities is unknowable because of the structure of compensation in
the securities market, there can be no doubt that Delafield and
Dirks gained both monetary rewards and enhanced reputations for
"looking after" their clients.

- 4 March 20 telephone call.
Los Angeles.

On March 21, Dirks met with Blundell in

Blundell began his own investigation,

relying

in

part on Dirks' contacts, and on March 23 telephoned Stanley Sporkin,

the SEC's Deputy Director of Enforcement.

On March 26, the

next business day, Sporkin and his staff interviewed Blundell and
asked to see Dirks the following morning.
the New York Stock Exchange

at about

Trading was halted by

the

talking to Los Angeles SEC personnel.

same

time Dirks was

The next day, March 28,

the SEC suspended trading in Equity Funding securities.

By that

time, Dirks' clients had unloaded close to $15 million of Equity
Funding stock and the price had plummeted from $26 to $15.

The

effect of Dirks' selective dissemination of Secrist's information
was that Dirks' clients were able to shift the losses that were
inevitable due

to

the Equity Funding fraud

from themselves

to

uninformed market participants.
II
A

No one questions that Secrist himself could not trade on his
inside information to the disadvantage of uninformed shareholders
and purchasers of Equity Funding securities.
ed States as Amicus Curiae 19,

n.

12.

See Brief for Unit-

Unlike

the printer

in

Chiarella, Secrist stood in a fiduciary relationship with these
shareholders.
ers

have

an

As the Court states, ante, at 5, corporate insidaffirmative

shareholders of
227.

This

corporation's

duty

of

the corporation.

duty

extends

securities.

as
Id.,

disclosure

when

See Chiarella,
well
at 227,

to
n.

trading
445

purchasers
8,

with

U.S.,
of

at
the

citing Gratz v.

- 5 -

Claughton,

187 F.2d

46,

49

(CA2),

cert.

denied,

341

u.s.

920

(1951).
The Court also acknowledges

that Seer ist could not do by

proxy what he was prohibited from doing personally.

Ante, at 12;

Mosser v. Darrow, 341

u.s.

ly what Secrist did.

Secrist used Dirks to disseminate informa-

tion to Dirks'
purchasers.

clients,

267, 272 (1951).

who

in

turn dumped

But this is precise-

stock on unknowing

Secrist thus intended Dirks to injure the purchasers

of Equity Funding securities to whom Secrist had a duty to disclose.

Accepting the Court's view of tippee liability, 5 it ap-

pears that Dirk's knowledge of this breach makes him liable as a
participant

in

Chiarella, 445

the

u.s.,

breach

after

the

fact.

Ante,

at

12,

19;

at 230, n. 12.
B

The Court holds,

however,

that Dirks is not liable because

Secrist did not violate his duty; according to the Court, this is
so because Secrist did not have the improper purpose of personal
gain.
new,

Ante,

at 15-16, 18-19.

In so doing, the Court imposes a

subjective limitation on the scope of the duty owed by in-

siders to shareholders.

The novelty of this limitation is re-

flected in the Court's lack of support for it. 6

5 I interpret the Court's op1n1on to impose liability on
tippees like Dirks when the tippee knows or has reason to know
that the information is material and nonpublic and was obtained
through a breach of duty by selective revelation or otherwise.
See In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971).
6 The Court cites only Professor Brudney to support its
rule.
Ante, at 16, quoting from his article, Insiders, OutsidFootnote continued on next page.

- 6 The

insider's

shareholders.?

duty

is owed

directly

to

the

corporation's

See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary

Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 5
(1982); 3A W. Fletcher, Private Corporations §1168.2, pp. 288-289
(1975).

As Chiarella recognized, it is based on the relationship

of trust and confidence between the insider and the shareholder.
445

u.s.,

at 228.

That relationship assures the shareholder that

the insider may not take actions that will harm him unfairly. 8

ers, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 348 (1979).
Ironically, Professor
Brudney's quoted statement appears in the context of his assertion that the duty of insiders to disclose prior to trading with
shareholders is in large part a mechanism to correct the information available to noninsiders.
Professor Brudney simply recognizes that the most common motive for breaching this duty is
personal gain; he does not state, however, that the duty prevents
only personal aggrandizement.
Id. , at 3 45-348.
Surely, the
Court does not now adopt Professor Brudney's access-toinformation theory, a close cousin to the equality-of-information
theory it accuses the SEC of harboring. See ante, at 8-10.
7 The Court correctly distinguishes this duty from the duty
of an insider to the corporation not to mismanage corporate affairs or to misappropriate corporate assets.
Ante, at 5, n. 9.
That duty also can be breached when the insider trades in corporate securities on the basis of inside information. Although a
shareholder suing in the name of the corporation can recover for
the corporation damages for any injury the insider causes by the
·breach of this distinct duty, Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,
498, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1969); see Thomas v. Roblins Industries, Inc., 520 F.2d 1393, 1397 (CA3 1975), insider trading
generally does not injure the corporation itself.
See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A PostChiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2, n. 5, 28, n. 111
(1982).
8As it did in Chiarella, 445 u.s., at 226-229, the Court
adopts the Cady, Roberts formulation of the duty. Ante, at 5-6.
"Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal
elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving
Footnote continued on next page.

- 7 The affirmative duty of disclosure protects against this injury.
See Pepper v. Litton, 308
Rap ide,

u.s.,

213

U.S.

at 228,

n.

419,
10;

u.s.

4 31-434
cf.

295, 307, n. 15 (1939); Strong v.
( 1909) ;

Pepper,

308

see also Chiarella,

u.s.,

at 307

4 45

(fiduciary

obligation to corporation exists for corporation's protection) •

/ ·~

c

~ the

The _fact
that
the_insider
himself
does
"_ _
__
___
---...____.._
_ _not
_ _benefit
_ _"-?_
breach does

not eradicate

the

shareholder's

~

injury. 9

Cf.

Re-

access, directly or indirectly, to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing." In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted).
The
first element--on which Chiarella's holding
rests-establishes the type of relationship that must exist between the
parties before a duty to disclose is present.
The second--not
addressed by Chiarella--identifies the harm that the duty protects against: the inherent unfairness to the shareholder caused
when an insider trades with him on the basis of undisclosed inside information.
9 without doubt, breaches of the insider's duty occur most
often when an insider seeks personal aggrandizement at the expense of shareholders. Because of this, descriptions of the duty
to disclose are often coupled with statements that the duty prevents unjust enrichment.
See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 912, n. 15 (1961); Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev.,
at 19. Private gain is certainly a strong motivation for breaching the duty.
It is, however, not an element of the breach of this duty.
The reference to personal gain in Cady, Roberts, for example, is
appended to the first element underlying the duty which requires
that an insider have a special relationship to corporate information that he cannot appropriate for his own benefit. See n. 8,
supra.
It does not limit the second element which addresses the
injury to the shareholder and is at issue here.
See ibid.
In
fact, Cady, Roberts, describes the duty more precisely in a later
footnote: "In the circumstances, [the insider's] relationship to
his customers was such that he would have a duty not to take a
Footnote continued on next page.

- 8 statement

(Second)

of

Trusts

§205,

Comments

c

and

d

(1959)

(trustee liable for acts causing diminution of value of trust); 3
A. Scott on Trusts §205, p. 1665

(1967)

losses to trust caused by his breach) •

(trustee liable for any
It makes no difference to

the shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or intended
to gain personally from the transaction;
has lost because of the
tion.

the shareholder still

insider's misuse of nonpublic informa-

The duty is addressed not to the insider's motives,lO but

to his actions and their consequences on the shareholder.

Per-

sonal gain is not an element of the breach of this duty.ll

position adverse to them, not to take secret profits at their
expense, not to misrepresent facts to them, and in general to
place their interests ahead of his own." 40 S.E.C., at 916, n.
31.
This statement makes clear that enrichment of the insider
himself is simply one of the results the duty attempts to prevent.
lOof course, an insider is not liable in a Rule lOb-S administrative action unless he has the r~quisite scienter. Aaron
v. SEC, 446 u.s. 680, 691 (1980).
He must know or intend that
h~uct violate his duty.
Secrist oEv1ously knew and intended that DirKs woula cause trading on the inside information and
that Equity Funding shareholders would be harmed. The scienter
requirement addresses the intent necessary to support liability;
it does not address the motives behind the intent.

3

7 ('

-

11The Court seems concerned that this case bears on insiders' contacts with analysts for valid corporate reasons.
Ante,
at 10-11. It also fears that insiders may not be able to determine whether the information transmitted is material or nonpublic.
Id., at 14-15.
When the disclosure is to an investment }
banker -or some other adviser, however, there is normally no
breach because the insider does not have scienter: he does not
intend that the inside information be used for trading urposes
to t e
s d anta e o s are o ers.
ore ver,
e 1ns1 r in \
good faith does not believe that the information is material or
nonpublic, he also lacks the necessary scienter.
Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185, 197 (1976).
In fact, the scienter
requirement functions in part to protect good faith errors of
this type. Id., at 211, n. 31.
--Footnote continued on next page.

·
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- 9 This

conclusion

Mosser v. Darrow, 341
analogous

is

borne

u.s.

situation:

out

by

267 (1951).

the Court's decision

There, the Court faced an

reorganization

a

in

trustee

-

engaged

two

employee-promoters of subsidiaries of the companies being reorga-

---------------nized to provide services
________...,..

-

that the trustee considered to be es-

sential to the successful operation of the trust.
secure

their

services,

the

trustee

expressly

In order to

agreed

'

---

-

--

with

the

employees that they could continue to trade in the securities of
"--_____...,

.....___

the subsidiaries.

The employees then turned their inside posi-

L-

tion into substantial profits at the expense both of the trust
and of otner holders of the companies' securities.
The Court acknowledged that the trustee neither intended to
nor did in actual fact benefit from this arrangement; his motives
were completely selfless and devoted to the companies.
at 275.

----

341 U.S.,

The Court, nevertheless, found the trustee liable to the

estate for the activities of the employees he authorized. 12

The

Should the adviser receiving the information use it to
trade, it may breach a separate contractual or other duty to the
corporation not to misuse the information.
Absent such an arrangement, however, the adviser is not barred by Rule lOb-S from
trading on that information if it believes that the insider has
not breached any duty to his shareholders. See Walton v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 798-799 (CA2 1980).
The situation here, of course, is radically different.
Ante, 11, n. 17 (Dirks received information reqyiring ~ nQ ~nalysis
"as to its market relevance"). Seer ist divulged the fn"formation
for the precise purpose of causing Dirks' clients to trade on it.
I fail to understand how imposing liability on Dirks will affect
legitimate insider-analyst contacts.
12 The duty involved in Mosser was the duty to the corporation in trust not to misappropriate its assets.
This duty, of
course, differs from the duty to shareholders involved in this
case.
See n. 7, supra.
Trustees are also subject to a higher
Footnote contrnued on next page.
~

- 10 Court described the trustee's defalcation as "a willful and deliberate setting up of an interest in employees adverse to that
of the trust."

Id., at 272.

trustee's personal gain,
were irrelevant;

The breach did not depend on the

and his motives in violating his duty

like Secrist, the trustee intended that others

would abuse the inside information for their personal gain.
Dodge v.

Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich.

684-685 (1919)

459, 506-509, 170 N.W.

Cf.
668,

(Henry Ford's philanthropic motives did not permit

him to set Ford Motor Company dividend policies to benefit public
at expense of shareholders).
As Mosser demonstrates, the breach consists in taking action
disadvantageous to the person to whom one owes a duty.
L(

In this

\\

case, Secrist owed a duty to purchasers of Equity Funding shares.
The

------------------~-------------

Court's addition of the bad purpose element to a breach of

fiduciary duty claim is flatly inconsistent with the principle of
Mosser.

I do not join this limitation of the scope of an insid-

e~fiduciary duty to shareholders.l3

f

staodaid of care than scienter.
3 A. Scott on Trusts §201, p.
1G50 (1967). In addition~ strict trustees are bound not to trade
in securities at all.
See Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev., at 2,
n. 5. The.se differences, however, are irrelevant to the pr inciple of Mosser that the motive of personal gain is not essential
to a trustee's liability.
In Mosser, as here, personal gain
accrued to the tippees. See 341 u.s., at 273.
13 Although I disagree in principle with the Court's requirement of an improper motive, I also note that the requirement
adds to the administrative and judicial burden in Rule lOb-5
cases.
Assuming the validity of the requirement, the SEC's
approach--a violation occurs when the insider knows that the
tippee will trade with the information, Brief for SEC 31--can be
seen as a presumption that the insider gains from the tipping.
The Court now requires a case-by-case determination, thus prohibFootnote continued on next page.

- 11 III
The
law,

improper purpose requirement not only has no basis in

but it rests implicitly on a policy that I cannot accept.
'"'\....

?

The Court justifies Secrist's and Dirks' action because the general

benefit

shareholders

derived

from

outweighed

the

violation

the harm caused

of Secrist's duty

to

to those shareholders,

see Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. Lawyer 517, 550 (1982); Easterbrook,
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
Production of Information,

1981

s.

Ct.

Rev.

words, because the end justified the means.

309,

and the

338--in other

Under this view, the

benefit conferred on society by Secrist's and Dirks'

activities

may be paid for with the losses caused to shareholders trading
with Dirks' clients.l4

iting such a presumption.
The Court acknowledges the burdens and difficulties of this
approach, but asserts that a principle is needed to guide market
participants. Ante, at 16.
I fail to see how the Court's rule
has any practical advantage over the SEC's presumption.
The
Court's approach is particularly difficult to administer when the
insider is not directly enriched monetarily by the trading he
induces. For example, the Court does not explain why the benefit
Secrist obtained--the good feeling of exposing a fraud and his
enhanced reputation--is any different from the benefit to an
insider who gives the information as a gift to a friend or relative.
Under the Court's somewhat cynical view, gifts involve
personal gain.
See ibid.
Secrist surely gave Dirks a gift of
the commissions Dirks made on the deal in order to induce him to
disseminate the information. The distinction between pure altruism and self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries;
there is no reason to believe that courts and administrative law
judges will have an easier time with it.
l4This position seems
insider trading should be
information to the market.
Footnote

little different from the theory that
permitted because it brings relevant
See H. Manne, Insider Trading and the
continued on next page.

- 12 Although Secrist's general motive to expose the Equity Funding

fr~ud

w::_

lau ~~ e,

the means he chose were not.

Moreover,

even assuming that Dirks played a substantial role in exposing
the fraud, 1 5 he and his clients should not profit from the information they obtained from Secrist.
has

been against public policy.

Misprision of a felony long
Branz burg v.

665, 696-697 (1972); see 18 u.s.c. §4.

Hayes,

408 U.s.

A person cannot condition

his transmission of information of a crime on a financial award.
As a citizen, Dirks had at least an ethical obligation to report
the information to the proper authorities.
20.

See ante, at 13, n.

The Court's holding is deficient in policy terms not because

it fails

to create a

legal norm out of that ethical norm,

see

ibid., but because it actually rewards Dirks for his aiding and
abetting.

-

Dirks and Secrist were under a duty to disclose the informa'
__....,
tion or to refrain from trading on it. 1 6 I agree that disclosure

Stock Market 59-76, 111-146 (1966); Manne, Insider Trading and
the Law Professors, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 547, 565-576 (1970). That
position, which sits at the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum from the much maligned equality-of-information theory, has
never been adopted by Congress or ratified by the Court.
See
Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev., at 1 and n. 1. The theory rejects
the existence of any enforceable principle of fairness between
market participants.
15 The Court uncritically accepts Dirks' own view of his
role in uncovering the Equity Funding fraud. See ante, at 11, n.
17.
It ignores the fact that Secrist gave the same information
at the same time to state insurance regulators, who proceeded to
expose massive fraud in a major Equity Funding subsidiary. The
fraud surfaced before Dirks ever spoke to the SEC.
16 secrist did pass on his information to regulatory authorities.
His good but misguided motive may be the reason the
Footnote continued on next page.

- 13 in this case would have been difficult.

Ante, at 13, n.

20.

I

also recognize that the SEC seemingly has been less than proficient in its view of the nature of disclosure necessary to satisfy

the disclose-or-refrain duty.

The Commission

tells persons

with inside information that they cannot trade on that information unless they disclose; it refuses, however, to tell them how
to

disclose. 17

{1973)

See

In

re

Faberge,

Inc.,

45

S.E.C.

249,

256

{disclosure requires public release through public media

designed to reach investing public generally) .

This seems to be

a less than sensible policy, which it is incumbent on the Commission to correct.
the

The Court, however, has no authority to remedy

problem by opening

a

hole

in the congressionally mandated

prohibition on insider trading, thus rewarding insider trading.
IV
In

my

view,

Secrist

violated

his

duty

to Equity Funding

SEC did not join him in the administrative proceedings against
Dirks and his clients. The fact that the SEC, in an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, did not charge Secrist under Rule lOb-S
says nothing about the applicable law.
Cf. ante, at 18, n. 25
{suggesting otherwise).
Nor does the fact that the SEC took an
unsupportable legal position in proceedings below indicate that
neither Secrist nor Dirks is liable under any theory. Cf. ibid.
{same).
17At oral argument, the SEC's view was that Dirks' obligation to disclose would not be satisfied by reporting the information to the SEC. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, quoted ante, at 13, n. 20.
This position is in apparent conflict with the statement in its
brief that speaks favorably of a safe harbor rule under which an
investor satisfies his obligation to disclose by reporting the
information to the Commission and then waiting a set period before trading.
Brief for SEC 43-44.
The SEC, however, has neither proposed nor adopted a rule to this effect, and thus persons
such as Dirks have no real option other than to refrain from
trading.
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shareholders

by

Dirks with the

transmitting

material

nonpublic

information

to

intention that Dirks would cause his clients to

trade on that information.

Dirks, therefore, was under a duty to

make the information publicly available or to refrain from actions that he knew would lead to trading.
his clients

to trade,

he violated §10 {b)

Because Dirks caused
and Rule lOb-5.

Any

other result is a disservice to this country's attempt to provide
fair and efficient capital markets.

I dissent.
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dissenting.
The Court today takes still another step to limit the protections provided investors by § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 1 See Chiarella v. United States, 445
U. S. 222, 246 (1980) (dissenting opinion). The device employed in this case engrafts a special motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty doctrine. This innovation excuses a knowing and intentional violation of an insider's duty
to shareholders if the insider does not act from a motive of
personal gain. Even on the extraordinary facts of this case,
such an innovation is not justified.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN,

See, e. g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723
(1975); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976); Piper v. ChrisCraft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1 (1977); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U. S. 222 (1980); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680 (1980). This trend frustrates the congressional intent that the securities laws be interpreted flexibly to protect investors, see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U. S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U. S. 180, 186 (1963), and to regulate deceptive practices "detrimental to
the interests of the investor," S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 18
(1934); see H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1934). Moreover, the Court continues to refuse to accord to SEC administrative decisions the deference it normally gives to an agency's interpretation of its
own statute. See, e. g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U. S. 132 (1982).
1
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I

As the Court recognizes, ante, at 11, n. 17, the facts here
are unusual. After a meeting with Ronald Secrist, a former
Equity Funding employee, on March 7, 1973, App. 226, petitioner Raymond Dirks found himself in possession of material
nonpublic information of massive fraud within the company. 2
In the Court's words, "[h]e uncovered ... startling information that required .no analysis or exercise of judgment as to
its market relevance." Ante, at 11, n. 17. In disclosing that
information to Dirks, Secrist intended that Dirks would disseminate the information to his clients, those clients would
unload their Equity Funding securities on the market, and
the price would fall precipitously, thereby triggering a reaction from the authorities. App. 16, 25, 27.
Dirks complied with his informant's wishes. Instead of reporting that information to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission) or to other regulatory
agencies, Dirks began to disseminate the information to his
clients and undertook his own investigation. 3 One of his
2

Unknown to Dirks, Secrist also told his story to New York insurance
regulators the same day. App. 23. They immediately assured themselves that Equity Funding's New York subsidiary had sufficient assets to
cover its outstanding policies and then passed on the information to California regulators who in turn informed Illinois regulators. Illinois investigators, later joined by California officials, conducted a surprise audit of Equity Funding's Illinois subsidiary, id., at 87-88, to find $22 million of the
subsidiary's assets missing. On March 30, these authorities seized control
of the Illinois subsidiary. !d., at 271.
3
In the same administrative proceeding at issue here, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Dirks' clients-five institutional investment advisors-violated § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U. S. C. § 77q(a), § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U. S. C. §78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5, by trading on
Dirks' tips. App. 297. All the clients were censured, except Dreyfus
Corporation. The ALJ found that Dreyfus had made significant efforts to
disclose the information to Goldman, Sachs, the purchaser of its securities.
App. 299, 301. None of Dirks' clients appealed these determinations.
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first steps was to direct his associates at Delafield Childs to
draw up a list of Delafield clients holding Equity Funding securities. On March 12, eight days before Dirks flew to Los
Angeles to investigate Secrist's story, he reported the full
allegations to Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc.,
which on March 15 and 16 sold approximately $1.2 million of
Equity securities. 4 See id., at 199. As he gathered more
information, he selectively disclosed it to his clients. To
those holding Equity Funding securities he gave the "hard"
story-all the allegations; others received the "soft" story-a
recitation of vague factors that might reflect adversely on
Equity Funding's management. See id., at 211, n. 24.
Dirks' attempts to disseminate the information to
nonclients were feeble, at best. On March 12, he left a message for Herbert Lawson, the San Francisco bureau chief of
The Wall Street Journal. Not until March 19 and 20 did he
call Lawson again, and outline the situation. William
Blundell, a Journal investigative reporter based in Los Angeles, got in touch with Dirks about his March 20 telephone
call. On March 21, Dirks met with Blundell in Los Angeles.
Blundell began his own investigation, relying in part on
Dirks' contacts, and on March 23 telephoned Stanley Sporkin,
the SEC's Deputy Director of Enforcement. On March 26,
the next business day, Sporkin and his staff interviewed
Blundell and asked to see Dirks the following morning.
App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2, n. 1.
'The Court's implicit suggestion that Dirks' did not gain by this selective dissemination of advice, ante, at 2, n. 2, is inaccurate. The ALJ found
that because of Dirks' information, Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., directed business to Delafield Childs that generated approximately $25,000 in commissions. App. 199, 204-205. While it is true that
the exact economic benefit gained by Delafield Childs due to Dirks' activities is unknowable because of the structure of compensation in the securities market, there can be no doubt that Delafield and Dirks gained both
monetary rewards and enhanced reputations for "looking after" their
clients.
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Trading was halted by the New York Stock Exchange at
about the same time Dirks was talking to Los Angeles SEC
personnel. The next day, March 28, the SEC suspended
trading in Equity Funding securities. By that time, Dirks'
clients had unloaded close to $15 million of Equity Funding
stock and the price had plummeted from $26 to $15. The effect of Dirks' selective dissemination of Secrist's information
was that Dirks' clients were able to shift the losses that were
inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselves
to uninformed market participants.
II
A

No one questions that Secrist himself could not trade·on his
inside information to the disadvantage of uninformed shareholders and purchasers of Equity Funding securities. See
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 12. Unlike
the printer in Chiarella, Secrist stood in a fiduciary relationship with these shareholders. As the Court states, ante, at
5, corporate insiders have an affirmative duty of disclosure
when trading with shareholders of the corporation. See
Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 227. This duty extends as well to
purchasers of the corporation's securities. I d., at 227, n. 8,
citing Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 920 (1951).
The Court also acknowledges that Secrist could not do by
proxy what he was prohibited from doing personally. Ante,
at 12; Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). But this
is precisely what Secrist did. Secrist used Dirks to disseminate information to Dirks' clients, who in turn dumped stock
on unknowing purchasers. Secrist thus intended Dirks to injure the purchasers of Equity Funding securities to whom
Secrist had a duty to disclose. Accepting the Court's view of
tippee liability, 5 it appears that Dirk's knowledge of this
5

I interpret the Court's opinion to impose liability on tippees like Dirks
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breach makes him liable as a participant in the breach after
the fact. Ante, at 12, 19; Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.
B
The Court holds, however, that Dirks is not liable because
Secrist did not violate his duty; according to the Court, this is
so because Secrist did not have the improper purpose of personal gain. Ante, at 15-16, 1~19. In so doing, the Court
imposes a new, subjective limitation on the scope of the duty
owed by insiders to shareholders. The novelty of this limitation is reflected in the Court's lack of support for it. 6
The insider's duty is owed directly to the corporation's
shareholders. 7 See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiwhen the tippee knows or has reason to know that the infonnation is material and nonpublic and was obtained through a breach of duty by selective
revelation or otherwise. See In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C.
633, 641 (1971).
"The Court cites only Professor Brudney to support its rule. Ante, at
16, quoting from his article, Insiders, Outsiders, and Infonnational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 348
(1979). Ironically, Professor Brudney's quoted statement appears in the
context of his assertion that the duty of insiders to disclose prior to trading
with shareholders is in large part a mechanism to correct the infonnation
available to noninsiders. Professor Brudney simply recognizes that the
most common motive for breaching this duty is personal gain; he does not
state, however, that the duty prevents only personal aggrandizement.
Id., at 345-348. Surely, the Court does not now adopt Professor
Brudney's access-to-infonnation theory, a close cousin to the equality-ofinfonnation theory it accuses the SEC of harboring. See ante, at 8-10.
7
The Court correctly distinguishes this duty from the duty of an insider
to the corporation not to mismanage corporate affairs or to misappropriate
corporate assets. Ante, at 5, n. 9. That duty also can be breached when
the insider trades in corporate securities on the basis of inside infonnation.
Although a shareholder suing in the name of the corporation can recover
for the corporation damages for any injury the insider causes by the breach
of this distinct duty, Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N. Y.2d 494, 498, 248
N. E. 2d 910, 912 (1969); see Thomas v. Roblins Industries, Inc., 520 F. 2d
1393, 1397 (CA3 1975), insider trading generally does not injure the cor-
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duciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif.
L. Rev. 1, 5 (1982); 3A W. Fletcher, Private Corporations
§ 1168.2, pp. 288-289 (1975). As Chiarella recognized, it is
based on the relationship of trust and ~onfidence between the
insider and the shareholder. 445 U. S., at 228. That relationship assures the shareholder that the insider may not
take actions that will harm him unfairly. 8 The affirmative
duty of disclosure protects against this injury. See Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 307, n. 15 (1939); Strong v. Rapide,
213 U. S. 419, 431-434 (1909); see also Chiarella, 445 U. S.,
at 228, n. 10; cf. Pepper, 308 U. S., at 307 (fiduciary obligation to corporation exists for corporation's protection).

c
The fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the
breach does not eradicate the shareholder's injury. 9 Cf. Reporation itself. See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2, n. 5, 28, n. 111
(1982).
8
As it did in Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 226-229, the Court adopts the
Cady, Roberts formulation of the duty. Ante, at 5-6.
"Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing." In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S. E. C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted).
The first element-on which Chiarella's holding rests-establishes the
type of relationship that must exist between the parties before a duty to
disclose is present. The second-not addressed by Chiarellar-identifies
the harm that the duty protects against: the inherent unfairness to the
shareholder caused when an insider trades with him on the basis of undisclosed inside information.
9
Without doubt, breaches of the insider's duty occur most often when
an insider seeks personal aggrandizement at the expense of shareholders.
Because of this, descriptions of the duty to disclose are often coupled with
statements that the duty prevents unjust enrichment. See, e. g., In re
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statement (Second) of Trusts § 205, Comments c and d (1959)
(trustee liable for acts causing diminution of value of trust); 3
A. Scott on Trusts § 205, p. 1665 (1967) (trustee liable for any
losses to trust caused by his breach). It makes no difference
to the shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or
intended to gain personally from the transaction; the shareholder still has lost because of the insider's misuse of nonpublic information. The duty is addressed not to the insider's
motives, 10 but to his actions and their consequences on the
shareholder. Personal gain is not an element of the breach
of this duty. 11
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E . C. 907, 912, n. 15 (1961); Langevoort, 70
Calif. L. Rev., at 19. Private gain is certainly a strong motivation for
breaching the duty.
It is, however, not an element of the breach of this duty. The reference
to personal gain in Cady, Roberts, for example, is appended to the first element underlying the duty which requires that an insider have a special
relationship to corporate information that he cannot appropriate for his
own benefit. See n. 8, supra. It does not limit the second element which
addresses the injury to the shareholder and is at issue here. See ibid. In
fact, Cady, Roberts, describes the duty more precisely in a later footnote:
"In the circumstances, [the insider's] relationship to his customers was
such that he would have a duty not to take a position adverse to them, not
to take secret profits at their expense, not to misrepresent facts to them,
and in general to place their interests ahead of his own." 40 S. E. C. , at
916, n. 31. This statement makes clear that enrichment of the insider himself is simply one of the results the duty attempts to prevent.
10
Of course, an insider is not liable in a Rule 10b--5 administrative action
unless he has the requisite scienter. Aaron v. SEC , 446 U. S. 680, 691
(1980). He must know or intend that his conduct violate his duty. Secrist
obviously knew and intended that Dirks would cause trading on the inside
information and that Equity Funding shareholders would be harmed. The
scienter requirement addresses the intent necessary to support liability; it
does not address the motives behind the intent.
11
The Court seems concerned that this case bears on insiders' contacts
with analysts for valid corporate reasons. Ante, at 10-11. It also fears
that insiders may not be able to determine whether the information transmitted is material or nonpublic. Id., at 14-15. When the disclosure is to
an investment banker or some other adviser, however, there is normally no
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This conclusion is borne out by the Court's decision in
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267 (1951). There, the Court
faced an analogous situation: a reorganization trustee engaged two employee-promoters of subsidiaries of the companies being reorganized to provide services that the trustee
considered to be essential to the successful operation of the
trust. In order to secure their services, the trustee expressly agreed with the employees that they could continue
to trade in the securities of the subsidiaries. The employees
then turned their inside position into substantial profits at
the expense both of the trust and of other holders of the companies' securities.
The Court acknowledged that the trustee neither intended
to nor did in actual fact benefit from this arrangement; his
motives were completely selfless and devoted to the companies. 341 U. S., at 275. The Court, nevertheless, found the
trustee liable to the estate for the activities of the employees
he authorized. 12 The Court described the trustee's defalcabreach because the insider does not have scienter: he does not intend that
the inside information be used for trading purposes to the disadvantage of
shareholders. Moreover, if the insider in good faith does not believe that
the information is material or nonpublic, he also lacks the necessary
scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197 (1976). In
fact, the scienter requirement functions in part to protect good faith errors
of this type. I d., at 211, n. 31.
Should the adviser receiving the information use it to trade, it may
breach a separate contractual or other duty to the corporation not to misuse the information. Absent such an arrangement, however, the adviser
is not barred by Rule 10b-5 from trading on that information if it believes
that the insider has not breached any duty to his shareholders. See W alton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796, 798-799 (CA2 1980).
The situation here, of course, is radically different. Ante, 11, n. 17
(Dirks received information requiring no analysis "as to its market relevance"). Secrist divulged the information for the precise purpose of causing Dirks' clients to trade on it. I fail to understand how imposing liability
on Dirks will affect legitimate insider-analyst contacts.
12
The duty involved in Mosser was the duty to the corporation in trust
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tion as "a willful and deliberate setting up of an interest in
employees adverse to that of the trust." I d., at 272. The
breach did not depend on the trustee's personal gain, and his
motives in violating his duty were irrelevant; like Secrist, the
trustee intended that others would abuse the inside information for their personal gain. Cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
204 Mich. 459, 50~09, 170 N. W. 668, 684-685 (1919)
(Henry Ford's philanthropic motives did not permit him to
set Ford Motor Company dividend policies to benefit public
at expense of shareholders).
As Mosser demonstrates, the breach consists in taking action disadvantageous to the person to whom one owes a duty.
In this case, Secrist owed a duty to purchasers of Equity
Funding shares. The Court's addition of the bad purpose element to a breach of fiduciary duty claim is flatly inconsistent
with the principle of Mosser. I do not join this limitation of
the scope of an insider's fiduciary duty to shareholders. 13
not to misappropriate its assets. This duty, of course, differs from the
duty to shareholders involved in this case. Seen. 7, supra. Trustees are
also subject to a higher standard of care than scienter. 3 A. Scott on
Trusts § 201, p. 1650 (1967). In addition, strict trustees are bound not to
trade in securities at all. See Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev., at 2, n. 5.
These differences, however, are irrelevant to the principle of Mosser that
the motive of personal gain is not essential to a trustee's liability. In
Mosser, as here, personal gain accrued to the tippees. See 341 U. S., at
273.
13
Although I disagree in principle with the Court's requirement of an
improper motive, I also note that the requirement adds to the administrative and judicial burden in Rule lOb-,5 cases. Assuming the validity of
the requirement, the SEC's approach-a violation occurs when the insider
knows that the tippee will trade with the information, Brief for SEC 31can be seen as a presumption that the insider gains from the tipping. The
Court now requires a case-by-case determination, thus prohibiting such a
presumption.
The Court acknowledges the burdens and difficulties of this approach,
but asserts that a principle is needed to guide market participants. Ante,
at 16. I fail to see how the Court's rule has any practical advantage over
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III
The improper purpose requirement not only has no basis in
law, but it rests implicitly on a policy that I cannot accept.
The Court justifies Secrist's and Dirks' action because the
general benefit derived from the violation of Secrist's duty to
shareholders outweighed the harm caused to those shareholders, see Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks:
''Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. Lawyer 517,
550 (1982); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information,
1981 S. Ct. Rev. 309, 338--in other words, because the end
justified the means. Under this view, the benefit conferred
on society by Secrist's and Dirks' activities may be paid for
with the losses caused to shareholders trading with Dirks' clients.14
Although Secrist's general motive to expose the Equity
Funding fraud was laudable, the means he chose were not.
the SEC's presumption. The Court's approach is particularly difficult to
administer when the insider is not directly enriched monetarily by the
trading he induces. For example, the Court does not explain why the benefit Secrist obtained-the good feeling of exposing a fraud and his enhanced reputation-is any different from the benefit to an insider who
gives the information as a gift to a friend or relative. Under the Court's
somewhat cynical view, gifts involve personal gain. See ibid. Secrist
surely gave Dirks a gift of the commissions Dirks made on the deal in order
to induce him to disseminate the information. The distinction between
pure altruism and self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries;
there is no reason to believe that courts and administrative law judges will
have an easier time with it.
14
This position seems little different from the theory that insider trading
should be permitted because it brings relevant information to the market.
See H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 59-76, 111-146
(1966); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 Vand. L. Rev.
547, 565--576 (1970). That position, which sits at the opposite end of the
theoretical spectrum from the much maligned equality-of-information theory, has never been adopted by Congress or ratified by the Court. See
Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev., at 1 and n. 1. The theory rejects the existence of any enforceable principle of fairness between market participants.
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Moreover, even assuming that Dirks played a substantial role
in exposing the fraud, 15 he and his clients should not profit
from the information they obtained from Secrist. Misprision
of a felony long has been against public policy. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696-697 (1972); see 18 U. S. C. §4. A
person cannot condition his transmission of information of a
crime on a financial award. As a citizen, Dirks had at least
an ethical obligation to report the information to the proper
authorities. See ante, at 13, n. 20. The Court's holding is
deficient in policy terms not because it fails to create a legal
norm out of that ethical norm, see ibid., but because it actually rewards Dirks for his aiding and abetting.
Dirks and Secrist were under a duty to disclose the information or to refrain from trading on it. 16 I agree that disclosure in this case would have been difficult. Ante, at 13,
n. 20. I also recognize that the SEC seemingly has been less
than proficient in its view of the nature of disclosure necessary to satisfy the disclose-or-refrain duty. The Commission
tells persons with inside information that they cannot trade
on that information unless they disclose; it refuses, however,
to tell them how to discloseY See In re Faberge, Inc., 45
16

The Court uncritically accepts Dirks' own view of his role in uncovering the Equity Funding fraud. See ante, at 11, n. 17. It ignores the fact
that Secrist gave the same information at the same time to state insurance
regulators, who proceeded to expose massive fraud in a major Equity
Funding subsidiary. The fraud surfaced before Dirks ever spoke to the
SEC.
16
Secrist did pass on his information to regulatory authorities. His
good but misguided motive may be the reason the SEC did not join him in
the administrative proceedings against Dirks and his clients. The fact
that the SEC, in an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, did not charge
Secrist under Rule 10b-5 says nothing about the applicable law. Cf. ante,
at 18, n. 25 (suggesting otherwise). Nor does the fact that the SEC took
an unsupportable legal position in proceedings below indicate that neither
Secrist nor Dirks is liable under any theory. Cf. ibid. (same).
17
At oral argument, the SEC's view was that Dirks' obligation to disclose would not be satisfied by reporting the information to the SEC. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 27, quoted ante, at 13, n. 20. This position is in apparent

.~
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S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973) (disclosure requires public release
through public media designed to reach investing public generally). This seems to be a less than sensible policy, which it
is incumbent on the Commission to correct. The Court,
however, has no authority to remedy the problem by opening
a hole in the congressionally mandated prohibition on insider
trading, thus rewarding insider trading.
IV
In my view, Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding
shareholders by transmitting material nonpublic information
to Dirks with the intention that Dirks would cause his clients
to trade on that information. Dirks, therefore, was under a
duty to make the information publicly available or to refrain
from actions that he knew would lead to trading. Because
Dirks caused his clients to trade, he violated § lO(b) and Rule
lOb-5. Any other result is a disservice to this country's attempt to provide fair and efficient capital markets. I
dissent.

conflict with the statement in its brief that speaks favorably of a safe harbor rule under which an investor satisfies his obligation to disclose by reporting the information to the Commission and then waiting a set period
before trading. Brief for SEC 43-44. The SEC, however, has neither
proposed nor adopted a rule to this effect, and thus persons such as Dirks
have no real option other than to refrain from trading.
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To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Dirks

I have attempted in the attached footnote to restate your
concerns in the rider that you prepared this morning.

My reason for

pause in not attacking directly JUSTICE BLACKMUN's distinction
between "motive" and "scienter" is that we make one between
"purpose" and "scienter."

We have to use the word "purpose," in my

opinion, to slide from the SEC's language in the older cases to the
requirement in your case that the Cady, Roberts duty includes not
only fiduciary duty, but a duty not to gain.

Therefore, to the

extent that JUSTICE BLACKMUN uses "motive" the same way we use
"purpose," his distinction is somewhat helpful to us.

Therefore,

perhaps we can use his distinction somewhat to our advantage.
The following suggested footnote would go after the citation to
Aaron on p. 16.

Am I on the right track?

'.

'.

RIDER F

The dissenting opinion correctly draws a distinction between
our requirement that the insider's breach must involve personal gain
and the requirement that the insider act with scienter.
at 8, and n. 10.

See ante,

As we said in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425

U.S. 185, 199 {1976), the statutory words "manipulative," "device,"
and "contrivance •••• connot[e] intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the price of securities."

But not all

conduct done with scienter violates Rule lOb-5, just as all
fraudulent acts done without scienter also do not come within the
ban of the federal securities laws.
scienter and a fraudulent act.

Rather, there must be both

We are concerned in this case with

those acts that are fraudulent, i. e., those that deceive or
manipulate the market.

Determination whether a particular act, such

as trading securities or disclosing information, is fraudulent turns
on objective criteria, such as the existence of a fiduciary duty and
personal gain from the use of nonpublic information.

The

determination whether those acts were done intentionally by a
particular individual, however, is inherently a subjective inquiry.

lfp/ss 06/2S/83

Rider A, p.

(Dirks}

DIRKSB SALLY-POW
Consider adding a note along the following lines:
In applying Rule lOb-S, the dissent would draw a
distinction impossible as a guide to conduct or to
administer by courts and the SEC.

It concedes that an

insider is not liable under the Rule "unless he has the
requisite scienter".

Seen. 10, post.

proposes a new definition of scienter:

The dissent then
"[T]he scienter

requirement addresses the intent necessary to support

liability~
intent."

it does not address the motives
Id.

Therefore,

behin~ the

~
~

Secrist "knew and intended

that Dirks would cause trading", he possessed the
requisite scienter regardless of what his motives may have
been.

. <

This distinction ignores both the language of lOb-S

2.

and the meaning of "scienter".

See Ernst & Ernst v.

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-199 (1976)

(the language

5
"manipulative", "device", and "contrivance" connote

"
"intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or
defraud investors • . • • ")

Even the unique facts of

this case illustrate the distinction that the dissent
overlooks.

~
. .1ntendd
certa1nly
e
~

to convey re 1 evant

information that mangement was unlawfully concealing, and
- so far as the record goes - he quite honestly believed
that persuading Dirks to investigate was the best way to
disclose the fraud.

The dissent acknowledges that any

other means of "disclosures would have been difficult",
~t
post, at 13, and yet would charge Secrist with a breach of
1\

,,

fiduciary duty even though there was no motive toAdeceive
or defraud investors".

We recognize the inherent

3.

difficult of detemining
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~~ intent

actor in a particular situation.
for a subjective inquiry.

or motive of an

Each connotes the need

Courts, however, necessarily
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eases of thi:s

is whether the insider receives a direct or indirect

personal benefit from the disclosure.

Imperfect as this
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may be it is a standard.
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The dissent's distinction

between "intent" and "motive" is without precedent and is
standardless.

.iu:prnnt <!Ittttrl ttf flrt ~b ~hdt%
Jrztgfringhtu, ~. <!J. 2!16i'!~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w ....

.J. BRENNAN, .JR .

June 27, 1983

No. 82-276
Dirks v. SEC

Dear Harry,
Please join me in your dissent in
the above.
Sincerely,

~
Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

•

-f1•

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

;,>,(",''

From:

Justice Blackmun

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

JUN 2 8
Recirculated: _ __:_
2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-276

RAYMOND L. DIRKS, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
The Court today takes still another step to limit the protections provided investors by § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 1 See Chiarella v. United States, 445
U. S. 222, 246 (1980) (dissenting opinion). The device employed in this case engrafts a special motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty doctrine. This innovation excuses a knowing and intentional violation of an insider's duty
to shareholders if the insider does not act from a motive of
personal gain. Even on the extraordinary facts of this case,
such an innovation is not justified.
'See, e. g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723
(1975); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976); Piper v. ChrisCraft Industries , Inc ., 430 U. S. 1 (1977); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U. S. 222 (1980); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680 (1980). This trend frustrates the congressional intent that the securities laws be interpreted flexibly to protect investors, see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U. S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc ., 375
U. S. 180, 186 (1963), and to regulate deceptive practices "detrimental to
the interests of the investor," S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 18
(1934); see H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1934). Moreover, the Court continues to refuse to accord to SEC administrative decisions the deference it normally gives to an agency's interpretation of its
own statute. See, e. g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982).
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I

As the Court recognizes, ante, at 11, n. 17, the facts here
are unusual. After a meeting with Ronald Secrist, a former
Equity Funding employee, on March 7, 1973, App. 226, petitioner Raymond Dirks found himself in possession of material
nonpublic information of massive fraud within the company. 2
In the Court's words, "[h]e uncovered ... startling information that required no analysis or exercise of judgment as to
its market relevance." Ante, at 11, n. 17. In disclosing that
information to Dirks, Secrist intended that Dirks would disseminate the information to his clients, those clients would
unload their Equity Funding securities on the market, and
the price would fall precipitously, thereby triggering a reaction from the authorities. App. 16, 25, 27.
Dirks complied with his informant's wishes. Instead of reporting that information to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission) or to other regulatory
agencies, Dirks began to disseminate the information to his
clients and undertook his own investigation. 3 One of his
2

Unknown to Dirks, Secrist also told his story to New York insurance
regulators the same day. App. 23. They immediately assured themselves that ·Equity Funding's New York subsidiary had sufficient assets to
cover its outstanding policies and then passed on the information to California regulators who in turn informed Illinois regulators. Illinois investigators, later joined by California officials, conducted a surprise audit of Equity Funding's Illinois subsidiary, id., at 87--88, to find $22 million of the
subsidiary's assets missing. On March 30, these authorities seized control
of the Illinois subsidiary. I d., at 271.
3
In the same administrative proceeding at issue here, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Dirks' clients-five institutional investment advisors-violated § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U. S. C. § 77q(a), § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S. C. §78j(b), and Rule 100-5, 17 CFR §240.100-5, by trading on
Dirks' tips. App. 297. All the clients were censured, except Dreyfus
Corporation. The ALJ found that Dreyfus had made significant efforts to
disclose the information to Goldman, Sachs, the purchaser of its securities.
App. 299, 301. None of Dirks' clients appealed these determinations.
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first steps was to direct his associates at Delafield Childs to
draw up a list of Delafield clients holding Equity Funding securities. On March 12, eight days before Dirks flew to Los
Angeles to investigate Secrist's story, he reported the full
allegations to Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc.,
which on March 15 and 16 sold approximately $1.2 million of
Equity securities. 4 See id., at 199. As he gathered more
information, he selectively disclosed it to his clients. To
those holding Equity Funding securities he gave the "hard"
story-all the allegations; others received the "soft" story-a
recitation of vague factors that might reflect adversely on
Equity Funding's management. See id., at 211, n. 24.
Dirks' attempts to disseminate the information to
nonclients were feeble, at best. On March 12, he left a message for Herbert Lawson, the San Francisco bureau chief of
The Wall Street Journal. Not until March 19 and 20 did he
call Lawson again, and outline the situation. William
Blundell, a Journal investigative reporter based in Los Angeles, got in touch with Dirks about his March 20 telephone
call. On March 21, Dirks met with Blundell in Los Angeles.
Blundell began his own investigation, relying in part on
Dirks' contacts, and on March 23 telephoned Stanley Sporkin,
the SEC's Deputy Director of Enforcement. On March 26,
the next business day, Sporkin and his staff interviewed
Blundell and asked to see Dirks the following morning.
App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2, n. 1.
• The Court's implicit suggestion that Dirks' did not gain by this selective dissemination of advice, ante, at 2, n. 2, is inaccurate. The ALJ found
that because of Dirks' information, Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., directed business to Delafield Childs that generated approximately $25,000 in commissions. App. 199, 204-205. While it is true that
the exact economic benefit gained by Delafield Childs due to Dirks' activities is unknowable because of the structure of compensation in the securities market, there can be no doubt that Delafield and Dirks gained both
monetary rewards and enhanced reputations for "looking after" their
clients.
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Trading was halted by the New York Stock Exchange at
about the same time Dirks was talking to Los Angeles SEC
personnel. The next day, March 28, the SEC suspended
trading in Equity Funding securities. By that time, Dirks'
clients had unloaded close to $15 million of Equity Funding
stock and the price had plummeted from $26 to $15. The effect of Dirks' selective dissemination of Secrist's information
was that Dirks' clients were able to shift the losses that were
inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselves
to uninformed market participants.
II

A
No one questions that Secrist himself could not trade on his
inside information to the disadvantage of uninformed shareholders and purchasers of Equity Funding securities. See
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 12. Unlike
the printer in Chiarella, Secrist stood in a fiduciary relationship with these shareholders. As the Court states, ante, at
5, corporate insiders have an affirmative duty of disclosure
when trading with shareholders of the corporation. See
Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 227. This duty extends as well to
purchasers of the corporation's securities. I d., at 227, n. 8,
citing Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 920 (1951).
The Court also acknowledges that Secrist could not do by
proxy what he was prohibited from doing personally. Ante,
at 12; Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). But this
is precisely what Secrist did. Secrist used Dirks to disseminate information to Dirks' clients, who in turn dumped stock
on unknowing purchasers. Secrist thus intended Dirks to injure the purchasers of Equity Funding securities to whom
Secrist had a duty to disclose. Accepting the Court's view of
tippee liability, 5 it appears that Dirk's knowledge of this
5

I interpret the Court's opinion to impose liability on tippees like Dirks
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breach makes him liable as a participant in the breach after
the fact. Ante, at 12, 19; Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.

B
The Court holds, however, that Dirks is not liable because
Secrist did not violate his duty; according to the Court, this is
so because Secrist did not have the improper purpose of personal gain. Ante, at 15-16, 18-19. In so doing, the Court
imposes a new, subjective limitation on the scope of the duty
owed by insiders to shareholders. The novelty of this limitation is reflected in the Court's lack of support for it. 6
The insider's duty is owed directly to the corporation's
shareholders. 7 See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiwhen the tippee knows or has reason to know that the information is material and nonpublic and was obtained through a breach of duty by selective
revelation or otherwise. See In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C.
633, 641 (1971).
6
The Court cites only a footnote in an SEC decision and Professor
Brudney to support its rule. Ante, at 15-16. The footnote, however,
merely identifies one result the securities laws are intended to prevent. It
does not define the nature of the duty itself. See n. 9, infra. Professor
Brudney's quoted statement appears in the context of his assertion that the
duty of insiders to disclose prior to trading with shareholders is in large
part a mechanism to correct the information available to noninsiders. Professor Brudney simply recognizes that the most common motive for
breaching this duty is personal gain; he does not state , however, that the
duty prevents only personal aggrandizement. Insiders, Outsiders, and
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv.
L. Rev. 322, 345-348 (1979). Surely, the Court does not now adopt Professor Brudney's access-to-information theory, a close cousin to the equality-of-information theory it accuses the SEC of harboring. See ante, at
8-10.
7
The Court correctly distinguishes this duty from the duty of an insider
to the corporation not to mismanage corporate affairs or to misappropriate
corporate assets. Ante, at 5, n. 9. That duty also can be breached when
the insider trades in corporate securities on the basis of inside information.
Although a shareholder suing in the name of the corporation can recover
for the corporation damages for any injury the insider causes by the breach
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duciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif.
L. Rev. 1, 5 (1982); 3A W. Fletcher, Private Corporations
§ 1168.2, pp. 28~289 (1975). As Chiarella recognized, it is
based on the relationship of trust and confidence between the
insider and the shareholder. 445 U. S., at 228. That relationship assures the shareholder that the insider may not
take actions that will harm him unfairly. 8 The affirmative
duty of disclosure protects against this injury. See Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 307, n. 15 (1939); Strong v. Rapide,
213 U. S. 419, 431-434 (1909); see also Chiarella, 445 U. 8.,
at 228, n. 10; cf. Pepper, 308 U. S., at 307 (fiduciary obligation to corporation exists for corporation's protection).

c
The fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the
breach does not eradicate the shareholder's injury. 9 Cf. Reof this distinct duty, Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N. Y. 2d 494, 498, 248
N. E. 2d 910, 912 (1969); see Thomas v. Roblins Industries, Inc., 520 F. 2d
1393, 1397 (CA3 1975), insider trading generally does not injure the corporation itself. See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2, n. 5, 28, n. 111
(1982).
8
As it did in Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 226-229, the Court adopts the
Cady, Roberts formulation of the duty. Ante, at 5-6.
"Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing." In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S. E. C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted).
The first element-on which Chiarella's holding rests-establishes the
type of relationship that must exist between the parties before a duty to
disclose is present. The second-not addressed by Chiarella-identifies
the harm that the duty protects against: the inherent unfairness to the
shareholder caused when an insider trades with him on the basis of undisclosed inside information.
9
Without doubt, breaches of the insider's duty occur most often when
an insider seeks personal aggrandizement at the expense of shareholders.
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statement (Second) of Trusts § 205, Comments c and d (1959)
(trustee liable for acts causing diminution of value of trust); 3
A. Scott on Trusts § 205, p. 1665 (1967) (trustee liable for any
losses to trust caused by his breach). It makes no difference
to the shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or
intended to gain personally from the transaction; the shareholder still has lost because of the insider's misuse of non public information. The duty is addressed not to the insider's
motives, 10 but to his actions and their consequences on the
shareholder. Personal gain is not an element of the breach
of this duty. 11
Because of this, descriptions of the duty to disclose are often coupled with
statements that the duty prevents unjust enrichment. See, e. g., In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907, 912, n. 15 (1961); Langevoort, 70
Calif. L. Rev., at 19. Private gain is certainly a strong motivation for
breaching the duty.
It is, however, not an element of the breach of this duty. The reference
to personal gain in Cady , Roberts for example, is appended to the first element underlying the duty which requires that an insider have a special
relationship to corporate information that he cannot appropriate for his
own benefit. See n. 8, supra. It does not limit the second element which
addresses the injury to the shareholder and is at issue here. See ibid. In
fact, Cady, Roberts, describes the duty more precisely in a later footnote:
"In the circumstances, [the insider's] relationship to his customers was
such that he would have a duty not to take a position adverse to them, not
to take secret profits at their expense, not to misrepresent facts to them,
and in general to place their interests ahead of his own." 40 S. E. C. , at
916, n. 31. This statement makes clear that enrichment of the insider himself is simply one of the results the duty attempts to prevent.
10
Of course, an insider is not liable in a Rule 10b-5 administrative action
unless he has the requisite scienter. Aaron v. SEC , 446 U. S. 680, 691
(1980). He must know or intend that his conduct violate his duty. Secrist
obviously knew and intended that Dirks would cause trading on the inside
information and that Equity Funding shareholders would be harmed. The
scienter requirement addresses the intent necessary to support liability; it
does not address the motives behind the intent.
11
The Court seems concerned that this case bears on insiders' contacts
w:ith analysts for valid corporate reasons. A nte, at 10- 11. It also fears
that insiders may not be able to determine whether the information transmitted is material or nonpublic. !d., at 14--15. When the disclosure is to
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This conclusion is borne out by the Court's decision in
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. 8. 267 (1951). There, the Court
faced an analogous situation: a reorganization trustee engaged two employee-promoters of subsidiaries of the companies being reorganized to provide services that the trustee
considered to be essential to the successful operation of the
trust. In order to secure their services, the trustee expressly agreed with the employees that they could continue
to trade in the securities of the subsidiaries. The employees
then turned their inside position into substantial profits at
the expense both of the trust and of other holders of the companies' securities.
The Court acknowledged that the trustee neither intended
to nor did in actual fact benefit from this arrangement; his
motives were completely selfless and devoted to the companies. 341 U. 8., at 275. The Court, nevertheless, found the
. trustee liable to the estate for the activities of the employees
he authorized. 12 The Court described the trustee's defalcaan investment banker or some other adviser, however, there is normally no
breach because the insider does not have scienter: he does not intend that
the inside information be used for trading purposes to the disadvantage of
shareholders. Moreover, if the insider in good faith does not believe that
the information is material or nonpublic, he also lacks the necessary
scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197 (1976). In
fact, the scienter requirement functions in part to protect good faith errors
of this type. !d., at 211, n. 31.
Should the adviser receiving the information use it to trade, it may
breach a separate contractual or other duty to the corporation not to misuse the information. Absent such an arrangement, however, the adviser
is not barred by Rule 10b-5 from trading on that information if it believes
that the insider has not breached any duty to his shareholders. See Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796, 798--799 (CA2 1980).
The situation here, of course, is radically different. Ante, at 11, n. 17
(Dirks received information requiring no analysis "as to its market relevance"). Secrist divulged the information for the precise purpose of causing Dirks' clients to trade on it. I fail to understand how imposing liability
on Dirks will affect legitimate insider-analyst contacts.
"The duty involved in Mosser was the duty to the corporation in trust

82-276---DISSENT
DIRKS v. SEC

9

tion as "a willful and deliberate setting up of an interest in
employees adverse to that of the trust." I d., at 272. The
breach did not depend on the trustee's personal gain, and his
motives in violating his duty were irrelevant; like Secrist, the
trustee intended that others would abuse the inside information for their personal gain. Cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
204 Mich. 459, 50&-509, 170 N. W. 668, 684-685 (1919)
(Henry Ford's philanthropic motives did not permit him to
set Ford Motor Company dividend policies to benefit public
at expense of shareholders).
As Mosser demonstrates, the breach consists in taking action disadvantageous to the person to whom one owes a duty.
In this case, Secrist owed a duty to purchasers of Equity
Funding shares. The Court's addition of the bad purpose element to a breach of fiduciary duty claim is flatly inconsistent
with the principle of Mosser. I do not join this limitation of
the scope of an insider's fiduciary duty to shareholders. 13
not to misappropriate its assets. This duty, of course, differs from the
duty to shareholders involved in this case. Seen. 7, supra. Trustees are
also subject to a higher standard of care than scienter. 3 A. Scott on
Trusts § 201, p. 1650 (1967). In addition, strict trustees are bound not to
trade in securities at all. See Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev., at 2, n. 5.
These differences, however, are irrelevant to the principle of Mosser that
the motive of personal gain is not essential to a trustee's liability. In
Mosser, as here, personal gain accrued to the tippees. See 341 U. S., at
273.
13
Although I disagree in principle with the Court's requirement of an
improper motive, I also note that the requirement adds to the administrative and judicial burden in Rule 10b-5 cases. Assuming the validity of
the requirement, the SEC's approach-a violation occurs when the insider
knows that the tippee will trade with the information, Brief for SEC 31can be seen as a presumption that the insider gains from the tipping. The
Court now requires a case-by-case determination, thus prohibiting such a
presumption.
The Court acknowledges the burdens and difficulties of this approach,
but asserts that a principle is needed to guide market participants. Ante,
at 16. I fail to see how the Court's rule has any practical advantage over
the SEC's presumption. The Court's approach is particularly difficult to
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III
The improper purpose requirement not only has no basis in
law, but it rests implicitly on a policy that I cannot accept.
The Court justifies Secrist's and Dirks' action because the
general benefit derived from the violation of Secrist's duty to
shareholders outweighed the harm caused to those shareholders, see Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks:
"Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. Lawyer 517,
550 (1982); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information,
1981 S. Ct. Rev. 309, 338--in other words, because the end
justified the means. Under this view, the benefit conferred
on society by Secrist's and Dirks' activities may be paid for
with the losses caused to shareholders trading with Dirks' clients.14
administer when the insider is not directly enriched monetarily by the
trading he induces. For example, the Court does not explain why the benefit Secrist obtained-the good feeling of exposing a fraud and his enhanced reputation-is any different from the benefit to an insider who
gives the information as a gift to a friend or relative. Under the Court's
somewhat cynical view, gifts involve personal gain. See ibid. Secrist
surely gave Dirks a gift of the commissions Dirks made on the deal in order
to induce him to disseminate the information. The distinction between
pure altruism and self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries;
there is no reason to believe that courts and administrative law judges will
have an easier time with it.
"This position seems little different from the theory that insider trading
should be permitted because it brings relevant information to the market.
See H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 59-76, 111-146
(1966); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 Vand. L. Rev.
547, 565--576 (1970). The Court also seems to embrace a variant of that
extreme theory, which postulates that insider trading causes no harm at all
to those who purchase from the insider. Ante, at 18, n. 27. Both the theory and its variant sit at the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum from
the much maligned equality-of-information theory, and never have been
adopted by Congress or ratified by this Court. See Langevoort, 70 Calif.
L. Rev., at 1 and n. 1. The theory rejects the existence of any enforceable
principle of fairness between market participants.
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Although Secrist's general motive to expose the Equity
Funding fraud was laudable, the means he chose were not.
Moreover, even assuming that Dirks played a substantial role
in exposing the fraud, 15 he and his clients should not profit
from the information they obtained from Secrist. Misprision
of a felony long has been against public policy. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 69tH>97 (1972); see 18 U. S. C. § 4. A
person cannot condition his transmission of information of a
crime on a financial award. As a citizen, Dirks had at least
an ethical obligation to report the information to the proper
authorities. See ante, at 13, n. 20. The Court's holding is
deficient in policy terms not because it fails to create a legal
norm out of that ethical norm, see ibid., but because it actually rewards Dirks for his aiding and abetting.
Dirks and Secrist were under a duty to disclose the information or to refrain from trading on it. 16 I agree that disclosure in this case would have been difficult. Ante, at 13,
n. 20. I also recognize that the SEC seemingly has been less
than helpful in its view of the riature of disclosure necessary \
to satisfy the disclose-or-refrain duty. The Commission tells
persons with inside information that they cannot trade on
that information unless they disclose; it refuses, however, to
15
The Court uncritically accepts Dirks' own view of his role in uncovering the Equity Funding fraud. See ante, at 11, n. 17. It ignores the fact
that Secrist gave the same information at the same time to state insurance
regulators, who proceeded to expose massive fraud in a major Equity
Funding subsidiary. The fraud surfaced before Dirks ever spoke to the
SEC.
16
Secrist did pass on his information to regulatory authorities. His
good but misguided motive may be the reason the SEC did not join him in
the administrative proceedings against Dirks and his clients. The fact
that the SEC, in an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, did not charge
Secrist under Rule lOb-5 says nothing about the applicable law. Cf. ante,
at 18, n. 25 (suggesting otherwise). Nor does the fact that the SEC took
an unsupportable legal position in proceedings below indicate that neither
Secrist nor Dirks is liable under any theory. Cf. ibid. (same).
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tell them how to disclose. 17 See In re Faberge, Inc., 45
S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973) (disclosure requires public release
through public media designed to reach investing public generally). This seems to be a less than sensible policy, which it
is incumbent on the Commission to correct. The Court,
however, has no authority to remedy the problem by opening
a hole in the congressionally mandated prohibition on insider
trading, thus rewarding such trading.
IV

In my view, Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding
shareholders by transmitting material nonpublic information
to Dirks with the intention that Dirks would cause his clients
to trade on that information. Dirks, therefore, was under a
duty to make the information publicly available or to refrain
from actions that he knew would lead to trading. Because
Dirks caused his clients to trade, he violated § lO(b) and Rule
lOb--5. Any other result is a disservice to this country's attempt to provide fair and efficient capital markets. I
dissent.

11
At oral argument, the SEC's view was that Dirks' obligation to disclose would not be satisfied by reporting the information to the SEC. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 27, quoted ante, at 13, n. 20. This position is in apparent
conflict with the statement in its brief that speaks favorably of a safe harbor rule under which an investor satisfies his obligation to disclose by reporting the information to the Commission and then waiting a set period
before trading. Brief for SEC 43-44. The SEC, however, has neither
proposed nor adopted a rule to this effect, and thus persons such as Dirks
have no real option other than to refrain from trading.
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shall make the following changes in the dissent:
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read:
" 6 The Court cites only a footnote in an SEC decision and Professor Brudney to support its rule. Ante,
at 15-16.
The footnote, however, merely identifies
one result the securities laws are intended to prevent.
It does not define the nature of the duty itself.
See n. 9, infra.
Professor Brudney's quoted
statement ••• "
2. I shall add the following to my footnote 14, immediately
following "(1970}" on the fifth line:
"The Court also seems to embrace a variant of
that extreme theory, which postulates that insider
trading causes no harm at all to those who purchase
from the insider. Ante, at 18, n. 27. Both the theory and its variant sit at the opposite end of the
theoretical spectrum from the much maligned equalityof-information theory, and have never been adopted by
Congress or ratified by this Court.
See Langevoort,
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it, or perhaps just omittin the reference to the Sixth
Circuit case.
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82-276 Dirks v.' SEC

This is an appeal from the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Petitioner Dirks was an officer of a broker-

~e specialized in insurance securities.

dealer.

Ronald

Secrist,ja former officer of Equity Funding of America } had
sought unsuccessfully to bring to the attention of the pub-

lic~fraudulent

practices of Equity's top management.

The

fraud primarily concerned insurance reserves.
Hoping that Dirks,j a specialist in insurance securities, / could assist in disclosing the fraud, Secrist gave
I

his information to Dirks.
investigation.
a story.

aQdJlt

In turn, Dirks conducted his own

He urged the Wall Street Journal to publish
the same

k..

tim~isclosed the information to

five investment advisers~who liquidated substantial holdings
of Equity Funding stock.
When the authorities finally were persuaded to
move,jthe market value of Equity Funding stock had plummeted.

The company was placed in bankruptcy.
In a subsequent proceeding by the SEc,/Dirks was

found to have violated Rule lOb-sjby disclosing the

~ens of fraud to persons who traded.
for his conduct.

.

allega~

Dirks was ce~ured

2.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Dirks' petition for
review.
Since its decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. in
196l;fthe Commission - and courts - have sought to prevent
corporate

ins~~:;s;4rom breaching their duty to stockholders

by trading on material/non-public information.

Nor could

insiders/- referred to as "tipp=.::_s"f avoid liability by
conveying the information to som-; favored "tippee" ./!"As former Commissioner Smith write ,jthe "focus" under Rule lOb-5
is on "policing insiders . . . rather than on policing information per

seI /~nd its possession".

A tippee's liability therefore is derivative:~he
stands in the shoes of the tipper.

In our recent decision

in Chiarella/we held that "a duty to disclose does not arise/

I

7

in the absence of a fiduciary relationship".
In this case, the SEC made no finding that Secrist
breached any duty/when he disclosed a massive fraud.
held, nevertheless, that Dirks - the

tipp~e

It

- violated lOb-5

when he passed on the information to people who traded.
It is conceded that Dirks, on his own, had no relationship with Equity stockholders.

Whether a particular

disclosure by the

inside~ a

breach of

duty~epends

3.

pri-

marily on his purpose, i.e., whether the insider- the tipper - personally will benefit, directly or indirectly.
Secrist gained nothing from his efforts to bring the fraud
to public attention.

As there was no insider breach of

duty;'Dirks was under no derivative duty.
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals.
Justice Blackmun has filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Justices Brennan and Marshall have concurred.
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Dear Mr.
..~~ ..... --c: J:-I.LuvJ.aea on the slip
opinion in the above-mentioned case, we wish to inform you
of a possible typographical or other formal error in that
Opinion.
The second paragraph of note 15, page 10, of the
Opinion of the Court, states, in part:

Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chiarella, the SEC attempts to distinguish
that case factually as involving not
"inside" information, but rather
"market" information, i.e., "information generated within the company
relating to its assets or earnings."
Brief for Respondent 23.
However, the phrase quoted from the Brief for Respondent
as a definition of "market" information, was in fact
presented in the Brief of Respondent as a definition of
"inside" information. Since the concept of "inside" information differs significantly from the concept of market"
or nou.tsiden information, the Court may wish to amend the
slip opinion to indicate that the quoted phrase defines
11

Mr. Henry c. Lind
July 6, 1983
Page Two
"inside", rather than "market" information. Indeed, the
Court may wish to d~fine "market" information in the footnote by referring to other sources, some of which are cited
elsewhere in the opinion, e.g., Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders,
and Informational Advantages-Dnder the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 329 (1979); Fleischer, Mundheim
& Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to
Disclose Market Information, 121 u. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 799
(1973); Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule
10 (b) ( 5) , 12 9 U. P a. L. Rev. 13 0 7 , 13 0 9-10 and n. ll ( 19 81) .
Sincerely,

*~Y:·M~
Arthur F. Mathews

rd

Andrew B. Weissman

January 3 , 1984

82-276 Dirks v . Securiti.es and Bxchanqe Commission

MEMORANDUM '1.'0 "'llF. CONJ"ERENf'E:

One of the- 1awver:s in this cage haR writtPn Henry
Lind a letter pnintino out a minor inaccuracy jn n . JS, pp .
9 and 10.

In the first sentence of the second paraqraph in
that note, I will chanqe th~ l~n~uage of the Rl . e.• rlause
(p . JO) to read "i.nformation oriqinatinq outsiile the compa.ny
1.1\no u~uaJly ahout the supply ani' demand for the company's
securl.ties".
~bsent

is eporopr.iate to

dissent, I will advi~e flPnrv Lind
m~k~ t~is change tn the offirial

L.'P.P. , Jr .
BS

be:

Mr. Henry Lind

th~t it
rP.port~ .

lfp/ss 05/14/83

Rider A, p. 26 (Di r k s)

DIRKS26 SALLY-POW
The SEC, of course, has an obligated to enforce
its rules against insider trading.

For the reasons stated

above, we think it has gone beyond any "evidence of
congressional intent" in imposing its disclose-or-abstain
rule in the absence of a fiduciary duty not to disclose.
We think the SEC view that a duty to disclose arises from
the mere possession of nonpublic market information could
have a seriously inhibiting influence on the role of
market analysts that the Commission itself recognizes is
essential.

It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out

and analyze information", see SEC Docket, at 1406, and
this customarily is done by meeting with and questioning
corporate officers and others who may viewed as insiders.

2.

Information so obtained may be the basis for judgments as
to the market worth of a corporation's securities.

The

analyst's judgment in this respect may be made available
in market letters or otherwise to clients of his firm.

In

the very nature of the information and indeed of the stock
markets themselves, such information cannot be made
simultaneously to all of the corporation's stockholders or
the public generally.
The line between what the corporate insider may
disclose to the analyst, and what in turn the analyst
properly may deduce or disclose, will not always be an
easy one to draw.

Yet, the SEC's rule, adopted in this

case, has no limiting principle.

The mere possession of

inside information without regard to a breach of fiduciary
duty to the coproration's stockholders, affords no

'

.

'

3.

guidance either to corporate executives or market
analysts •

..

Rider A, p. 26 (Dirks)

lfp/ss 05/14/83

("
1-o k
~~
~

DIRKS26 SALLY-POW

'-<!.t..t--0f.

~

~IV)
The SEC, of course, has an obligation
enforce its rules against insider trading.

to

We also

appreciate the inherent difficulties even in identifying
possible violations in view of the millions of
transactions on the securities exchanges.

We think,

however, that the Commission has gone beyond any "evidence
of congressional intent," see Chiarella at p.
imposing its disclose-or-abstain
f ic1.1ciary daly

~ #u~ .

uk~

~

l'iet to a i

sc~ ose

J

, in

rule ::~ ~=:~e of

a

Imposing a duty to

disclose merely because of possession of nonpublic

~r,
. ~ material market information could have a seriously
~\~/,\~~~
0~~

~cJ.. U

QJf\-

1

OJNl,

~b~ng

~ .. ·.·. 0-~~~

~~

influence on the role of market analysts that
7J

~ the SEC itself recognizes is essential.

.do

oU:: ~. o\-\l wlak

-\k ~~ .

'll

t'\<:G4~

It is commonplace

,_, ~ ~
"""~
wJt- ~·

2.

for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information", see
SEC Docket, at 1406, and this customarily is done by
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others

t<
"
the basis

who may viewed as insiders.
be

Information so obtained may

for judgments as to the market worth of a

corporation's securities.

The analyst's judgment in this

t,A/
respect

~e

made available in market letters or

1\
otherwise to clients of his firm.

In the very nature of

the information and indeed of the markets themselves, such
information cannot be made simultaneously to all of the
corporation's stockholders or the public generally.
The line between what the corporate insider may
disclose to the analyst, and what in turn the analyst

~.Q.
properly may deduce or disclose, will not-- as
said -- always be an easy one to draw.

we~ ~

Yet, the SEC's

3.

rule, adopted in this case, has no limiting principle.

A

rule imposing liability from the mere possession and use
o;Anside information without regard to

~each

of

fiduciary duty to the coproration's stockholders, affords
no guidance either to corporate executives or market
analysts.

Jim:

Something along these lines might be

included in IV if we restructure our opinion as I have
suggestd.

lfp/ss 05/14/83
DIRKS
This will be a rough "shot" at revising some of
the language in our critical Subpart III-B (p. 19).
B

As

we

have

shown,

a

tippee's

liability

is

derivative from a breach of duty by the insider tipper of
which the tippee has notice.

Thus, in order to make out a

tipping case against an individual, it is first necessary
to

establish

information

that
in

shareholders.
had

notice

difficult

the

insider

violation

of

disclosed
his

confidential

fiduciary

duty

to

It is then necessary to show that the tipee
of

such

factual

determined whether

a

violation.

issues.
the

At

the

These

can

outset,

it

present
must

be

information was both confidential

and material, questions that arise in every tipping case.
When

these

remains

are

answered

whether

the

violation of duty.

affirmatively,

disclosure

itself

the

question

constituted

a

It is clear under our Rule lOb-5 cases

that liability is imposed only when one acts with scienter
(cite

cases) •

There

corporate

executive

disclosed

the

would

be

no

inadvertently

information

relied

breach of duty where
or

even

upon.

negligently
The

critical

2.

quest ion,

therefore,

is whether

there was

an

intent or

purpose to disclose material nonpublic information to one
who could

trade

shareholders.
but

this

there

a

There

justify

familiar
are

inferences

may

information to the detriment of

Ascertaining

is

courts.

on the

be

a

facts
of

intention may
question
and

often

purpose.

exists

difficult,

confronted

circumstances

wrongful

relationship

be

that

For

the

by

often

example,

insiderand

the

recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or
an

intention

to

benefit

the

recipient.

Also,

such

an

inference may arise where the disclosure was made at the
initiative of

the

insider

rather

than

by

the

recipient

tipee.
Where a breach of fiduciary duty by the insider
is established, liability may be imposed on the tipee only
when he has notice of such a breach.

See supra, at

Again, this is a question of fact that must be resolved in
light

of

all

relevant

circumstances.

A

securities

analyst, making a study of a particular corporation that
includes

interviews

with

its

officers,

acquires

information that may form the basis of a market letter to
clients.
involves

This

is

a

typical

participants

situation,
who

and

customarily

understand

their

3.

responsibilities and adhere to them.
of course,

where the

facts -- and

But there are cases,
inferences reasonable

drawn from them -- demonstrate the requisite scienter on
the part of both the tipper and the tipee.

This is not

such a case.

(Jim:
will

have

to

appropriate
unnecessary
followed

by

If we adopt the foregoing approach,
write

it

out

documentation.
elaboration.
your

Part

more
I

This
IV

carefully,

would

avoid,

subpart

III-B

with

limited

and

ss

with

however,
would

changes.

example, the first sentence in IV would be omitted.)
L.F.P., Jr.

you

be
For

lfp/ss 05/14/83

Rider A, p. 1 (Dirks)

DIRKSl SALLY-POW
Petitioner recived material nonpublic
information from "insiders" of a corporation with which he
had no connection.

He disclosed this information to

investors and analysts who were prompted to use the
information in trading in the shares of the corporation.
The question is whether petitioner violated the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws by this
disclosure.

lfp/ss 05/14/83

Rider A, p. 14 (Dirks)

DIRKS14 SALLY-POW
Mere possession of inside information did not
impose an obligation to disclose or abstain in Chiarella.
Similarly, merely receiving information from a corporate
insider is not enough to impose such an obligation.

The

recipient of insider information (a "tipee") cannot be "a
participant after the fact", see Chairella, at n. 12, or a
"constructive trustee", see n. 17, supra, unless the
provider of the information (the "insider") has breached
his duty to the corporation's shareholders.

Moreover, the

tipee must have had "notice of the violation of duty".
Loss, 3, L. Loss,(?) Securities Regulations 1451 (1961).

2.

Note to Jim and myself:

If the above summary is correct,

the next question analytically on the facts of this case
is whether the insiders breached their duty.
on the facts is easy.
Secrest.

The answer

Not even the SEC claims a breach by

Therefore this case could be decided quite

narrowly on its facts.

It still would be an important

case, as the basic principle would be established.

We

would like, in addition, to make clear that the typical
situation in which this question may arise is where
analysts - in the normal course of their work - obtain and
use confidential information.

Determining whether the

tipper has breached a duty and whether the tipee had
notice, present two difficult questions.

The standard we

propose with respect to the tipper is his purpose or
motive - essentially a subjective standard.

It will be

3.

even more difficult to show whether or not the tipee had
notice of an improper motive.

These are the questions

that make this case so difficult.

-f

lfp/ss 05/14/83

Rider A, p. 14 (Dirks)

DIRKS14 SALLY-POW
Mere possession of inside information did not
impose an obligation to disclose or abstain in Chiarella.
Similarly, merely receiving information from a corporate
/

insider is not enough to impose such an obligation.

The

recipient of insider information (a "tipee") cannot be "a
participant after the fact", see Chairella, at n. 12, or a
"constructive trustee", see n. 17, supra, unless the
provider of the information (the "insider") has breached
his duty to the corporation's shareholders.

Moreover, the

tipee must have had "notice of the violation of duty".
Loss, 3, L. Loss,(?) Securities Regulations 1451 (1961).

lfp/ss 05/16/83

Rider A, n. 28, p. 25 (Dirks)

DIRKS24 SALLY-POW
Consider a revision of n. 28 as follows:

We agree with the view expressed in Investor's
Management Co. by Commissioner Smith.
this type of case it is "important

He observed that in
to focus on

policing insiders and what they do • • • rather than on
policing information per se and its possession, which I
think is impracticable."

See n. 19, p. 16.

The root of

the problem lies with the conduct of insiders, and we
think emphasis should continue to be upon such conduct as
it clearly was Cady Roberts.
Similarly, following the Texas Gulf Sulphur
decision, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge spoke of

2.

the limitation - now abandoned by the SEC - that should
apply in insider trading cases under Rule lOb-5:
Turning to the realm of possible defendants
in the present and potential civil actions, the
Commission certainly does not contemplate suing
every person who may come accross inside
information. In the Texas Gulf action neither
tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of
employees have been named as defendants. In my
view, the Commission in future cases normally
should not join rank and file employees of
persons outside the company such as an analyst
or reporter who learn of insider information.

Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional
Group of the American Society of Corporate
Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf
Sulphur Case--What It is and What It Isn't,
Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).

f

'

I
'

I

RIDER B

(P J<:!J)

The dissenting opinion talks at length about shareholder
"losses," "injury," and "damages" without identifying the

e~..t har~

See post, at 4, 7, 8, 1 ~ Some

that the shareholders suffered.

I

/

insight into the dissent's concern can be seen in its assertion that
I

"[t]he effect of Dirks' selective dissemination;?' Secrist's
information was that Dirks' clients were able to shift the losses

l-0
\

that were inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselver
to uninformed market participants."

Id., at 4.

As a descriptive

\

matter, the dissent is correct, but the legal significance of that
conclusion is difficult to understand.

As the dissent notes, the

/

special obligation on insider~ &f fectivel~ is a duty not to trade a~
all on material ryonpublic information.
is concede

Id., at 12-13.

And once it

that there is no duty to disclose absent trading, it is!

h~~scape

the conclusion inJ Frid:ich ;. Bradford, 542 F.2d 30;,

..

318 {CA6 1976}, cert. denied, 429

u.s.

~z ~.t',

1053 (1977}

,Athat

there is no

causal connection between inside trading and outsiders' losses:
"Investors must be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open
market wi~ut complete or always accurate informatio;an·
~ tt~ ~
here can be

.____...

-----

_....

n~

argument that Secrist and Dirks created

"victims" by disclosing the information to

~~.. .
any..Ln

traded.

If

.
.
t~t h ey prevente d the fraud f rom cont1nu1ng
an d1\~
9-r:~~Wlii!!IC•
r
1

e many more i vpstors.

i

perso~ -who

w

~ W6

•
lj ~ ~
f t /-JJf. ;I. (
J\ how Secrist and Dirks silenc

~QQe,

it is

diE~ieul ~e

a~sta~

1

on tne existence of the Equity

Funding fraud would have served "this country's attempt to provide
fair and efficient capital markets."

(

Post, at 14.

~px_L-~M:V~~~
~

#-

.. ~":-

~ ~~1 -t!o' :Alasa• ~~~

(~) . ~~~1...-t-~ &9~~
~~~'5

RIDER C

JUSTICE BLACKMON's dissenting opinion agrees with us th t the
SEC's legal position in the proceeding~
,below is "unsupportable ~ 11 .
.
~
.t .-, 1 ·
·~~SIC~~
;
but adopts t.Ds i:Me ~ new theoryAei' •ehe ~ase. But by presumptively
..that ~ iutended t~facilitate trading

m_
~fjducia~y

duty, the dissenting opinion effectively would
~

achieve the same result as the SEC's old theory, i. e., Apossession
of inside information while trading would be a Rule lOb-S violation.

~~~ ~1

disclosures of inside information

areA b~aches
of
~

fiduciary

'\

duty

)~earl ~~s-ngt

~rec~,

seep. 14, supra, but even

if~ i

.

were,

the Court has rejected the view that all breaches of corporate
fiduciary duties are violations of the federal securities laws, see

of an insider's duty to the corporation's shareholders.

RIDER E

The dissenting opinion makes some policy arguments to support
its view that that our decision "actually rewards Dirks for his
aiding and abetting," post, at 12, and that there is a legal duty
"not to condition .•• transmission of information of a crime on a
~t
financial award," id. It .i--e a1 novel view for a society premised on
individual

~~ ~~~~

freedo~,

however, that Government's failure to punish an

activity is the same as rewarding the participants.

And William

Blundell, who was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of
the Equity Funding scandal, see 681 F.2d, at 832 (Wright, J.), as
well as many other reporters, might be surprised to learn that
reporting of criminal activity for a livelihood violates public
policy.

:

RIDER D

The dissenting opinion is concerned that the requirement that
the insider must personally gain before he breaches his Cady,
Roberts duty will add a significant administrative and judicial
burden in Rule lOb-S cases.

See post, at 10-11, n. 13.

Although we

preclude the SEC's use of a presumption that the insider necessarily
violates his fiduciary duty when the insider knows that the tippee
will trade with the information, we certainly do not discourage the
SEC from all uses of presumptions to facilitate its prosecution of
inside-trading cases.

The voluntary disclosure of material

nonpublic information might be, for example, presumptively a breach
where the informant clearly had a motive for favoring the recipient,
e. g., familial or personal relationships.
of course, be rebuttable.

Such presumptions would,

RIDER A ( '{)

4-)

JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion minimizes the role Dirks
played in making public the Equity Funding fraud.
and 12, n. 15.

The dissent

~

l'lJ

....e&

staft&s~actically-aloR~

See, e. g.,

~

.L.fe~~ ,4:-J ·~

rewrite the history of Dirks

efforts.

See post, at 3

'I\ ~tr~o ~

~s

ef£ort ~

investigative

pp. 115 (testimony of Stanley Goldblum, ~

quity Funding's Chairman and principal architect of
Dirks "personal credit" for uncovering the

fraud)~

S.E.C., at 1412 ("It is clear that Dirks played an important role in
' bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light, and it is also
true that he reported the fraud allegation to [Equity Funding's]
auditors and sought to have the information published in the Wall
Street Journal.")

~

681 F. 2d, at 829 (Wright; J.)

("Largely thanks to

Dirks one of the most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered
and exposed, while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed
opportunities to investigate Equity Funding.").

lfp/ss 05/16/83

Rider A, p.

(Dirks)

DIRKSB SALLY-POW
Add the substance of the following note at some
appropriate place in Part V:
On its facts, this case is the unusual one.
Dirks is

a~

analyst in a broker-dealer firm, and he did

interview management in the course of his investigation.
He uncovered startling information that required no
analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market
relevance.

The principle at issue here, extends far

beyond these facts.

As we note above, the SEC's rule -

applicable without regard to

any breach of duty by an

insider that creates a derivative duty - could have wide
ramifications.

.

~

lfp/ss 05/16/83

Rider A, fn 20, p. 18 (Dirks)

DIRKS18 SALLY-POW
Suggested revision of n. 20:
The SEC's decision in this case is at odds with
that of Walton v. Morgan, Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (CA2
1980).

The defendant investment banking firm, representing

one of its own corporate clients, investigated another
corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by
its client.

In the course of negotiations the investment

banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished
material information.

Subsequently, after the proposed

takeover was abandoned, the firm was charged with relying on
the information when it traded in the target corporation's
stock.

Apparently it was conceded that the firm knew the

information was confidential, but it had been received in
arm's length negotiations.

In the absence of any fiduciary

relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for

t'.

2.
imposing a tippee liability on the investment firm.
id., at 799.

See
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Rider A, page 15
As

this

confidential
with

the

case

illustrates,

corporate

duty

all

information are

insiders

disclosures
not

of

inconsistent

owe to
-tkrc:. '•s A

usual

lA· i•~~«'•

lg..u~v

CIVI.:t,

laM-:Y;.ie€) is

r.eoeive

dnfermation from

be

clear

See n.

iftsiee:t&a~

either

to

It may not

!~supra.

the corporate

eorper~t€?

' insider

or

to

the

recipient analyst - whether the information will be viewed
as material

nonpubli ~formation.

There may be

where

the

analyst

both

insider

and

the

s ~ations ~

recipient

have

acted in good faith, and yet release of the information
affected the market.
duty therefore depends

Whether disclosure is a breach of
in large part on the purpose or

good faith of the insider who made the disclosure.

Absent

an improper purpose, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders

e.g.,

a

corporate

official

mistakenly

thinks the information already has been disclosed or that
it is not material enough to affect the market.
~

T-

absen~

~

a

derivative breach.

breach

by

the

insider,

there

And 4-ft:;,...-is

no

Rider B, p. 15, fn. 20 (Dirks)

lfp/ss 05/23/83
DIRK15B SALLY-POW

We do not suggest that knowingly trading on
inside information is "socially desirable or even that it
is devoid of moral considerations".
do we

~e~

~
an absence of

~

Dooley, at 55.

Nor

responsibility to disclose

promptly indications of illegal actions by a corporation
to the proper authorities - typically the SEC and Exchange
authorities in cases involving securities.

Depending on

~

the circumstances, even where permitted by law one's
~

~

trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that
may fall below ethical standards of conduct adopted by
professional organizations of the securities business.

13u.r
~ ~n

/J.-1£~
of the law such as securities regulation, where

an ~ area

2.

legal principles of general application must be applied,
there may be

...

lfp/ss 05/23/83

Rider A, p. 16 (Dirks)

DIRKS16 SALLY-POW
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a
question of fact, will not always be easy.

8J
A

~

is

essential, we think, to have a guiding principle:

as

stated by Commissioner Smith, there must be a breach of
the insider's fiduciary duty.

The rule adopted by the SEC

in this case would have no limiting principle. 22
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Rider A, page 15
As

this

confidential
with

the

illustrates,

case
corporate

duty

information are

insiders

owe

disclosures

all

of

inconsistent

not

to shareholders.

The more

usual context in which the question of insider duty may
arise

is

when

security

analysts

information from insiders.
be

clear

-

either

to

receive

See n. 16 supra.

the corporate

corporate
It may not

insider or

to the

recipient analyst - whether the information will be viewed
A;t-

as material nonpublicj nformation.

There may be si~ations

where

analyst

both

the

insider

and

the

recipient

have

acted in good faith,

and yet release of the information

affected the market.

Whether disclosure is a breach of

duty therefore depends

in large part on the purpose or

good faith of the insider who made the disclosure.

Absent

an improper purpose, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders

e.g.,

a

corporate

official

mistakenly

thinks the information already has been disclosed or that
it is not material enough to affect the market.

~

abseny

9-f

a

derivative breach.

breach

by

the

insider,

there

And

~

is

no

~
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Rider A, p. 16 (Dirks)

DIRKS16 SALLY-POW
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a
question of fact, will not always be easy.

It is

essential, we think, to have a guiding principle:

as

stated by Commissioner Smith, there must be a breach of
the insider's fiduciary duty.

The rule adopted by the SEC

in this case would have no limiting principle. 22

lfp/ss 05/23/83

Rider B, p. 15, fn. 20 {Dirks)

DIRK15B SALLY-POW
We do not suggest that knowingly trading on
inside information is "socially desirable or even that it
is devoid of moral considerations".

Dooley, at 55.

Nor

do we suggest an absence of all responsibility to disclose
promptly indications of illegal actions by a corporation
to the proper authorities - typically the SEC and Exchange
authorities in cases involving securities.

Depending on

the circumstances, even where permitted by law one's
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that
may fall below ethical standards of conduct adopted by
professional organizations of the securities business.
an area of the law such as securities regulation, where

In

2.

legal principles of general application must be applied,
there may be

Rider A, p.

lfp/ss 06/25/83

(Dirks)

DIRKSB SALLY-POW
Consider adding a note along the following lines:
In applying Rule lOb-5, the dissent would draw a
distinction impossible as a guide to conduct or to
administer by courts and the SEC.

It concedes that an

insider is not liable under the Rule "unless he has the
requisite scienter".

Seen. 10, post.

proposes a new definition of scienter:

The dissent then
"[T]he scienter

requirement addresses the intent necessary to support
liability; it does not address the motives
intent."

Id.

Therefore,

behin~the

~Secrist "knew and intended

~

that Dirks would cause trading", l he possessed the
requisite scienter regardless of what his motives may have
been.

1'·

This distinction ignores both the language of lOb-5

2.

and the meaning of "scienter".
Hochfelder, 425

u.s.

See Ernst & Ernst v.

185, 197-199 (1976)

(the language

"manipulative", "device", and "contrivance" connote
"intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or
defraud investors • . . . ")

Even the unique facts of

this case illustrate the distinction that the dissent
overlooks.

Dirks certainly intended to convey relevant

information that mangement was unlawfully concealing, and
- so far as the record goes - he quite honestly believed
that persuading Dirks to investigate was the best way to
disclose the fraud.

The dissent acknowledges that any

other means of "disclosures would have been difficult",
post, at 13, and yet would charge Secrist with a breach of
fiduciary duty even though there was no motive to deceive
or defraud investors".

We recognize the inherent

3.

difficult of detemining either the intent or motive of an
actor in a particular situation.
for a subjective inquiry.

Each connotes the need

Courts, however, necessarily

look to objective evidence to ascertain the statutory
requirement of intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.
The standard adopted by the Court today in cases of this
kind is whether the insider receives a direct or indirect
personal benefit from the disclosure.
may be it is a standard.

Imperfect as this

The dissent's distinction

between "intent" and "motive" is without precedent and is
standardless •

• <

RIDER D

Scienter--"a mental state embracing intent to deceive,

u.s.

manipulate, or defraud," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425

185,

193, n. 12 (1976)--is an independent element of a Rule lOb-S
violation.

See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980).

Contrary to

the dissent's suggestion, see post, at p. 7, n. 10, motivation is
not irrelevant to the issue of scienter.

It is not enough that an

insider's conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a violation
may be found only where there is "intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the price of securities."
Hochfelder, supra, at 199.

Ernst & Ernst v.

The issue in this case, however, is not
~

whether Secrist or Dirks acted with scienter, but rather there was
1\

any deceptive or fraudulent conduct at all, i.e., whether Secrist's
disclosure constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty and thereby
caused injury to shareholders.

Seen. 27, infra.

Only if there was

such a breach did Dirks, a tippee, acquire a fiduciary duty to
disclose or abstain.

77.-.c-

~

1\~bJ.ot~!H!Iii tha

e1

RIDER E

'i~ ~U~9Rill

f3a4:A 1

~JQ

ii~li'Q~~hat

_.il:AR9t

"Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding shareholders by
transmitting material nonpublic information to Dirks with the
intention that Dirks would cause his clients to trade on that
information."

Post, at 12.

By

~reach

of fiduciary duty

whenever inside information is intentionally disclosed to securities
traders, the

disse~t~n 1 ~ inion

t H&

[

-

effectively would achieve the same

"-

result as the SEC's theory below, i. e., mere possession of inside

... f*"

information while tradinJ

~ ~ ~ IACt~....,J..

........._

u aM-1 a Rule lOb-S violation.

issent agrees that an insider does not violate Rule lOb-S

The /,./"

~ss

he

intend[s] that the inside information be used for
of shareholders." - Post, at 8, n. 11. --Bu~
1ntentional disclosures to those

~~~~~~A

~ ~ ,lc .

ho will trade

w ~l r be

. ;B ~c..ll..a ,_...a._.,.........~~~~

~,.,..., t:7'JI(.J

o:A aRd

shareholders. ~ ~1
~
.~
~
&haaA . , ·
Me,.4ft4J

to the disadvantage 6f

••a·t

.

......~~

diS.C..~1.1r~J\ inside information ~ not ~~

of an

~Chiarella,

.,fr

;x!.. .fl.

445
I 0 .(,. .S-

u.s.,

of ~;:~l!al GeeYFities
1~,

there must be fraud.

See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425

U.S. 185, 199 {1976} {statutory words "manipulative," "device," and
"contrivance ••• connot[e] intentional or willful conduct designed
to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially
affecting the price of securities"}
}~ There

{emphasis added}.

is no evidence that Secrist's disclosure was intended to

or did in fact "deceive or defraud" anyone.

Secrist certainly

intended to convey relevant information that management was
unlawfully concealing, and -- so far as the record shows -- he

believed that

persuk~s~i~ :::::::/::::~

disclose the fraud. l Under any objective standard, Secrist received
no direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure.
The dissenting opinion tallts

t.c:~~ch-t; shareholder

&t ie1'1:~+!'R1)

"losses," "injury," and "damages," but as the court noted in
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (CA6 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977), there is no clear causal connection between
inside trading and outsiders' losses: "Investors must be prepared to
accept the risk of trading in an open market without complete or
always accurate information."

In one sense, as market values

fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect
information, there always are winners and losers; those who have
"lost" have not been defrauded.
fraudulent

other

federal securities

~nside

trading for personal gain is
is a violation of the

investors would prefer to

--~--

stock where directors and officers do not secretly compensate
themselves and "indulg [e themselves] to the point of dishonesty" b

---

trading on information not available to shareholders

~

Dooley,

Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 va. L. Rev. 1, 3941, 70 (1980),.,
•

1~

SHPra.

t.ft us=~aely_ ~~ ~~

Thus, there is little legal significance to the

dissent's argument that Secrist and Dirks created new "victims" by
disclosing the information to persons who traded.

In fact, they

prevented the fraud from continuing and victimizing many more
doubt whether Secrist and Dirks' silence
the Equity Funding fraud would have served

3.

to provide fair and efficient capital markets."
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FIRST DRAFT: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether an individual
who

is not

nonetheless

~

...

(

an officer or director of J a corporation but
receives

\

material

information

nonpublic

concerning ongoing criminal conduct within the corporation
from

an

officer

or

director

violates

the

antifraud

provisions of the federal securities laws by transmitting

1

that information to persons who use the information to buy
or sell the corporation's stock.
I

In March

1973,

petitioner was an officer at a New

York broker-dealer firm, providing investment analysis on
insurance company securities to
On March 6,

petitioner

received

1

institutional investors.
information

from Ronald

Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America, a
diversified

company

primarily

engaged

in

selling

life

insurance and mutual funds, to the effect that the assets
of that company were vastly overstated as the result of

2

2.

fraudulent
that

internal corporate practices.

regulatory

charges

made

agencies

by

Equity

had

failed

Funding

Seer ist stated

to

act

on

employees,

similar

and

urged

petitioner to verify the fraud and publicly disclose it.
Petitioner

decided

~
allegations

~

.I ~

to

investigate

its

to Los Angeles, where Equity Funding
~

headquarters,

company.

Despite

..u}-~~~

interview

employees

A

denials

senior
substantial

the

fl!tuv"

£ly~
A

~

had

personally

2

of

management,

corroboration of

the

wrongdoing

current and former company employees.

of

the

di

~

by

petitioner
charges

of

obtained
fraud

3

from

Neither petitioner

nor his firm owned or traded any Equity Funding stock, but
throughout
discussed

his
with

investigation,
a

number

of

petitioner

investors

and

candidly

analysts

the

3

progress of his investigation and the information he had
obtained.
with
their

Not surprisingly, some of the persons who spoke

petitioner
holdings

investment

and

learned

of

of

Equity

Funding

advisers

who

the

alleged

communicated

fraud

securities.
with

sold
Five

petitioner

liquidated securities worth more than $16 million.
During

the

entire

week

that

petitioner

was

in Los

4

3.

Angeles, he was in touch regularly with William Blundell,
the

Wall

Street

Journal's

Los

Angeles

bureau

chief.

Petitioner urged Blundell to write a story for the Journal

fr.-~
on the allegations

'\

however,

o~-fra~a

.

a-t -Bq1:1i Ly fi'uwHAg.

4

Blundell,

was afraid that publishing such damaging rumors

supported only by hearsay from former employees might be
libelous and declined to write the story, discounting the
allegations because he did not believe that such a huge

5

fraud could go undetected.
During
pursued

the

his

charges,

two-week

investigation

period
and

in

spread

which
word

petitioner

of Seer ist' s
stock

fell

precipitously from $26 per share to less than $15.

This

the

price

of

Equity

Funding

5

led the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to halt trading on
March 27.

Shortly thereafter state insurance authorities

impounded Equity Funding's records and uncovered evidence
of the fraud.
Commission (SEC)

Only then did the Securities and Exchange
file a complaint against Equity Funding 1

1As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations
of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding.
Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an official of the California
Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in
Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud.
Petitioner
Footnote continued on next page.

6

and only then, on April 2, did the Journal publish a front
page

story

based

Equity

petitioner.
.

h.

largely

on

information

Funding

assembled

immediately

went

by
into

~~a.f~e:v~~~~

2

The SEC+~~= ~t~t

rece1vors 1p.

a,''AJ'

~~.a.--~j/tL

s

~

~

.Petitioner '\aided and abetted violations of §17 (a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, lS u.s.c. §77q(a)
of

the

Securities

Exchange

Act

of

(1976) , 3 §10 (b)

1934,

lS

u.s.c.

§78j(b) , 4 and Commission Rule lOb-S, 17 C.P.R. §240.10b-S

himself voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's
regional office beginning on March 27.
2A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently
returned a lOS-count indictment against 22 persons,
including many of Equity Funding's officers and directors.
Those proceedings were concluded by entry of guilty pleas
or convictions after trial of all defendants for one or
more of the counts against them.
3section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the
offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the
use of the mails, directly or indirectly-"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, or
" ( 2) to obtain money or property by means
of any untrue statement of a rna ter ial fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
"(3}
to
engage
in
any
transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser."
4section lO(b) provides:
Footnote continued on next page.

6

~~- h).,e..,~~~

5.

(Jz=~r~ /Jl:-~ 'P-dv- ~~
4~9~~~~

~~~~~

(1982) , 5

~tA-L.. ~·.L.-U_A.-o£- .. ...«i#~ ?)
-~-~;e.--~11..
~~~
when

he

repeated

the

allegations

of

fraud

to

7

--~J'".4"7 ~q~L

members of the investment community ~ho later sold their
Equity Funding

stock.

The Commission concluded:

.

tr~

"Where

'tippees'--regardless of their motivation or occupation-come

in to

possess ion

of

rna ter ial

information

that

they

know is confidential and know or should know came from a
corporate
that

insider,'

information

or

they

must

refrain

either
from

publicly

trading."

disclose
21

S.E.C.

"It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange--

....

"(b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a
national
securities exchange or
any
security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public
interest
or
for
the
protection of
investors."
5 Rule lOb-S provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."

7

6.

Docket

1401,

Chiarella
(1980)).

1407

v.

United

(footnote

States,

445

(quoting

omitted)

u.s.

222,

230

n.

12

Recognizing, however, that petitioner played "an

important

role

fraud

light,"

to

( 1981)

in

bringing
21

[Equity

Funding] 's

Docket,

at

S.E.C.

8

massive

1412-1413,

the

Commission only censured petitioner for his conduct. 6
The

Court of Appeals

for

the District of

Columbia

entered a judgment without accompanying opinion, denying,

8

"for the reasons stated by the Commission in its opinion,"
petitioner's
Judge

Tamm

petition
dissented

Judge Wright,
Judge

Robb

for
from

review
the

of

the

censure order.

judgment.

Subsequently,

a member of the panel,

concurred

in

the

issued an opinion.

result,

and

dissented; neither filed a separate opinion.
believed

that

"the

obligations of corporate

Judge

Tamm

Judge Wright
fiduciaries

pass to all those to whom they disclose their information
before it has been disseminated to the public at large."

6 section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
u.s.c. §78..Q.(b) (4) (E), provides that the Commission may
impose certain sanctions, including a censure, on any
person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has
"willfully aided
[or]
abetted" any violation of the
federal
securities
laws.
See
15
u.s.c.
§78ff(a)
{providing criminal penalties).

9

7.

681

F.2d 824,

concluded

839

that,

(1982).

as

an

employee

petitioner "had [violated]
the

public completely

Alternatively,
of

a

obligations to the SEC and to

independent of any obligations he

We granted a writ of certiorari, ___
the

9

broker-dealer,

acquired" from sources at Equity Funding.

because of

Judge Wright

Id., at 840.

u.s. ___

(1982),

10

56C~}k
importance to the securities industry of
A

the question presented by this case.

We now reverse the

judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
The

majority

corporate

rule

officers

and

in

this

country

is

that,

while

10

~~t!l.-1~~

directors

fiduciary duties to preserve

owe

thei r

corporation

~

its assets and to maintain

its secrets, that duty does not apply to the stockholder
in the sale and purchase of stock.

See, e. g., Treadway

Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 375-377 (CA2
1980);

3A

Fletcher

Cyclopedia

of

the

Laws

Corporations §1168.1 (1975 & 1982 Supp.).
jurisdictions,

however,

fiduciary

running

duty

have
from

recognized
the

of

11

Private

A minority of
an

corporate

independent
officers

and

directors to individual shareholders with whom they trade

11

8.

in the corporation's stock.
118 Ga.
Kan.

362,

45 S.E.

498, 77 P.

277

232

See, e. g., Oliver v. Oliver,
(1903);

(1904);

Stewart v. Harris,

69

3A Fletcher, supra, §1168.2.

These courts hold that, while he is not forbidden to deal
with a shareholder, an officer or director's relationship

12

of trust requires him to "inform such stockholder of the
true condition of the affairs of the corporation" before
trading with him.
281.

Stewart,

Cf. Strong v. Repide,

69

Kan.,

213

u.s.

at 508,

77 P.,

419, 431-435

at

(1909)

(duty to disclose because of special circumstances).

12
)

'/L.~/

clnsistent

with

this

latter

"agency"

uty

owed

by

i~{iders directly to their company's shareholders, the SEC

41

n

the

S.E.C.

seminal
907

case

of

In

re Cady,

(196l), f recognized

insiders'

agency duties

violation

of

Rule

that

Roberts
a

&

breach

Co.,

40

of

the

to shareholders also could be a

lOb-5. 7

The

Commission

13

acknowledged

7 There are good reasons to view the breach of this
articular common-law duty as a violation of the fe~ral /
securities laws.
The breach of an insider's ~ustee
duties to the corporation are peculiarly _wi~hin the
corporation's ability to police, foL incompetence or
negligence in management, while not beneficial to any
particular corporation's stoCk, do not undermine the
integrity
of
the
securities
market
as
a
whole.
Corporations may have little incentive, on the other hand,
to sanction violations of an insider's agency duties to
shareholders,
and
the
breaches
of
this
duty
are
Footnote continued on next page.

I

9.

that the special obligation to disclose 8 or abstain from
trading

traditionally

has

been

required

directors, and controlling stockholders,

of

officers,

id., at 911, but

did not so limit the breadth of the duty required by the

13

federal securities laws.
Analytically,
the
obligation, rests
on
two
principal elements; first, the existence of a
relationship
giving
access,
directly
or
indirectly,
to
information
intended
to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second,
the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.

particularly
difficult
for
outsiders
to
detectn
Consequently, investors that prefer to own stock where the
directors
and
officers
do
not
secretly
compensate
themselves and "indulg ~ themselves] to the point of
dishonesty" by trading on information not available to
market
participants
generally
may
have
difficulty
distinguishing between corporations that tolerate such
practices and those that do not. See Dooley, Enforcement
of Insider Trading Rest~ictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 39-41,
70 (1980). These dishonest acts induce investors to enter
into or remain in a relationship that they would prefer to
avoid, and the resulting loss of welfare inevitably
undermines market confidence. See In re Faberge, Inc., 45
S.E.C. ):4~ 254 (1973).
Thus, insider trading satisfies
the legal requirements of §lOb because it presupposes both
i~stor injury and deception.
See Dooley, supra, at 41
e agree with the Cady, Roberts Commission that "[a]
significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate
the idea that use of inside information for personal
advantage was a normal emolument of corporate off ice."
See 40 S.E.C., at 912 n. 15. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc.
v. Provident Securites Co., 423 u.s. 232, 255 (1976); §16
of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 u.s.c. §78p; H.R. Rep.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); s. Rep. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 9 (1934).
8The SEC's disclosure duty is not just to the
immediate purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate
disclosure of significant corporate developments can only
be effected by public release through the appropriate
public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to
the investing public generally and without favoring any
special per son or group."
Faberge, Inc., 45 S .E. C. , at
256.

14

14

10.

Id., at 912

(footnote omitted).

at 241 (BURGER, C.J.,
&

Co.,

See Chiarella, 445

dissenting~

43 S .E.C. 1080, 1085

u.s.,

In re Van Alstyne, ,Noel

(1969)

(noting "the inherent

unfairness involved where one, with access by virtue of a
special

relationship

to

information ••• intended

to

the
be

to

issuer
available

15

material

only

for

a

corporate purpose and not for his personal benefit, takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable toj

15
Fenner

&

Smith,

Inc.,

43 S.E.C.

933,

936

(1968).

Thus

the Commission has expanded the class of individuals wh
I

I
\

fall under the federal disclose-or-abstain obligation, an
premised
existence

the
of

disclosure
a

requirement

relationship

simply

affording

on

access

" ( i)
to

the

inside

information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose,

and

( ii)

the unfairness of allowing a corporate

insider to take advantage of that information by trading
without disclosure."

--·

--

Chiarella, 445

-- - --: ~-- --

u.s.,

at 227. 9

--- ---

J

9 The Cady, Roberts conditions for imposing a duty
to disclose or abstain from trading are not arbitrary
limitations on the use of inside information, but are
consistent with the common-law rules and grounded in the
policies underlying the federal securities laws.
As a
Footnote continued on next page.

I

16

11.

In

Chiarella,

we

quoted

with

approval

the

Cady,

16

Roberts statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain
rule

and

finding

adopted
a

the

violation

restrictions--a
exploitation

of

of

Commission's

10b-5's 10

Rule

fiduciary
confidential

result of that relationship.

twin

elements

insider-trading

relationship
information
See 445

for

and

acquired

u.s.,

at 227.

the
as

a

The

~ -J tlSki~ this Court unanimously agreed that there is no

general

duty

11

to

material nonpublic

make

disclosure

information,

12

before

trading

with

and recognized that "a

general proposition,
there
is no duty to disclose
information to the public at large before engaging in a
commercial transaction or before imparting the information
to other persons.
See Chiarella, 445 u.s., at 228: id.,
at 239-240 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting).
Moreover, itTs
evident that stock ownership and securities trading by
insiders
are
not
nec~ariry
detrimental
to
the
corporation, to shareholders, or to society.
Thus, the
Cadx, Roberts elements are simply an acknowledgement that
it 1s only some uses of inside information, and then only
under certain circumstances, that will create liability.
lOAlthough §10 (b) and §17 (a) both extend to a wide
variety of
fraudulent
practices,
there
are
certain
differences in their coverage. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 u.s.
680, 687-702 (1980).
In determining whetherthere is a
duty to disclose nonpublic information before trading or
tipping, however, identical principles apply.
11 The Court of Appeals in Chiarella had affirmed
petitioner's conviction by holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate insider or not--who regularly receives-material
nonpublic information may not use that information to
trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty
to disclose.'" 445 u.s., at 231 (emphasis in original).
12 See 445 U.S., at 233: id., at 237 (STEVENS, J.,
concurring): id., at 238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in
the result); id., at 239-240 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting)
Footnote continued on next page.
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12.

duty to disclose under §lO(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information."

17

Id., at 235.

Instead, such a duty arises either from the existence of a
fiduciary relationship or some act of misappropriation or
.
13
convers1on.
Chiarella

turned

on

the

absence

d-4relationship,

~

this

was

the

"'

r-

of

a

fiduciary

element

of

18

an

insider-trading violation that was missing from the case

PL::z_. fagainst petitioner there.

(1--1><'

-B-Y-t ~ e also recognized " ''4-t

..'

1/V WzS4.-.

to

the ~»act of trading which essentially con st i tu tes~/ the

violation of Rule lOb-5, for it is this which brings( the
illicit

benefit

to

the

insider,

and

it

is

this con uct

which impairs the integrity of the market and which is
target of the rule."

he

Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d

("As a general rule, neither party to an arm's-length
business
transaction
has
an obligation
to disclose
information to the other unless the parties stand in some
confidential or fiduciary relation."): id., at 252, n. 2
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (recognizing that there is no
obligation to disclose material nonpublic information
obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and
"honest means," as opposed to "stealth").
13see
445
u.s.,
at
227-235:
id.,
at
238-239
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in the resul t)--;--id. , at 2 39-243
(BURGER, C.J., dissenting) (duty of disclosure arises from
mere possession only where
information is illegally
obtained): id., at 245-247 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)
(mere possession creates duty where information not
legally available to others in the investment community).

18

13.

318

(CA6 1976), cert.

445

u.s.,

at

227;

denied,

id.,

at

u.s.

429

228-229

[between insiders and shareholders]
to

disc lose

because

of

the

1055

("This

(1977).

See

relationship

19

gives rise to a duty /1

'necessity

of

preventing

a

corporate insider from ••• tak[ing] unfair advantage of the
uninformed

minority

Transamer ica Corp.,
id., at 249

stockholders.'")
99

F.

Supp.

(quoting

808,

829

(BLACKMON, J., dissenting)

the courts have stressed

the

Speed

(Del.

1951));

insider's misuse of secret

Commission noted in Cady, Roberts,
exploitation

of

19

("Both the SEC and

knowledge as the gravamen of illegal conduct.").

insider's

v.

As the

unjust enrichment, the

information

"not

for

the

20
I

personal

benefit

of

anyone,"

is

also

an

element

violation of the duty to disclose or abstain.
insider,

because of

the

fiduciary

of

Thus,

status he has

a
an

to the

shareholders of his corporation, will be liable where he
exploits material nonpublic information for personal gain
and fails to disclose that information before doing so.
III

Unlike

insiders

who

..tyPje&liY

;,
relationship

with

the

have

a

fiduciary

~~

corporation)

'\ shareholders,

the

20

~?'LO

~

typical tippee.A doQs Ret--heW'! a
~

f\

$'

.f.;iduoi«~y

In

relationship w4-t.1:h
~

21

~~~~
}~e ab•enGQ ef such
/

"duty" to refrain from trading on inside information.
What is clear is the prophylactic need for a ban on
.

~t

ieast some tippee trading.

~) are
from

using

Because

forbidden by their

undisclosed

corporate

~

corporate 1Ao£fi~ers

~ationship

information

to

their

personal advantage, they may not give such information to
outsiders

for

the same improper purpose.

"[T] hat which

sure, under certain circumstances, such as
where cor orate information is revealed legitimately to an
underwri er, accountant, or attorney working for the
company, ~ outsiders may, as a result of such relationship,
become fiduciaries of the company. The basis for imposing
fiduciary duties is not simply that such persons acquired
nonpublic corporate information, but that they have
~~ entered into ~~onfidential relationship in the conduct of
·~ ,-the business ·o'I: the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes.
See SEC v.
Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 942 {CA2 1979); In re
Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 {1971); In re
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 {1969);
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43
S.E.C. 933, 937 {1968);
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
~ S.E.C., at 912.
When such'\ ~ breaches his fiduciary
111
~~-relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper
than a tippee.
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 {CA2 1974)
{investment banker learned rna ter ial information through
. . _ _,}. _ his work on a proposed public offering for the company) •
~
For t~ duties to be imposed, however, "there must be
some expectation of trust and confidence with respect to
the information imparted, and the person receiving the
information must assent at least implicitly to the
expectation."
Langevoort,
Insider
Trading
and
the
Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70
Calif. L. Rev. 1, 30 {1982).

21

15.

the

trustee

has

no

right

Mosser

authorize •••• "

to

v.

do

he

Darrow,

has

:J?tH-t.her,

participate

with

forbidden"

as

himself."

Id.

the
the

right

u.s.

341

s ~,
(1951}.

no

267,

to

22

272

~
transactions of -a-i-1 who knowingly

~~~~*"~;{

transactions

"on

See Jackson v.

(1921}; Jackson v. Ludeling, 88

such

a

behalf
Smith,

u.s.

As the Court explained in Mosser,

breach
of

254

the

u.s.

are

"as

trustee
586,

589

22

616, 631-632 (1874}.

a contrary rule "would

open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of
the others that the trustee could not conduct in his own."
341

u.s.,

at 271. 15

Hence,

as

we

23
noted

in

Chiarella,

"[t]he

tippee's

obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a
participant after

the fact

fiduciary duty."

445

u.s.,

in the insider's breach of a
at 230 n.

12. 16

As the SEC

15"Ei ther
the
transactions
so
traded
could
be
concluded by a relative or an acquaintance of the insider,
or
implied
understandings
could
arise
under
which
reciprocal tips between insiders in different corporations
could be given." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 446 F.2d
1301, 1308 (CA2}, cert. denied, 404 u.s. 1005 (1971}.
16 For
this
proposition,
the
Court
cited
Subcommittees of American Bar Association Section of
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Comment Letter on
Material, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 1973} reprinted
in BNA, Securities Regulation & Law Report No. 233, at Dl,
D2 (Jan. 2, 1974}, which states:
Footnote continued on next page.

16.

concedes, the tippee's duty is purely "derivative" of his
informant's duty.

Tr.

445

(BLACKMUN,

U.s.,

at

Management,
concurring

246
44

of Oral Arg.

S.E.C.,

J.,

at

in the result)

See Chiarella,

38.

dissenting);

651

23

(Smith,

Investors

Commissioner,

(" [T] ippee responsibility must

be related back to insider responsibility by a necessary

24

finding that the tippee knew the information was given to
him

in

breach

of

relationship

to

information.").
tippees

may

It

r

by a

issuer

therefore
an

is

person
not
is

because

rather

having
to

clear

insider's

not

that,

they

special

disclose

~GJj

~e

a

although
to

dut 1f'

receive

they

the

24

ins idee:..--

receive

d-i:he-1

As THE CHIEF JUSTICE stated

improperly.

in

a disclosure obligation should exist "when an

informational
experience,

the

this

information,

Chiarella,

duty

assume

shareholders,

~

a

advantage

foresight,

or

is

obtained,

not

by

superior

industry, but by some unlawful

[I]t appears that the Commission's view is based
upon the premise that the tippee who does trade
upon such information is a participant after the
fact in the tipping corporate official's breach
of
fiduciary
duty,
and,
under
common
law
principles, the tippee may be held responsible
for
the
consequences
of
that
breach
in
appropriate cases.

25

17.

means."

445

U.S.,

at

240

(BURGER,

C.J.,

dissenting}

(emphasis added} • 17
When

tipping

properly

is

viewed

as

a

means

indirectly violating the disclose-or-abstain rule,
~t

the elements of a

rule

it

of

is6

25

lOb-5 violation in a

tipping case should be the same as in an insider trading
case.
not

Thus,
impose

Chiarella,

just as possession of inside information did
an

obligation

s~

to

disclose

or

abstain

in

"tippee" of corporate insiders is

2E

C"(

not enough to inherit such a duty.

In other words,

the

?

simple release of information may violate trustee duties
to

the

company,

but

it

violates no obligations

running

1 7Professor Loss has traced tippee liability to the
concept in the law of restitution that "' [w]here a
fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary
communicates confidential information to a third person,
the third person, if he had notice of the violation of
duty, holds upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary
any profit which he makes through the use of such
information.'"
3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451
(1961}
(quoting
Restatement
of
Restitution
§201(2}
(1937}}.
Other authorities ~ I1kewise A expressed the
view that tippee liability ex1s s only where there has
been a breach of trust by an insider. See, e. g., Ross v.
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410
(SDNY 1973}: Brudney,
Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 348
(1979}: Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry
Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information,
121 u. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 818 n. 76 (1973} ("The extension
of rule lOb-5
restrictions to tippees of corporate
insiders can best be justified on the theory that they are
participating_ in the insider's breach of his fiduciary
duty."} •

(

18.

?

~

directly to shareholders.
A

2€

The Commission's position, as stated in its opinion,
is

that

"tippees

such

as

[petitioner]

who

receive

non-

public material information from insiders become 'subject
to the same duty as [the]
1410

n.

Fenner

42

{quoting

& Smith,

insider,'" 21 S.E.C. Docket, at

Shapiro

Inc.,

495

v.

Merrill

F.2d

228,

Lynch,
237

Pierce,

{CA2

1974)

{quoting Ross v. Licht,

263 F. Supp., at 410)), and that

"a

fiduciary

tippee

breaches

the

duty which

he

2i

assumes

from the insider when the tippee knowingly transmits the
information
basis

to

someone

thereof,"

21

who

S.E.C.

will
Docket,

probably
at

1410

trade
n.

on

42.

the

2i

The

outsider, by simply possessing nonpublic information while
trading with a shareholder,

is thus a participant in the

insider's breach of duty to the shareholder and violates

evu-

his inherited obligation to the shareholder when he is on
notice that the insider himself is disabled from using the
information without disclosure.
, . 1 ,,

~~

IV~~·
~ .f·
J

~
5 ~~-

Courts are not free to "disregard [an] agency's view"
of one of its statutes and to construe the statute based

~

vv~
~ 6f-'

11

")f..

IK

D'W

~f- ~

'

2~

19.

on their
and

"own view of what would best serve the purpose

policy"

Commission

v.

of

the

statute.

See

Federal

Election

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,

454 u.s. 27, 36 (1981).

differs little from tfie

The SEC's theory here, 18 however,
~ vi4..-cvtheory that we rejected as

....SEe'~

inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella.

In

~

essence,

the

Commission's position

is

that

~

disclose

or

abstain

~assed

t\

automatically

~

duty

to

w-k.t ...

.t6

-1.

petitioner

' /lh"Yk.t .y~-/-t.f
SEC
itself / _bas" recognized
that
tippee
liability properly is imposed only in circumstances where
the "tippee" knows, or has reason to know, that the
insider
has
improperly
disclosed , inside
corporate
information.
In Investors Management Co., the Commission
stated that in finding tippee liability one element is
that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that the
information
was
non-public
and
had
been
obtained
improperly by selective revelation or otherwise." Id., at
641 (emphasis added).
Commissioner Smith, concurring in
Investors Management, expressly read this test to mean
that before a tippee can be held liable it must be shown
that he received information in breach of an insider's
duty not to disclose it.
Id., at 649 (warning against
interpretations that would "penalize or thwart the quest
for new knowledge by analysts and researchers").
Indeed,
before this case, the Commission apparently never held
that tippee liability may be imposed where there has been
no breach of fiduciary duty by the insider.
What the Commission has said is that a recipient of
the information need not have "actual knowledge that the
information was disclosed in a breach of fiduciary duty
not to reveal it."
Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C., at 256
(emphasis added).
See Investors Management Co.,
44
s ,.E.C., at 643. , These statements s:::r:mp;fy indicate thatl\ a
br~ach
of duty by the insider is required, but that
constructive knowledge of the breach will suffice. , Th 1
impo~ee r1a 1 1 y unae:r sue
cfrcumst:ances is
thus nothing more than an applic 'on f the well-accepted
common-law principle
one who acquires nonpublic
information throug participation in a breach of duty may
become a "constructive trustee" with fiduciary duties with
r~spect
to that information.
See 5 A. Scott, Scott o
~~ sts §506, at 3569-3570 (1967).
18 The

")

28

29

), ;U

t.~ <- t-A-< d.

I.J :J ;/ "?~

~ " (L'.,~ 1_.;
act of disclosure

~

L

I

with the inside information ~ana ~e m~r~
,
/. L/jl • L /
/
~
of nonpublic information by corporate insiders, regardless
1

.

.L

of how proper and legal, conferred on petitioner duties of

~~

f

y

Ln-hQld~ng,

drsclosure.

)t " ~

'

howev~~,

29

1

f

that the mere possession

'\
of nonpublic material information

do~s

noe

. .s .

g1ve~ r1se

to a

.d uty to disclose,. s..e-e-4-4.5--U-..S., at 235,
0

fi:nd

c..

~

a general duty between all participants in
market transactions to forgo actions based on
material, nonpublic information. Formulation of
such a broad duty, which departs radically from
the established doctrine that arises from a
specific
relationship
between
two
parties ••• should not be undertaken absent some
explicit evidence of congressional intent.

30 1

30

Id., at 233.

We

311

thef."e f. re

r

again

must

reject

SEe's

the

imposition of the abstain-or-disclose obligation on anyone

w-b>
'~!hat
knowingly
and trades.

possesses material nonpublic

information

As we noted in Chiarella, adopting the SEC's
~

rule could have consequences ..f.a.r beyond any that we have
assurance Congress intended.
disclosure
possession
1/t.A.tr~.-t /..

obligation
of

on

the

who

knowingly

nonpublic
,<

-i

Cti>mmission

all

material

mposing the abstain-or-

~

come

into

information,

the

-IP(

normal

and

beneficial

market-

31

facilitating
maintaining
market

an

orderly

participants

security

any

information

security .. eo a
Congress

the

confederates,

cease

they

market.

trading

knowingly

We

such

have no

a

a

have

had

no

result.

reason

nonpublic

for

to assume

~~
Eh:amat1c

require

particular

possess

reason

trading activities of
we

in

To

~{fl~~r~

ha~t.

intended

scrutinize

to

time

could,j

securities

that
that

Although we

insiders and their
to

advantages that market

~

consider

1

the

their normal
objectives of the

federal securities laws.

32

19

But not only could

the Commission 1 s

tippee-trading

~
l9As this Court recognized in
445 u.s.,
at 233, Congress has expressly exempted ~ market
professionals from the general statutory prohibition set
forth in §ll(a}(l} of the Act, 15 u.s.c. §78k(a}(l},
against members of a national securities exchange trading
for their own account.
We s~ecifically observed, 445
u.s., at 233 n. 16, that "[t]he exception is based upon
Congress 1
recognition
that
[market
professionals]
contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same
time they exploit the informational advantage that comes
from their possession of [nonpublic information]." As the
Commission i tse,lf has recognized, "market professionals
have been permitted to enjoy these market information and
competitive advantages because they have obligations to
the markets for the securities that they trade and have
made
significant
contributions
to
the
continuity,
liquidity and depth of the markets for these securities."
SEC, Report of the Special Study of the Options Markets,
House Comm. on Int. and For. Commerce, Comm. Print No.
IFC3, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1978}.
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22.

rules impair market orderliness, they also could penalize
analytical excellence and, indeed, would place in jeopardy
those
values

analysts
not

existence
before

have

generally

of

the

who

perceived

unsoundness
common

sufficient

or

even

crowd. 20

As

insight

or

securities law structure manifests,

to

fraud
the

true

where

the

observe

recognize
in

the

federal

public policy favors
and this is

information concerns criminal

fraud within the corporation.

3~

securities

entire

the unfettered dissemination of information,
especially

to

Yet the resources available

to government law enforcement agencies to investigate all

2 0The SEC here also recognized the positive side to
information-gathering by securities analysts: "The value
to the entire market of these efforts cannot be gainsaid~
market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by
such initiatives to ferret out and anlyze information, and
thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of the
investors."
21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1406. Accordingly, the
Commission acknowledges the need to accommodate the two
goals of market efficiency and fairness, and would permit
analysts to "utilize non-public, inside information which
in itself is immaterial in order to fill in 'interstices
in analysis.'"
21 S.E.C.
Docket,
at 1409
(quoting
Investors Management, 44 S.E.C., at 646). An analyst is
free to "weav [e) together a series of publicly available
facts
and nonmaterial
inside disclosures
to form a
'mosaic' which is only material after the bits and pieces
are assembled into one picture."
21 S.E.C. Docket, at
1409. But the Commission's rule is inherently imprecise,
and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their
actions in accord with legal requirements. Tippees are in
a poor position to distinguish
information that is
"interstices in analysis" and that which is material in
itself.
Tippees would necessarily act at their peril in
exploiting
such
information,
and
this
risk
almost
certainly would chill the socially desirable activities of
securities analysts.

34

23.

rumors are limited,
incentive

to

and private parties with a financial

pursue

evidence

of

wrongdoing

provide

a

34

valuable supplement, see, e. g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377

u.s.

426,

432

(1964), even if their investigation is

not motivated by altruism.
costly,

and

if

an

Investigative efforts can be

investigation

does

not

hold out

the

possibility of financial or at least reputational benefit
which may translate into financial benefit at some later
point,

no analyst will

resources

and

expose

be

likely

himself

to

to devote
personal

substantial
danger 21

to

investigate rumors of corporate fraud. 22

21 It is doubtful that many corporate conspiracies
can be uncovered without obtaining information from an
inside source. Evidence of an ongoing criminal conspiracy
involving those who control the company will not likely
become public through the Commission's periodic disclosure
requirements.
22 This empirical assumption in no way suggests that
knowingly trading on inside information by securities
analysts is "socially desirable or even that it is devoid
of moral considerations." Dooley, supra, at 55. Nor does
it suggest that it is unreasonable to expect that all
citizens, including securities analysts, have a social
obligation to disclose promptly indications of illegal
actions by a corporation to the proper authorities-typically the SEC in cases involving securities.
See
Lorie, Public Policy for American Capital Markets 11
(1974).
On
the
contrary,
~
trading
on
inside
information clearly is behavior that falls below the
standard of conduct to which many aspire.
See Code of
Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct of the
Financial Analysts Federation (as amended May 9, 1982).
That conclusion does not, however, further analysis very
far.
There are "si~nificant distinctions between actual
obligations and eth1cal ideals."
s. Rep. No. 75, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 237-238 (1975). Recognizing that insider
Footnote continued on next page.

35

24.

35
~~

a tipping case against
an insider J un(:ler the

fede~fra-tiQ

p~onii,

f~

prove

insider

exploited

of

fiduciary

confidential
duties

to

to

information

;r

that

in

the

violation

shareholders.

Liability

his
for

-i t ... is

disclosing

36

l..

material nonpublic information thus depends on the purpose

/J
of the disclosure.
discloses material,
trades

on

disclosure

the

I

i~formant

An

nonpublic information to 7one who

information

was

will be liable if (i) he

and

(ii)

~~~
~

to

s

.

benef1t

the purpose of
in

return

the

~:rom

t.he

to

the

36

""
f'k.<

r~

or

to

make

a

gift

of ..{ information

~ ..tA.L~ ~ ,J.f!} 9~ 6-'~~ ~

recipient /\.13¥ giving hitm

"Mt..._. arva~

over other traders.

~~

Similarly, a lOb-5 claim against an alleged tippee must be
based

on

the

theory

that

he

knowingly 23

)'2a.'-~ari4.
a~~isteu

the

t\

trading imposes costs on society that should not be
tolerated, Congress legislated against such actions, but
it
presumably
attempted
to
reduce
those
costs
as
efficiently as possible in such a sensitive and important
area
as
securities
trading.
We
believe
that
the
deterrence of the SEC's insider-trading rules, while
certainly discouraging insider trading, would impose its
own, perhaps greater costs on the securities industry,
without any assurance of corresponding benefit.
In the
absence of more explicit congressional direction, we are
not
inclined
to
assume
that Congress
through
its
securities laws meant to upset the established role of
securities dealers and analysts in the American securities
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 23 will appear on following pages.

25.

insider

in

exploiting

the

confidential

essence that he was an aider and abetter.

information:

in

A recipient of

such a tip would be liable if he used the information in
connection with securities trading, knowing the purpose of
the

disclosure. 24

See

Chazen,

'Dirks'

Presents

Unique

industry as the SEC's rules would do.

,.

2 3rt is clear that a tipper or tippee does not
violate Rule lOb-5 unless he acts with scienter.
The
scienter requirement protects a defendant who was unaware
that he was receiving or passing on inside information.
But this requirement is of little benefit to the tippers
or tippees who, such as petitioner, knowingly tips or
trades on inside information.
24
"All these elements can be found in classic
tipping situations, such as an arrangement under
which a securities firm gives its customers
confidential
information
it
learns
from
investment banking clients in exchange for
brokerage
bus ineS's.
The
tip
violates
the
securities firm's duty to keep the information
in confidence~ it is also a means by which the
securities firm exploits the information for its
own
benefit.
Similarly,
the
customer
who
directs brokerage to the securities firm in
exchange for confidential information aids and
abets the violation, in that the customer's
willingness to pay for the information with
'soft dollars'
makes
it
possible
for
the
securities
firm
to
take
advantage of
the
information without trading itself.
The twin elements--breach of fiduciary duty
and
exploitation
of
information--are
also
present, though not quite so obviously, when an
insider makes a gift of confidential information
to a relative or friend, with the expectation
that
the
recipient
will
trade
on
the
information.
The
tip
and
trade
are
the
functional equivalent of trading by the insider
followed by a gift of the profits to the
recipient.
Again, the requirements for aiding
and abetting liability are satisfied as the
insider
could
not
utilize
this
means
of
benefitting the recipient unless the recipient
were prepared to play his part by trading on the
information."
Footnote continued on next page.
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Social

Legal Times 14, 18

Issues,

(March 14,

37 .

liability
not
a

proper

trading,
could

not

it

exist when the
purpose

would

i.

but

be a

fabricate

is transmitted

informati

e.,

for

rare situation when

some ostensibly legitimate

justification for transmitting the information.

other

areas

of

the

law,

courts

are permitted

purpose from the surrounding circumstances.

to

infer

38

Two factors

in particular would tend to show that the informant acted
with
infer

an

improper

improper

purpose.

purpose

First,

when

it

there

is
is

reasonable
a

to

relationship

between the informant and the recipient that suggests that
the informant expected a quid pro quo from the recipient,
such

as when

the

informant wished

recipient

is

a

customer,

to benefit the recipient,

or

that

the

such as when

See Chazen, 'Dirks' Presents Unique Corporate,
Issues, Legal Times 14, 18 (March 14, 1983).

Social
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27.

they are relatives or friends.

Second,

made

informant

at

the

response

to

initiative of
questioning

~hat
available

to

the

by

the

a disclosure was
rather

recipient

than

in

39

~"1£.~

may

ruse . a

the insider seeks to exploit information

him.

On

the

other

hand,

a

strong

nonfinancial motive for providing the information would be
evidence that the disclosure was not made with a forbidden
purpose.

40

See id.

~fl
~review

of

the

~
~s

for

insider-trading

and

tipping restrictions underscores the weakness of the ~
case

against

employees

did

petitioner. 25
not

violate

First,
their

the

Equity

~y

Funding
to

the

1\

company's

shareholders

pe t 1' t '1oner. 26

by

Petitioner's

providing
informants

information

to

received

no

25 Petitioner contends that he was not a "tippee"
because the information he received constituted unverified
allegations of fraud that were v.i~nrau!l-i
by
management and were
not
"material
facts"
under
the
securities laws that required disclosure before trading.
He also argues that the information he received was not
truly
"inside"
information,
i.
e.,
intended
for
a
confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of
a crime.
For purposes of deciding this case, however, W e---~
----_, assume
the
correctness
of
the SEC's
findings
at
petitioner was a tippee of material, inside information.
26In
violates

this Court, the SEC contends that an insider
a
fiduciary
duty
to
the
corporation's
Footnote continued on next page.
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28.

monetary benefit for
nor

did

they have an apparent desire to make a gift of

valuable

information

undisputed
Equity

revealing Equity Funding's secrets,

that

Funding,

to

petitioner.

petitioner
with

no

himself

preexisting

Second,

was

a

stranger

fiduciary

those who sold or bought Equity Funding stock. 27
no

action,

directly

or

indirectly,

that

it

duty

41

is
to
to

He took

induced

the

shareholders
by
transmitting
nonpublic
corporate
information to an outsider when he has reason to believe
that the outsider will take advantage of the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to
public attention the derelictions at Equity Funding,
Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders."
Brief for Respondent 31. The Commission, however, did not
charge Secrist with any wrongdoing,
and we do not
understand the SEC to have relied on Secrist's breach of
any "duty" in finding that petitioner breached his duty to
Equity Funding's shareholders.
See J.A. 250 (decision of
administrative law judge} ("One who knows himself to be a
beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside
information
must
fully
disclose
or
refrain
from
trading."}; . 21 S.E.C., at 1410, n. 42
("Presumably,
[petitioner's] informants were entitled to disclose the
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and
its perpetrators to justice."}; Brief of Respondent in the
Court of Appeals, at 50 ("The Commission and the courts
have repeatedly held that possession of inside information
makes one an insider, regardless of whether possession of
the information is obtained lawfully or through a breach
of fiduciary duty to the issuer."}; id., at 51 ("[T]he
knowing possession of inside information by any person
imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."}; id., at 55; 681
F. 2d 8 24, 8 38 (Wright, J.} (assuming Seer ist breached no
duty because of "SEC's failure to dispute the issue"}.
The merits of such a duty are therefore not before the
Court.
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 u.s. 194, 196-197
( 19 4 7} •
27 Judge Wright held
that petitioner acquired a
fiduciary duty by virtue of his position as an employee of
a
broker-dealer.
The Commission,
however,
did
not
consider Judge Wright's alternate theory in its decision,
nor did it present that theory to the Court of Appeals or
to this Court.

41
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29.

stockholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust
or

in him. 28

confidence

misappropriate

or

Equity Funding.

And clearly petitioner did not

illegally

obtain

information

about

Petitioner acquired the information from

sources who were legally free to give it to him. 29

Under

4:

such circumstances, petitioner did not acquire any duty to
the

corporation's
when

he

shareholders
passed

on

~ ~~

thus ..ft.a.eA no duty -to

and

the

information

to

other

investors.
Indeed,

rather

than

violating

a

duty

to

Equity

Funding or its shareholders, or to the market in general,
petitioner's

~~brought
~a-uP~~
aetiV±tie:
to light a massive fraud

28 There was no expectation by petitioner's sources
that he would keep their information in confidence, nor
could there legitimately have been any such expectation.
He was not given information ·
s·
·
he
~-of- """t:lre= -bus~:i::-t.y--Fuooi-A~ but, rather:, to
expose a ma••iue fraud at the company.
As a result, to
find liability in this case, the Commission again was
reduced to finding a general duty applicable to anyone
possessing what
is
found
to be material nonpublic
information,
even
though
this Court made clear
in
Chiarella that no such duty exists.
29Even
under
the
broadest
formulation
of
the
abstain-or-disclose doctrine articulated in Chiarella,
petitioner would be immune from liability.
Here, other
analysts were free to contact Equity Funding's present and
former employees, and petitioner obtained the information
in question through a combination of good fortune and
diligent investigative technique.
In a free enterprise
economy,
"advantages obtained
by honest means"
are
entitled to "reap their full reward." 445 u.s., at 252 n.
2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting}.

4:

30.

at

Equity

state

of

Funding
affairs

and
at

informed
the

the

market

company. 30

of

Until

the

the

true

Equity

Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading
market

was

grossly

inaccurate.

But

for

43

petitioner's

efforts, the fraud might well have gone undetected longer.

On the Commission and the federal courts has fallen
the responsibility to develop specific trading rules that
are

consistent with

securities

laws.

the purposes underlying

the

43

federal

Although we must construct rules

that

preclude tippee trading which circumvents the prohibitions
of our insider-trading restrictions, those rules must not

--4~.

1

t,

"

t;-

"

30Although
the
Commission's
disclose-or-abstain
obligation is phrased in the conjunctive, in an exchange
market with millions of impersonal transactions every
hour, disclosure by individual shareholders is not very
practical.
Thus the special obligation on insiders is a
duty
not
to
trade
at
all
on
material
nonpublic
information.
This fact is made obvious by the facts of
this case.
It is hard to imagine how, given his position
as an outsider and the SEC's failure to investigate the
----------~~r~aud
allegations, petitioner could have gone about
.
_, p3bl1 · ing them other than the way he did--by talking to
/._ .. ~~..,__,~ ne press and . to anyone else who would listen to him •
.Jf77 VK-"Once it is conceded, as the Commission does,
h t
J
~
there is no independent duty to disclose, it is hard o
t1
f.(J
escape the conclusion in Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F. d
~
~
307,318 (CA6 1976), cert. den1ed, 429 u.s. 1053 (197 ),
~
that there is no causal connection between insider tr ing
"",_.~ ..fl..~
and outsiders' losses: "Investors must be prepa d to
~accept the risk of trading in an open market
ithout
~)
complete or always accurate information." 'D
~
that petitioner created
vict~by

l

1

~

~

~

;

31.

sweep

so

broadly

that

they

useful market activity.

chill

legitimate,

socially

4~

Corporations must conduct certain

business in private, while the securities market, to serve
the
vast

important public

interest

sums of capital

manner

possible,

possible

about

in the most efficient and orderly

needs
the

in raising and allocating

as much

public

material

companies

information as

that

it

4~

serves.

Insiders have much discretion in delaying the disclosure
of rna ter ial
beneficial

information,
role

and securities analysts play a

in assaulting the corporate citadel for

inside information.

Rule lOb-5 should not be used, absent

clear congressional

intent

to that effect,

4~

to upset the

beneficial balance that the securities market has enjoyed
by the check the competing interests have on each other.
While the federal securities laws are appropriate bars to
the exploitation of information by corporate insiders, 31

3 1we find ourselves in agreement with many of
Commissioner Srni th' s sta ternents in Investors Management
Co.:

"It is important in this type of case to focus
on policing insiders and what they do, which I
think appropriate,
rather than on policing
information per se and its possession, which I
think impracticable.
I believe the emphasis in
the law should continue to be upon the conduct
of corporate insiders and their privies, as it
Footnote continued on next page.
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32.

they

should

not

be

used

to

securities analysts performing

protect
their

corporations

from

normal information-

gathering roles.

We conclude that petitioner, in the circumstances of
this

case,

had

no

duty

to

abstain

inside information that he obtained.

from ( trading

on

46

the

The judgment of the

Court of Appeals therefore is

Reversed.

has been since Strong v. Rep ide, 213 U.s. 419
(1909} and as it was in Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf
and Merrill Lynch, rather than upon a concept-too vague for me to apply with any consistency-of relative informational advantages in the
marketplace."
44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the judgment}.
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job 05/10/83
SECOND DRAFT: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether an individual
who

has

no

connection

with

a

corporation

but

receives

5

material nonpublic information concerning ongoing criminal
conduct within the corporation from an officer or director
violates

the

securities
persons

antifraud

laws

who

use

by

provisions

transmitting

the

of

that

information

to

the

federal

information

buy

or

sell

to
the

10

corporation's stock.
I

In

1973,

broker-dealer

petitioner
firm,

was

an

providing

offieer

at

investment

a

New York

analysis

on

insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1
On

March 6,

Secrist,

a

petitioner
former

received

information from

officer of Equity Funding

of

Ronald
America

1 The facts stated here are taken from more detailed
statements set forth by the Administrative Law Judge,
J.A., at 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401,
1402-1406 ( 1981) ; and the opinion of Judge Wright in the
Court of Appeals, 681 F.2d 824, 829-833 (CADC 1982).

15

2.

(Equity

Funding),

a

diversified

corporation

primarily

engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, to the
effect that the assets of that corporation were vastly

20

overstated as the result of fraudulent internal corporate
practices.

Secrist stated that

regulatory agencies had

failed to act on similar charges made by Equity Funding
employees, and urged petitioner to verify the fraud and
publicly disclose it.
Petitioner
allegations.

25

decided

to

investigate

personally

the

He flew to Los Angeles, where Equity Funding

had its headquarters, and interviewed several officers and
employees

of

the

corporation.

Despite

denials

of

wrongdoing by its senior management, petitioner obtained
substantial
current

corroboration of

and

former

the charges of

corporation

employees.

fraud

30

from

Neither

petitioner nor his firm owned or traded any Equity Funding
stock,

but

throughout

his

investigation,

petitioner

candidly discussed with a number of investors and analysts
the progress of his investigation and the information he
had obtained.

Not surprisingly, some of the persons who

spoke with petitioner and

learned of

the alleged

fraud

35

3.

sold

their holdings of Equity Funding securities.

investment

advisers

who

communicated

with

Five

petitioner

40

liquidated securities worth more than $16 million. 2
During

the

entire week

that

petitioner

was

in

Los

Angeles, he was in touch regularly with William Blundell,
the

Wall

Street

Journal's

Los

Angeles

bureau

chief.

Petitioner urged Blundell to write a story for the Journal
on the fraud
that

allegations.

publishing

such

45

Blundell, however, was afraid

damaging

rumors

supported

only

by

~~
hearsay

from ~

former

employees

might

be

libelous

and

declined to write the story, discounting the allegations
I

because he did not believe that such

a ~~

50

undetected.
During
pur sued
charges,

his

the

two-week

investigation

the

price

of

period
and

in

spread

Equity

which
word

Funding

petitioner

of

Seer i st' s

stock

fell

precipitously from $26 per share to less than $15.

~his

2 Petitioner received from his firm a salary plus a
commission for securities transact ions above a certain
amount which his clients directed through his firm.
Some
of the firms to which petitioner gave information on the
Equity Funding fraud directed or promised to direct
commission business to petitioner's firm.
See 681 F.2d,
at 829, 831~ 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, 1404.
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led the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on March
27.

Shortly

thereafter

state

insurance

authorities

impounded Equity Funding's records and uncovered evidence
of the fraud.

Only then did the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC)

file a complaint against Equity Funding 3

60

and only then, on April 2, did the Journal publish a front
page

story

based

petitioner.

largely

Equity

on

Funding

information

assembled

immediately

went

by
into

.
h'1p. 4
rece1vors

The SEC investigated petr's role in the disclosure of
the fraud,

and after a hearing by an administrative

law

judge, found that petitioner aided and abetted violations
of §17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15

u.s.c.

§77q(a)

(1976) , 5 §lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15

3As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations
of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding.
Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an official of the California
Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in
Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud.
Petitioner
himself voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's
regional office beginning on March 27.
4 A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently
returned a
lOS-count
indictment against 22 persons,
including many of Equity Funding's officers and directors.
Those proceedings were concluded by entry of guilty pleas
or convictions after trial of all defendants for one or
more of the counts against them. See Brief for Petitioner
15: J.A. 149-153.
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages.
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U.S.C. §78j (b) , 6 and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5
(1982) , 7

when

he

repeated

the

allegations

of

fraud

5 section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the
of fer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the
use of the mails, directly or indirectly-"(1)
to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means
of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
"(3)
to
engage
in
any
transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser."
6 section lO(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-"(b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered
on
a
national
securities exchange or
any
security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the SEC may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public
interest or
for
the
protection of
investors."
7 Rule lOb-S provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device,
scheme, or
artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a
rna ter ial fact or to omit to state a rna ter ial
fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or
Footnote continued on next page.

to
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members of the investment community--including clients of
his firm--who later sold their Equity Funding stock.
SEC

concluded:

"Where

1

tippees 1 --regardless

of

~he

their

motivation or occupation--come into possession of material
1

•••

75

information that they know is confidential and know or

should

know

came

from

a

corporate

insider,

1

they must

either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading."

21 S.E.C.

omitted)
222,

(quoting

230

n.

12

Docket 1401,

1407

United

(1981)

(footnote

States,

445 u.s.

Chiarella

v.

(1980)).

Recognizing,

however,

petitioner played "an important role in bringing
Funding]

1

S

1412-1413,

that

[Equity

massive fraud to light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at
the

SEC

only

censured

petitioner

for

his

conduct. 8
The

80

85
Court of Appeals

for

the

District of

Columbia

course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."
8 section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
u.s.c. §78o(b) (4) (E), provides that the SEC may impose
certain sanctions, including a censure, on any person
associated with
a
registered
broker-dealer who has
"willfully aided [or]
abetted" any violation of the
federal
securities
laws.
See
15
u.s.c.
§78ff(a)
(providing criminal penalties).

7.

entered
"for

judgment without

the

reasons

petitioner's

accompanying

opinion,

by

in

stated

petition

for

the

review

SEC
of

the

Judge Tamm dissented from the judgment.
member

of

the

Judge

Robb

panel,

concurred

subsequently
in

the

its

that

Judge Wright, a

issued

result,

"the obligations of

opinion,"

censure order.

an

and

9C

opinion.

Judge

dissented; neither filed a separate opinion.
believed

denying,

Tamm

Judge Wright

corporate

fiduciaries

pass to all those to whom they disclose their information

95

before it has been disseminated to the public at large."
681

F.2d

824,

concluded

that,

petitioner "had
the public

839

(1982).

as

an

[violated]

completely

Alternatively,

employee

of

broker-dealer,

obligations to the SEC and to

independent of any obligations he

acquired" from sources at Equity Funding.
We granted a writ of certiorari,
because of the

a

Judge Wright

100

Id., at 840.

u.s.

(1982),

importance to the SEC and the securities

industry of the question presented by this case.

We now

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40

105

8.

S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that a breach of the
insiders• 9 agency duties to shareholders 10 also could be a
violation
however,

of

Rule

10b-s. 11

The

SEC

did

not

limit,

its special obligation to di sclose 12 or abstain

to officers, directors, and controlling shareholders, id.,

1(~ t-f~
at 911, ~A found

t

to exist whenever two factors were

9we use the word "insiders" to include directors,
officers, controlling shareholders, and those ~
employees and agents of the corporation who have r~ /
access to the corporation's confidential information. - See R
Feldman v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 839, 844
(ND Ca 1 i f . 19 8 0) , a f f ' d , 6 7 9 F . 2d 12 9 9 ( CA 9 19 8 2) : n . 15 ,
infra.
10 An
insider's
duty
to
the
corporation's
shareholders not to trade on inside information is to be
distinguished from the common-law duty that insiders also
have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate
assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3A
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations
§§1168.1, 1168.2 (1975 & 1982 Supp.). We believe that a
breach of the duty to shareholders satisfies the legal
requirements of
~ 10 (b)
because
it
presupposes
both
investor injury and deception, Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v.
Green,
430
u.s. 462, 471-474 (1977): Dooley,
Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L.
Rev. 1, 41 (1980), and agree with the Cady, Roberts
Commission that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange
Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside
information for personal advantage was a normal emolument
of corporate office." See 40 S.E.C., at 912 n. 15.
11 of the three provisions on which the SEC rested
its decision, Rule lOb-S is generally the most inclusive,
and we will refer to it when we note the statutory basis
for the SEC's inside trading rules.

(1\S
~~~
~~~~
12 The SE~~disclosure
duty~s RO~ just =ee the
immediate purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate
disclosure of significant corporate developments can only
be effected by public release through the appropriate
public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to
the investing public generally and without favoring any
special person or group."
Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C., at
256.

11(

9.

present:
Analytically,
the
obligation
rests
on
two
principal elements; first, the existence of a
relationship
giving
access,
directly
or
indirectly,
to
information
intended
to
be
available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second,
the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.

115

120

125
Id., at 912 (footnote omitted) • 13
In

Chiarella,

we

quoted

with

approval

the

Cady,

Roberts statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain
rule

and

adopted

violation of Rule
fiduciary

the SEC's
lOb-S's

relationship

confidential
relationship.

information
See

445

twin elements for

finding

a

inside-trading restrictions--a
and

the

acquired

u.s.,

as
at

exploitation
a

result

227.

of

The

of
that
Court

unanimously agreed that there is no general duty to make

13 The Cady, Roberts conditions for imposing a duty
to disclose or abstain from trading are not arbitrary
limitations on the use of inside information, but are
consistent with the common-law rules and grounded in the
policies underlying the federal securities laws.
As a
general
proposition,
there
is no duty
to disclose
information to the public at large before engaging in a
commercial transaction or before imparting the information
to other persons.
See Chiarella, 445 u.s., at 228; id.,
at 239-240 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting).
Moreover, itTs
evident that stock ownership and securities trading by
insiders are not detrimental to the corporation, to
shareholders, or to society.
Thus, the Cady, Roberts
elements are simply an acknowledgement that it is only
some uses of inside information, and then only under
certain circumstances, that will create liability.

130

10.

disclosure

before

information, 14
under §lO(b)

and

trading

with

recognized

that

does not arise

rather

relationship.

from
See 445

the

"a

to

Id., at 235.

existence

u.s.,

duty

135

disclose

from the mere possession of

nonpublic market information."
arises

nonpublic

material

Such a duty

of

a

fiduciary

at 227-235.

140

The case against the petitioner in Chiarella failed

\

for

lack

of

a

fiduciary

relationship.

B-la-t j t

is

~~~-'

clear

/1

that there also can be no liability for an inside trade
where

there

liable

where

is
he

no

trading.

Thus,

exploits material

for personal gain and

an

insider

will

be

nonpublic

information

fails to disclose that

information

145

before doing so.
III
Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties
to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical
tippee

has

no

such

relationships. 15

In

view

of

the

14 See

445 U.S., at 233~ id., at 237 (STEVENS, J.,
id., at 238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in
id., at 239-240, 252, n. 2 (BURGER, C.J.,
dissenting)~ ia:-;- at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, ,J., dissenting).
concurring)~
the result)~

ceta~~stances,

15 To be sure, under
such as
where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an
underwriter,
accountant, or aktorn~y working for the
Footnote continued on next page.

150

11.

absence of similar relationships, it has been unclear how

a~" tippee

acquires the duty to refrain

from trading on

inside information.
What is clear is the prophylactic need for a ban on
some
their

tippee trading.
fiduciary

corporate

~

Be~e

insiders are

A

relationship

information

to

from

their

forbidden by

using

personal

undisclosed

advantage,

may not give such information to outsiders for
improper purpose.
the

trustee

has

authorize •.•• "

corporation,

See 18
no

u.s.c.

right

Mosser

v.

to

§78t(b).
do

Darrow,

may )

he

341

they

the same

"['l']hat which

has

155

no

u.s.

right
267,

160

to
272

these outsiders
as.. a £@8eU ef sueR ,----become fiduciaries of the corporation and of
its shareholders. The basis for imposing fiduciary duties
is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic
corporate information, but that they have entered into a
special confidential relationship in the conduct of the
business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes.
See SEC v.
Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 942 (CA2 1979): In re
Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971): In re
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969):
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43
S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968):
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper
~----,t;:;h
c:-a
=-n
=---·
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner
Sm1
Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974)
(investment banker l.earR-Qd mater-ial- -in$ormatioA t'Arou~b
h..i-s
w~!!'k
on
proposed
public
of fer ing
for
the
corporation).
For such duties to be imposed, however,
"there must be some expectation of trust and confidence
with respect to the information imparted, and the person
receiving the information must assent at least implicitly
to the expectation." Langevoort, Insider Trading and the
Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70
Calif. L. Rev. 1, 30 (1982).
(

r~tJoAeQip,

12.

Similarly,

(1951).

the

transactions

of

those

who

knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach
are

"as

forbidden"

trustee himself."

as

transact ions

"on

See Jackson v.

Id.

behalf
Smith,

of
254

the

165

u.s.

586, 589 (1921): Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616, 631-632
(1874).

As the Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule

"would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the
name of the others that the trustee could not conduct in
his

own."

u.s.,

341

at

271.

Sulpher Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308

u.s.

See

SEC

v.

Texas

170

Gulf

(CA2), cert. denied, 404

1005 (1971).
Hence,

as

we

noted

in

Chiarella,

"[t]he

tippee's

obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a
participant after the fact
f id ucia ry duty."

445

u.s.,

in the insider's breach of a
at 230 n.

12. 16

As the SEC

16 For
this
proposition,
the
Court
cited
Subcommittees of American Bar Association Section of
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Comment Letter on
Material, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 1973) reprinted
in BNA, Securities Regulation & Law Report No. 233, at Dl,
D2 (Jan. 2, 197 4) , which states:
[I]t appears that the Commission's view is based
upon the premise that the tippee who does trade
upon such information is a participant after the
fact in the tipping corporate official's breach
of
fiduciary
duty,
and,
under
common law
principles, the tippee may be held responsible
for
the
consequences
of
that
breach
in
Footnote continued on next page.

-

13.

concedes, the tippee's duty is purely "derivative" of his
informant's
445

u.s.,

duty.

at 246

is clear

that,

duty

the

to

because

they

receive

it

Chiarella,

of Oral Arg.

38.

See Chiarella,

(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).

It therefore

corporation's
receive

shareholders,

inside
As

information,

this

is

rather

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

not
they

stated

in

a disclosure obligation should exist "when an

experience,

advantage

foresight,

445

180

although tippees may assume an insider's

improperly.

informational

means."

Tr.

U.S.,

at

or

is

obtained,

industry,
240

not

by

superior

but by some unlawful

(BURGER,

C.J.,

dissenting)

(emphasis added) • 17

appropriate cases.
id., at D-1 ("As to 'tipper' and
liability, itwas clear that a corporate official who is
not allowed to benefit directly from the use of material
undisclosed information ought not to be able to benefit
indirectly by passing on the information to relatives,
friends or others for the
17 Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the
concept in the law of restitution that "' (w]here a
fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary
communicates confidential information to a third person,
the third person, if he had notice of the violation of
duty, holds upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary
any profit which he makes through the use of such
information. '"
3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451
(1961)
(quoting
Restatement
of
Restitution
§201(2)
(1937)).
Other authorities ~ likewise) expressed the
view that tippee liability ex1sts only where there has
been a breach of trust by an insider. See, e. g., Ross v.
Licht,
26 3 F. Supp.
39 5, 410
(SDNY 1967) : Brudney,
Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under
Footnote continued on next page.
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When

tipping

indirectly
elements

I

is

violating

of

a

as

a

the

rule

t:X4 ... !

means
rule,

lOb-5

should be the same as

~ 4'

viewed

violation

tipping

of

19(

the
case

in an inside-trading

~

4ifJ[;

{ ~jl.l'!5"r a~ossession~ f inside information did no

impose an

Chiarella~

a

obligation to disclose or abstain in

19 ~

~

tippee a£ C-GTpor~ is not: errotHJh t:n inlrM it ...such
A

a~ .

A tippee

will

not

be

liable

for

aiding

and

abetting an insider's exploitation of rna ter ial nonpublic
information unless the insider breaches his
corporation's

shareholder sl'

'tv

using

confidential information for personal

dut ~

his

to the

access

gai~

A

The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion, is that
"tippees

such

as

[petitioner]

who

receive

non-public

the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 348
(1979); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry
Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information,
121 u. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 818 n. 76 (1973) ("The extension
of rule lOb-5 restrictions to tippees of corporate
insiders can best be justified on the theory that they are
participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary
duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency ~312, comment
c (1958) ("A person who, with notice that an agent is
thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives
confidential
information
from
the
agent,
may
be
[deemed] .•. a constructive trustee.").

20(

15.

material information from insiders become 'subject to the
same duty as [the] insider,'" 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1410 n.
42

(quoting

Shapiro v.

Merrill Lynch,

Pierce,

Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974)
Licht,

263 F. Supp.

395,

410

(SDNY

Fenner

&

(quoting Ross v.

1967)),

and that "a

tippee breaches the fiduciary duty which he assumes from
the

insider

information
basis

to

a

who

the

tippee

someone

thereof,"

outsider
with

when

who

21 S.E.C.

uses

the

shareholder

knowingly

will

transmits

probably

Docket,

at

trade

the

on

the

1410

nonpublic

is

a

in

the

breach of

his

inherited

obl iga t · n

to

the

shareholder

when

he

is

on

is himself disabled from using the
without
- !

Respondent

disclosure."
-

1

3 ~.J~.., ru4 ~ ~)
I

I

1"1

Petitioner

_

_,

o-

220

;~f)

"disregard
of one of its statutes and to cons
on their

"own view

at would best serve the purpose
the

v.

based

statute.

Democratic

See

Senatorial

Federal
Campaign

Election
Committee,

225

16.

~~UU--~~
454

u.s.

(198l).~he SEC's) th€e<y fle•<~~r

27, 36

differs

little

from

its

view

inconsistent with congressional

that

we

rejected

as

J!/In

intent in Chiarella.

short,
possesses
disclose

nonpubl ic
before

rna ter ial

trading.

230

In Chiarella,

'fle

specifically

refused to find
a general duty between all participants in
market transactions to forgo actions based on
material, nonpublic information. Formulation of
such a broad duty, which departs radically from
the established doctrine that arises from a
specific
relationship
between
two
parties •.• should not be undertaken absent some
explicit evidence of congressional intent.

235

240

Id., at 233.
We
disclose

again

reject

obligation

the

imposition

of

the

abstain-or-

~~~a--~
~ne

whp

knowingly

material nonpublic information and trades. 1 9

possesses

As we noted

18 The SEC itself formerly recognized that tippee
liability properly is imposed only in circumstances where
the "tippee" knows, or has reason to know, that the
insider
has
improperly
disclosed
inside
corporate
information.
In Investors Management Co., the SEC stated
that in finding tippee liability one element is that the
tippee knew or had reason to know "that the information
was non-public and had been obtained improperly by
selective revelation or otherwise."
44 S.E.C., at 641
(emphasis added).
Commissioner Smith expressly read this
test to mean that before a tippee can be held liable it
must be shown that he received information in breach of an
insider's
duty
not
to
disclose
it.
Id.,
at
649
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 19 will appear on following pages.
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17.

in

Chiarella,

consequences

adopting

well

Congress intended.
to

the

entire

gainsaid:

beyond
20

any

~ r;;:

market

market

the

of

that

rule
we

in

could

have

have

assurance

~~
1(~alue

[analysts']

efficiency

(concurring in the result)

SEC

SEC's

pricing

efforts
is

cannot

be

significantly

(see n. 25, supra).

EC appare
s that
e obligation
s to impose on all those who knowingly possess
-ilv-'f' , Y
material nonpublic information has no legal limit and that
r
~
liability is limited only by its
.
.
reasonable under the
urns
As Commissioner Budge
. ~ .~
y~- u .
ate shortly after the SEC filed the Texas Gulf Sulpher
~. n
action: "The Commission certainly does not contemplate
· .1~
j,{
suing
every
person
who
may
come
across
inside
~~A~~ inform[at]ion....
Obviously, persons such as the taxi
~ ry·.
driver, the barber, or the caddy who by chance overhear a
.( ~- ~ bit of corporate news should not be named as defendants in
~
}0'~?civil actions brought by the Commission."
Budge, The
t.,. ~/""" ~ 1/
Texas Gulf Sulpher Case--What It Is and What It Isn't,
vt' ·,J
"
Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (1965) (quoted in 6 L. Loss,
supra, at 3564).
We find ourselves in agreement with
yL
Commissioner Smith in Investors Management Co. when he
••
said: "It is important in this type of case to focus on
policing
insiders and what they do,
which I
think
appropriate, rather than on policing information per se
and its possess ion, which I think impracticable."
44
S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the judgment).
~

q

)?

20 To require market participants to cease trading in
a particular security any time they knowingly possess
nonpublic information could affect adversely the market
for that security.
Although we scrutinize the trading
activities of insiders and their confederates, we have had
no reason to consider that the advantages that market
professionals
may
gain
in
their
normal
roles
are
incompatible with the provisions or objectives of the
federal securities laws.
As this Court recognized in
Chiarella, 445 U.S., at 233, Congress has expressly
exempted many market professionals from the general
statutory prohibition set forth in §ll(a) (1) of the Act,
15 U.S .C. ~78k (a) (1), against members of a national
securities exchange trading for their own account.
We
specifically observed, 445 U.S., at 233 n. 16, that "[t]he
exception is based upon Congress' recognition that [market
professionals]
contribute
to
a
fair
and
orderly
marketplace
at
the
same
time
they
exploit
the
informational advantage that comes from their possession
of [nonpublic information]."

250

18.

enhanced by [their]
information,

initiatives to ferret out and analyze

and thus the analyst's work redounds to the
S • E • C • Doc k e t , at 1406. 21

benefit of all investors."

Yet

the SEC's tippee-trading rules could be used to penalize

25S

analytical excellence and place in jeopardy those analysts

~dt9~~~~

Awho

have the

insight to

recogniz ~value

before they are reflected

and unsoundness

in the market.

Moreover,

the

resources available to government law enforcement agencies
to investigate all rumors are limited, and private parties
with

a

financial

incentive

to

pursue

evidence

260

of

wrongdoing provide a valuable supplement, see, e. g., J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377

u.s.

426, 432 (1964), even if their

investigation is not motivated by altruism.
efforts can be costly, and
hold

out

the

possibility

u...a..:r

Investigative

if an investigation does not
of

financial

reputational benefit w-R-:i,.e.h may translate

or

at

least

into financial

~
21 The SEC ~
that "[a] nalysts remain free to
obtain from corporate ~management corporate information
that is not itself material for purposes of filling in the
~
'interstices in analysis' ..•• "
Brief for Respondent 42
~ ting
Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646).
But~ t~
rule
is
inherently
imprecise,
and
imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions
in accord with legal requirements.
Unless the line
between permissible and impermissible disclosures and uses
is bright, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be
sure when the line is crossed.

265

/

\

19.

benefit at some later point,
devote

sab!ltantial

corporate fraud.

resources

to

investigate

rumors

of

22

270
B

As we have shown, a tippee's liability is derivative

~of~4Pi(:
from the tipper's liabiliey.

See p.

_,

supra.

Thus, in

order to make out a tipping case against an individual, it

~~
is

first

necessary

confidential

to pt:ove that
1\

information

in

A-•c..clu4>

the

violation

~·~·~b~

insider

exploited

of

his

fiduciary

supra.

Whether

t\
dut ~

to

shareholders.

disclosure of material nonpublic

~
information is a breach

A

~,h.;~
~

therefore

depends 1\ on

the

purpose

of

the

22 This empirical assumption in no way suggests that
knowingly trading on inside information by secu · ies
analysts is "socially desirable or even that it
devoid
of moral considerations." Dooley, supra, at 55
Nor does
it suggest that it is unreasonable to ex ct that all
citizens, including securities analysts,
ave a social
obligation to disclose promptly indic ions of illegal
actions by a corporation to the
oper authorities-typically the SEC in cases
ing securities.
See
Lorie, Public Policy for Arne can Capital Markets 11
(1974).
There are, howeve , "significant distinctions
between actual legal ob · ations and ethical ideals."
SEC, Report of the
ecial Study of the Securities
Markets, H.R. Doc. N. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
237-238 (1963).
ognizing that inside trading imposes
costs on societ
that should not be tolerated, Congress
legislated
a 1nst
such actions,
but
it
presumably
attempted t
reduce those costs as efficiently as possible
in such
sensitive and important area as securities
tradi
We believe that the deterrence of the SEC's
ins' e-trading rules would impose its own, perhaps greater
ts on the securities industry, without any assurance of
corresponding benefit.

275

20.

disclosure. 23

The

tipper

will

be

liable

if

(i)

he

280

discloses material nonpublic information to one who trades
on the information and (ii) the purpose of the disclosure
was to receive some benefit in return or to make a gift of
the information to the recipient to enable him to gain a
market advantage over otner

traders.

See p. _ ,

supra.

285

Similarly, a lOb-5 claim against an alleged tippee must be
based on the theory that he knowingly 24 participated with
the insider in exploiting the confidential information. 25

~

23The SEC's decision in this case is sharply at odds
with the decision in Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623
~~
F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980).
There, the Court of Appeals held
g~~~
that an investment banking firm did not acquire or breach
~
any fiduciary duty to a corporation that was not a client
l~
.~~~·~ when it traded in the corporation's stock on the basis of
rv ~- ~ confidential earnings reports it acquired from the
.
corporation while investigating it for a client. See id.,
.
~ · , at 798-799. The in~:eMme.R.e. l;;Janl(i-R.g firm had received---u1e
.A~
'nformation legitimately, and while the firm knew that the
r~~~
information was confidential corporate data that came from
~ J. ", . L> • inside the corporation, and had been expected to keep it
~
so, the corporation had secured no agreement that the firm
~ ·~· ... ~ould do so.
In the absence of any confidentiality
~r~~ agreement, or other fiduciary relationship, the court
fP,~~
held, the investment bankers did not acquire any duty with
~
~
respect to this
information simply by receiving it
~~
legitimately. See id:, at 799.
24 It is clear that a tipper or tippee does not
r·
~~~.~ ~ violate Rule lOb-5 unless he acts with scienter.
See
V~-I.M Aaron v. SEC 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980).
The scienter
~~-~~
t requ1rement protects a defendant who was unaware that he
' . ~ was receiving or passing on inside information. See State
..,VV
Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843,
54-855 (CA2 1981).
But this requirement is of li ttleJ
benefit to the tippers or tippees who, such as petitioner,
~
knowingly tip or trade on inside information.
'

"'

.~ ~

).pJ

-~
/

.

Manag!!:~t C~~~rnission&r

~

Jr·l#t' .lA rf-

~:t--vr.·

~~~

Smith

stated

Investors

in

tJ.P' ~

Footnote continued on next page.

. ·"' ~
-:. ..x./

~ ·;, ~

~a-·

~~
~~~:;;~

21.

A recipient of such a tip would be liable if he used the
information in connection with securities trading, knowing
th e

purpose

of

th e

290

. 1 osure. 26
d 1sc

"[T] ippee responsibility must be related back to
insider responsibility by a necessary finding
that the tippee knew the information was given
to him in breach of a duty by a person having a
special relationship to the issuer not to
disclose
the
information,
and
that
the
information must be shown not only to have been
material and non-public, but also to have
substantially contributed to the trading which
occurred."
44 S.E.C., at 651 (concurring in
F.2d, at 839, n. 16 (Wright, J.).

the

result).

See 681

26
"All these elements can be found in classic
tipping situations, such as an arrangement under
which a securities firm gives its customers
confidential
information
it
learns
from
investment banking clients in exchange for
brokerage
business.
The
tip
violates
the
securities firm's duty to keep the information
in confidence: it is also a means by which the
securities firm exploits the information for its
own
benefit.
Similarly,
the
customer who
directs brokerage to the securities firm in
exchange for confidential information aids and
abets the violation, in that the customer's
willingness to pay for the information with
'soft
dollars'
makes
it
possible
for
the
securities
firm
to
take
advantage
of
the
information without trading itself.
The twin elements--breach of fiduciary duty
and
ex loitation
of
informat'on are
alee
present
, when an
insider makes a gift of confidential information
to a relative or friend, with the expectation
that
the
recipient
will
trade
on
the
information.
The
tip
and
trade
are
the
functional equivalent of trading by the insider
followed by a gift of the profits to the
recipient.
Again, the requirements for aiding
and abetting liability are satisfied as the
insider
could
not
utilize
this
means
of
benefitting the recipient unless the recipient
were prepared to play his part by trading on the
information."
'Dirks' Presents Unique Corporate,
Time s 14 , 18 (March 14 , 19 8 3 ) .

Social

\

l

22.

The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability also
does not exist when the information is transmitted for a

295

proper purpose but used wrongfully, i.e., for trading, it
would

be

a

fabricate

rare

situation when

some

ostensibly

the

parties could

legitimate

business

justification for transmitting the information.
the SEC
law,

is unduly concerned.

courts

are

permitted

surrounding

circumstances.

would

to

tend

improper

show

purpose.

As
to

the

First,

it

We think

in other areas of the

infer

Two

that

not

purpose

factors
informant

in

from

the

particular

acted

~-4.

-!:-5- reasonable
.1\

with
to

an

infer

improper purpose when there is a relationship between the
informant

and

the

...4-;C ~ ~~
informan~tQd

as

recipient

suggests

that

a.-A

that

305

t&Q

rla quid pro quo from the recipientl

JollhQR ~ip.ie.ot_Ls_a. custo~r

I

9!'

cnc-~~~~
<.d~ to benefit t.luil _.scj.pienJ;,
SJJ.c.b

~ relativej

300

or friendf.

--t.ha..t ...thQ..
....QS

-wbQR-

~e~

iR£ormanL

thQy

a!'e ~

~
Second, that a disclosure was made

at the initiative of the informant rather than in response
1\

....
to questioning by the

-

recipient.A~

an inference

310

23.

~~

J\ that
~-

(~

/lt~J~f-

~he insider ~ to exploit informat~~T~Jaa+i~l~a~b~l~e~ to

On the other hand, a

providing

the

disclosure

information

was

not made

~

would

with

a

nonfinancial motive for
be

evidence

forbidden

that

purpose.

the

315

~

IV
Our

review of

the rationales for

tr.,_
~~~_;_@
inside-trading

an~

tipping rules highlights the absence of any ca•Q agai-Rst

320

f\

~ ~e
violate

their

s h are h o ld ers

by

Equity Funding employees did not

fiduciary
.
prov1. d 1ng

duty

to

. f orma t 1on
.
1n

the
to

corporation's
28
.
pe t 1. t 1oner.

27 Petitioner contends that he was not a "tippee"
because the information he received constituted unverified
allegations of fraud that were denied by management and
were not "rna ter ial facts" under the securities laws that
required disclosure before trading.
He also argues that
the
information he
received was not truly "inside"
information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate
purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. For purposes
of deciding this case, however, we must assume the
correctness of the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court
of Appeals, that petitioner was a tippee of material
inside information.
_.,
~ ~i!J-4)
~·
...

28 r~

~n insi~

!he SEC AcontenQ.s_.t;hat
iolateA
a
fiduciary
duty
to
the
corporation's
shareholders
by
transmitting
nonpublic
corporate
information to an outsider when he has reason to believe
that the outsider will take arl~~ge o~ the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to
public attention th
derelictions at Equity Funding,
Secrist breached his Buty to Equity Funding shareholders."
Brief for Responde
31. The SEC, however, did not charge
Secrist with any rongdoing, and we do not understand the
SEC to have re ed on Seer ist' s breach of any "duty" in
finding that
etitioner breached his duty to Equity
Funding's
sh reholders.
See
J .A.
250
(decision of
Footnote continued on next page.

.

24.

Petitioner's

informants received no monetary benefit for

revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have an

32

~

apparent desire to make a gift of valuable information to
petitioner.
himself

~ ~t

was

preexisting

a

stranger

fiduciary

Equity Funding

is

Equity

that

petitioner

Funding,

with

no

duty

stock. 29

indirectly, that

to

undisputed

He

took no action,

directly or

induced the shareholders or officers of

merits of such a duty are therefore not before
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-197
29Judge Wright held that petitioner acqui~ed a
fiduciary duty by virtue of his position as an employee of
a broker-dealer. The SEC, however, did not consider Judge
Wright's alternate theory in its decision, nor did it
present that theory to the Court of Appeals or to this
Court.

33(

25.

Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him, and
there was no expectation by petitioner's sources that he

iii fi gt,tP c:,
would keep their
petitioner

did

information in confidence.
not

misappropriate

information about Equity Funding.

or

And clearly

illegally

33~

obtain

Petitioner acquired the

information from sources who were legally free to give it
to

'h.-~

~r -

him.

•u.ch

circumstances,

u,..d4.~ ~ ~
acqujre.
thus

aElX

dJf.y

to

he ~

petitioner

,rUJ...
the - c~rporation's

~
<i4d

no-e

~~~~~J-

shareholders~ and z<.S5l-

340

duty when he passed on the information

1\

to other investors.
\

l.4c- ~ t:d

Indeed,

rather

4,..-(..

than

violating

a

duty

to

Equity

1
Funding's shareholders, petitioner's careful investigation
brought

to

light

a massive

fraud

at Equity Funding and

informed the market of the true state of affairs at the
corporation.
the

Until the Equity Funding fraud was exposed,

information

inaccurate.

345

in

the

trading

market

wa,s

grossly

But for petitioner's efforts, the fraud might

well have gone undetected longer. 30

-----y<:::::.__-~_0 ~ /.2.-4.. rl ~ /

~k..L- ~

petit~~ir's di"s~\~~'ls*~~< ~r•di~~~
shal'~~~ -ere-a~

y

new victims of the co.~a:ot-i:~ ~
d
fraud.
A~:Eece-~i~ --etrse- -ft\alte <>b~ the
/
~ disclose-or-abstain obligation is more a duty not
~
Footnote continued on next page.
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26.

v
Although the SEC must
t i

p~ee

tr ad i nq

-

pr-O.b.ihlt i.Q.ns

~

A rules

must

legitimate,
have
material

information.
corporations

~1 r~s ' t<Aat ..prQclude

;l. ~ ~p;;;:;; t §~

o£

&.-;fA.--& ....~ r
~ } inside-trading
~

sw~

so

socially

useful

discretion

in

role

and

ci.•e,..,eR~ ~lle

)

broadly

market

that

from

~

they "'\ ghil ~

activity.

delaying

the

securities

Insiders

disclosure

analysts

in

Rule

~
~....

~~trict:ions,

k~

not --\

information,

~fi';t/;_

35

play

35 !

of
a

relevant
lOb-5

should

securities

not

be

analysts

used

to

performing

shield
their

36(

normal information-gathering roles.

We conclude that petitioner,

to trade at all on material nonpub ic informa
is a duty to disclose.
It is hard to imagin ~ &ew, given
his position as an outsider and the SEC's failure to
investigate the fraud allegations, petitione
could have
gone about publicizing them other t an the wa he did--by
talking to the press, to customers of his firm (to whom he
owed some duty), and indeed, to anyone els
who would Gcm.listen to him.
as ~ ..,PEC ~
7
~ there is no 1ndependent duty to disclose ~ ee Elkind ~
v. Liggitt & ~ 635 F.2d 156, 169, and n. 26
(CA2 1980) 1
=tlTe ~ lusiQ.ll 1n
- -t e- ""e Scape
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (CA6 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977), ~ there is no causal
connect ion between ins ide trading and outsiders' losses:
"Investors must be prepared to accept the risk of trading
in an open market without complete or always accurate
information."

-

V'(

'-"

yv

~
;r:./ if'

~

ZtMP
~

.

in the circumstances of

M

27.

this

case,

trading
obtained.
is

Reversed.

by

had

no

others

duty
on

the

to

abstain
inside

from

facilitating

information

that

he

The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner
from

received

"insiders"

of

a

material

corporation

connection.

He

disclosed

who

on

it

relied

corporation.

in

this

nonpublic
with

which

information

trading

in

information

the

he

to

had

no

investors

shares

of

the

The question is whether petitioner violated

the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by

lC

this disclosure.
I

In

1973,

broker-dealer

petitioner
firm,

was

an

providing

officer

of

investment

a

New York

analysis

on

insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1
On March

6,

Secrist,

a

Secrist

petitioner
former

alleged

received

information from Ronald

officer of Equity Funding of America.
that

the

assets

of

Equity

Funding,

a

1 The facts stated here are taken from more detailed
statements set forth by the administrative law judge, App.
176-180, 225-247~
the op1n1on of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406
(1981) ~ and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of
Appeals, 220 U.S. App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F.2d 824,
829-833 (1982).

I
E

2.

diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life
insurance and mutual funds, were vastly overstated as the
result

of

fraudulent

internal

practices.

corporate

2(

Seer ist also stated that various regulatory agencies had
failed

to act on similar charges made by Equity Funding

employees,

and

urged petitioner

to verify the fraud

and

disclose it publicly.
Petitioner
He
and

decided

to

investigate

visited Equity Funding's
interviewed

corporation.

several

the

headquarters

officers

and

allegations.

2~

in Los Angeles

employees

of

the

Its senior management denied any wrongdoing,

but current and former corporation employees corroborated
the

charges of

fraud.

Neither

petitioner

nor

his

firm

3(

owned or traded any Equity Funding stock, but throughout
his

investigation

number

of

obtained.
Equity

investors

and

Some of

these

Funding

advisers

petitioner

who

analysts the

discussed

with

a

information he had

persons sold their holdings of

securities,

liquidated

candidly

including

securities

five

worth

more

investment
than

million. 2

Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

$16

35

3.

During

the

entire week

that petitioner was

in Los

Angeles, he was in touch regularly with William Blundell,
the

Wall

Street

Journal's

Los

Angeles

bureau

chief.

40

Petitioner urged Blundell to write a story on the fraud
allegations.
he

did

not

Blundell discounted the allegations because
believe

undetected.

that

such

a

massive

fraud

could

go

He declined to write the story, fearing that

publishing such damaging rumors supported only by hearsay

45

from current and former employees might be libelous.
During
pursued
charges,

his

the

two-week

investigation

the

price

precipitously

from

share.

This

led

on

March

trading

period

$26
the
27.

and

of

New

spread

Equity

per

in

share
York

Shortly

which
word

of

Funding
to

Stock

less

petitioner
Secrist's

stock
than

Exchange

thereafter

$15
to

fell
per
halt

California

2Peti tioner received from his firm a salary plus a
commission for securities transactions above a certain
amount that his clients directed through his firm. See 21
S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how
many of those with whom [petitioner] spoke promised to
direct some brokerage business through [petitioner's firm]
to compensate [petitioner], or how many actually did so."
220 u.s. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F.2d, at 831. The Boston
Company Institutional Investors, Inc., promised petitioner
about $25,000 in commissions, but it is unclear whether
Boston actually generated any brokerage business for
petitioner's firm.
See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S.E.C.
Docket, at 1404, n. 10; 220 u.s. App. D.C., at 316, n. 5,
681 F.2d, at 831, n. 5.

50

4.

insurance authorities

impounded Equity Funding's records

and uncovered evidence of the fraud.
Securities and Exchange Commission

Only then did the

(SEC)

file a complaint

5!

against Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the
Wall

Street

largely on

Journal

publish

information

a

assembled

front-page

story

by petitioner.

based
Equity

Funding immediately went into receivorship. 4
The
disclosure

SEC
of

administrative
had

aided

and

investigated
the
law

fraud.
judge,

abetted

petitioner's
After

a

the SEC found
violations

of

role
hearing

in
by

the
an

that petitioner
§17(a)

of

the

Securities Act of 1933, 15 u.s.c. §77q(a) , 5 §lO(b) of the

3As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations
of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding.
Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an official of the California
Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in
Los Angeles of Seer ist' s charges of fraud.
Petitioner
himself voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's
regional office beginning on March 27.
4A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently
returned a 105-count indictment against 22 persons,
including many of Equity Funding's officers and directors.
All defendants were found guilty of one or more counts,
either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial.
See Brief for Petitioner 15; App. 149-153.
5 section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in
offer or sale of any securities by the use
any means or instruments of transportation
communication in interstate commerce or by
use of the mails, directly or indirectly-"(1)
to employ any device, scheme,
Footnote continued on next page.

the
of
or
the
or

6(

5.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 u.s.c.
SEC

Rule

repeated

lOb-5,
the

17

C.F.R.

allegations

§240.10b-5
of

fraud

to

§78j (b) , 6 and

(1982) , 7
members

when
of

artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means
of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
"(3)
to
engage
in
any
transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser."
6 section lO(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-"(b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a
national
securities
exchange
or
any
security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public
interest or
for
the
protection of
investors."
7 Rule lOb-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."

he
the

65

6.

investment community--including clients of his f irrn--who
later sold their Equity Funding stock.
"Where

'tippees '--regardless

of

The SEC concluded:

their

motivation

or

7(

occupation--come into possession of material 'information
that

they

know

is confidential and

know or

should

know

carne from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly
disclose
S.E.C.

that
Docket

information or
1401,

1407

refrain from trading."
(1981)

(footnote

21

omitted)

75

(quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 u.s. 222, 230 n.,
12 (1980)).

Recognizing, however, that petitioner "played

an important role in bringing

[Equity Funding's] massive

fraud to light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only
censured hirn. 8

80

Petitioner sought review in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.

Without opinion,

the

court entered judgment against petitioner "for the reasons
stated by the Commission in its opinion."

App.

to Pet.

8 section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. §78o(b) (4) (E), provides that the SEC may impose
certain sanctions,
including censure, on any person
associated with
a
registered
broker-dealer
who has
"willfully aided [or]
abetted" any violation of the
federal
securities
laws.
See
15
U.S.C.
§78ff(a)
(providing criminal penalties).

7.

for

Cert.

C-2.

Judge

Wright,

subsequently issued an opinion.
the

result,

separate

and

Judge

opinion.

Tamm

Judge

a

member

of

the

panel,

8~

Judge Robb concurred in

dissented~

Wright

neither

believed

filed

that

a

"the

obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to
whom they disclose

their

information before it has been

disseminated to the public at large."
309, 324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982) •

220

u.s.

9C

App. D.C.

Alternatively, Judge

Wright concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer,
petitioner had violated "obligations to the SEC and to the
public

completely

acquired"

independent

of

any

obligations

from sources at Equity Funding.

Id.,

he

95

at 325,

681 F.2d, at 840.
We granted a writ of certiorari,

u.s.

(1982),

because of the importance to the SEC and to the securities
industry of the question presented by this case.

We now

lOC

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C.

907

(1961),

the

SEC

recognized

that

"[a]n

affirmative duty to disclose material information has been

105

8.

traditionally
particularly

imposed
officers,

on

corporate

directors,

or

'insiders,'
controlling

stockholders," id., at 911, and that a breach of that duty
to shareholders 9 also could be a violation of Rule lOb5. 10

The SEC did not, however, limit this obligation to

11(

?

9.

disclose 11 or abstain to these insiders.

See id., at 911.

Rather, the duty was found to exist whenever two factors
were present:
Analytically,
the
obligation
rests
on
two
principal elements; first, the existence of a
relationship
giving
access,
directly
or
indirectly,
to
information
intended
to
be
available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second,
the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.

11

12

Id., at 912 (footnote omitted).
In

Chiarella,

we

quoted

12
with

approval

the

Cady,

Roberts statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain
rule

and

violation
" ( i)

adopted
of

Rule

the SEC's twin elements
lOb-S's

inside-~rading

for

finding

a

restrictions:

the existence of a relationship affording access to

inside

information

intended

corporate purpose, and

(ii)

to

be available only

for

a

the unfairness of allowing a

corporate insider to take advantage of that information by

11The SEC views the disclosure duty as extending
beyond the immediate purchasers or sellers: "Proper and
adequate disclosure of significant corporate developments
can only be effected by a public release through the
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad
dissemination to the investing public generally and
without favoring any special person or group."
Faberge,
Inc., 45 S.E.C., at 256.

13

10.

trading without disclosure."
agreed that there

445

u.s.,

at 227.

The Court

is no general duty to make disclosure

13~

before trading with material nonpublic information, 12 and
held that "a duty to disclose under §lO{b) does not arise
from the mere possession of nonpublic market information."
Id., at 235.

Such a duty arises rather from the existence

of a fiduciary relationship.

See id., at 227-235.

140

~;;:~

The
course,

fraud
the

in

mere

an

inside-trading

possession

of

case

inside

is

not,

of

information

or

simply the person's relationship with the shareholders "by
virtue of

[his]

position."
is

Rather,

911.

the

Cady, Roberts,
"inherent

40 S.E.C., at

unfairness

involved

145

where one [with access by virtue of a special relationship
to

the

issuer

available

only

to
for

material
a

information

corporate

intended

purpose

and

to

not

be
for

personal gain] takes advantage of such information knowing
it is unavailable to the investing public."

In re Merrill

12 See 445 U.S., at 233; id., at 237 {STEVENS, J.,
concurring) ; id., at 238-239 {BRENNAN, J., concurring in
the judgment); id., at 239-240 {BURGER, C.J., dissenting).
Cf.
id.,
at 252,
n.
2
{BLACKMUN,
J.,
dissenting)
{recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose
material
nonpublic
information
obtained
through
the
exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "honest means," as
opposed to "stealth").

150

11.

Lynch,

Pierce, Fenner

&

Smith,

Inc.,

43 S.E.C.

933,

936

I

L.A.-

(1968).
of

It is therefore clear that there g.au

the

Cady,

Roberts

shareholders unless
available

to

the

him

for

duty

that

breach

insiders

insider exploits the
his

personal

have

to

information

benefit.

Thus,

an

15

insider will be liable under Rule lOb-5 for inside trading
only where he exploits material nonpublic information for
personal

gain

and

fails

to

disclose

that

information

before doing so.
III

~ ~~~-

..

We made clear in Chiarella
~

to

disclose

where

the

infomation "was not
a fiduciary,
[of

the

who

there can be no duty

has

traded

on

inside

[or] he was not a person in whom the sellers
had

u.s.,

at

relationship,

we

confidence."

~

[the corporation's] agent, he was not

securities]

fiduciary

person

~ r2.d'4(~

~

445

placed
232.

Not

their

trust

to require

recognized,

would

and

16

such a

"depar[t]

radically from the established doctrine that duty arises
from
would

a

specific

amount

to

relationship

between

two

parties"

and

"recognizing a general duty between all

participants in market transactions to forgo actions based

171

12.

on material,
This

nonpublic

information."

requirement of a

shareholders

and

Id.,

at

232,

233.

specific relationship between the

the

individual

trading

on

inside

information, however, has created analytical difficulties
for

the

SEC

information.
fiduciary

in

Unlike

duties

shareholders,

how a

to

the

relationships.l3
unclear

policing

In

tippees

insiders
both
typical
view of

who
who

the

have

on

has

absence,

inside

independent

corporation

tippee
this

trade

17~

and
no

it

its
such

has

been

tippee acquires the duty to refrain

from

trading on inside information.

13 under
certain
circumstances,
such
as
where
corporate information is revealed legitimately to an
underwriter,
accountant,
or
lawyer
working
for
the
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders.
The basis for recognizing such fiduciary
duties is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic
corporate information, but also that they have entered
into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of
the business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes.
See SEC v.
Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942
(CA2 1979} ~
In re
Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971}~ In re
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969} ~
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43
S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968} ~ Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912.
When such a person breaches his fiduciary relationship, he
may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee.
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 495 F. 2d 228, 23 7 (CA2 197 4} (investment banker had
access to material information when working on a proposed
public offering for the corporation}. For such duties to
be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the
outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information
confidential, and the person receiving the information
must agree at least implicitly to such an arrangement.

180

13.

A

The

SEC's

position,

as

stated

in

its

opinion,

is

that:

185
"In tipping potential
traders,
[petitioner]
breached a duty which he had assumed as a result
of knowingly receiving confidential information
from [Equity Funding] insiders. Tippees such as
[petitioner] who receive non-public material
information from insiders become 'subject to the
same duty as
[the]
insiders. '
Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
[495 F.2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (quoting Ross v.
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 39 5, 410 (SDNY 1967) ) ] .
Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary duty which
he assumes from the insider when the tippee
knowingly transmits the information to someone
who will probably trade on the basis thereof ••.•
Presumably,
[petitioner's]
informants
were
entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud
in
order
to
bring
it
to
light
and
its
perpetrators to justice. However, [petitioner]-standing in their shoes--committed a breach of
the fiduciary duty which he had assumed in
dealing
with
them,
when
he
passed
the
information on to traders.

190

195

20C

205

210

21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1410, n. 42.
W.Q..-tbink thrt

fhe

SEC's position in this case differs

little from its view that we rejected as inconsistent with
congressional

intent

in

~f~,
C!l;i ereJ ,J a,

In

Chiarella.

the

(\

Court

of

Appeals

conviction

there

agreed
by

with

holding

the

SEC

that

"'

and

[~_]

affirmed

the

nyone--corporate

insider or not--who regularly receives material nonpublic
information
securities
disclose.'"

may

not

without

use

that

incurring

United States v.

information
an

to

trade

in

affirmative

duty

to

Chiarella,

588 F. 2d 1358,

21~

1365

{CA2 1978)

maintains

that

material

{emphasis
anyone

information

before trading.
how the

who
has

a

knowingly
a

Here,

receives

fiduciary

duty

the SEC
nonpublic

to

disclose

nonpublic

fiduciary

duty

information
with

imposed on

Equity

Funding's

shareholders when Chiarella's possession did not. 14
The SEC must consider

the difference

between this

case and Chiarella

.

somehow

~
pesseee&a

accompanying duties

the

disclosed

than the

information

we

~n

nonpublic

Chiarella,

information does

with

more

information that Chiarella

came by without the direct involvement of an
as

221

The SEC fails to explain, however, why or

possession of

petitioner

in original).

mere

inside~ut
possession

of

~~
the . .;;C.. .;.a.;._d_,y""','--.. .;.R.;. ;;o_b_;e;_r.;._t.;._s_

no~ng
1\

duty; only a specific relationship does that.

~n

effect,

14 Apparently
recognizing
the
weakness
of
its
argument in light of Chiarella, the SEC attempts to
distinguish that case factually as involving not "inside"
information, but rather "market" information, i. e.,
"information generated within the company relating to its
assets or earnings." Brief for Respondent 23. This Court
drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, as THE CHIEF
JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that §lO{b) and Rule lOb-5
by their terms and by their history make no such
distinction." 445 u.s., at 241, n.l {dissenting opinion).
See ALI Fed. Sec. Code §1603, Comment {2) {j) {Proposed
Official Draft 1978).

22!

15.

then,

the SEC's

more in the

theory of tippee liability seems rooted

di~e~t:::.
that
A

235

the antifraud provisions

~

require
than

equal

access

the

principle

in

Chiarella

that

to

material

set

only

circumstances,

will

possession

material

of

1\

forth

be

in

Cady,

persons,

some
barred

information

nonpublic

from

Roberts
under

trading

"

some

while

~

rronpobl:Lc

and

information.l5

in

240

Judge

Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella, however,
as

repudiating any notion that traders must enjoy equal

information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is
rejected.

Because

extraordinary,
obligations

it

other

the

attaches
than

a

disclose-or-refrain
only when
mere

duty

a

duty

party has

is

245

legal

to comply with

the

general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities

15 rn Chiarella, we noted that formulation of~
an ~
equal information rule "should not be undertaken absent
some explicit evidence of congressional intent."
445
U.S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of
securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many
market
professionals
from
the
general
statutory
prohibition set forth in §ll(a) (1) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78k(a) (1), against members of a
national
securities
exchange
trading
for
their
own
account.
See id., at 233, n. 16.
We observed in
Chiarella th"'at "[t] he exception is based upon Congress'
recognition that [market professionals] contribute to a
fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit
the
informational
advantage
that
comes
from
their
possession of [nonpublic information]." Ibid.

16.

laws."

220

Chiarella,

u.s.

App. D.C., at 322, 681 F.2d, at 837.

See

445

U.S.,

J.,

at

235,

n.

20

(BLACKMON,

25

dissenting}.
We therefore reject the view that a duty to disclose
or

abstain

receives

exists

material

solely

because

nonpublic

a

person

information

and

knowingly
trades.

Imposing such a duty could have an inhibiting influence on

25

the role of market analysts that the SEC itself recognizes
is essentia1. 16

It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret

out and analyze information," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, and this
often

is done by meeting with and questioning corporate

officers and others who may be viewed as insiders.

Such

meetings customarily involve participants who understand

16 The SEC expressly recognized that "[t] he value to
the entire market of
[analysts']
efforts cannot be
gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly
enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze
information, and thus the analyst's work redounds to the
benefit of all investors."
21 S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC
asserts that "[a]nalysts remain free to obtain from
corporate management corporate information that is not
itself
material
for
purposes
of
filling
in
the
'interstices in analysis'
" Brief for Respondent 42
(quoting Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646}.
But its rule is inherently imprecise, and imprec1s1on
prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord
with legal requirements.
Unless the parties know where
the
line
is
between
permissible
and
impermissible
disclosures and uses, neither corporate insiders nor
analysts can be sure when the line is crossed. Cf. Adler
v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959} (Burger, J.,
sitt1ng by designation}.

26

17.

their

responsibilities

and

adhere

And

them.

to

information that the analysts obtain normally may be the
basis

for

judgments

as

corporation's securities.

to

the

market

worth

of

a

The analyst's judgment in this

265

respect is made available in market letters or otherwise
to clients of the firm.

A different judgment may be made

by a different analyst:

~fferent

views make a market. 17

In the very nature of this type of information, and indeed
of the markets themselves, such information cannot be made
simultaneously

available

to

all

of

the

27C

corporation's

stockholders or the public generally.
In effect, the SEC's view would mean that the duty to
disclose
all

accompanies

those

who

the

possess

That is the general duty

. ~

We reaff1rm that "[a]

t\

inside

information,

nonpublic
~

material

resting

on

information.

we rejected in Chiarella •

duty [to disclose]

arises from the

17 on its facts, this case is the unusual one.
Petitioner is an analyst in a broker-dealer firm, and he
did
interview
management
in
the
course
of
his
investigation.
He
uncovered,
however,
startling
information that required no analysis or exercise of
judgment as to its market relevance.
Nonetheless, the
principle at issue here extends beyond these facts.
The
SEC's rule--applicable without regard to any breach by an
insider--could have wide ramifications on reporting by
analysts of :mere---Jftti.R9tme investment~ ~~

27:

18.

relationship between parties ••• and not merely from one's
ability to acquire information because of his position in
the market."

445

u.s.,

281

at 232-233, n. 14.
B

It

is clear under Cady, Roberts that,

insiders

forbidden

by

their

fiduciary

not only are

relationship

from

using undisclosed corporate information to their personal
advantage,

but they may not give such

information to an

outsider for

the same improper purpose of exploiting the

information

for

§78t (b).
knowingly
such

a

the

participate

and

the

are

"as

trustee

u.s.

267, 272 (1951).

589

(1921):

(1874).

personal

Similarly,

breach

behalf of

their

Jackson

gain.

transactions
profit

forbidden"
himself."

as

15

of

those

transactions

Mosser

Ludeling,

88

who

fiduciary

v.

Darrow,

See Jackson v. Smith, 254
v.

u.s.c.

See

the

with

U.S.

u.s.

616,

in
"on

29(

341
586,

631-632

As the Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule

"would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the
name of the others that the trustee could not conduct in
his

28~

own."

341

U.S.,

at

271.

See

SEC

v.

Texas

Gulf

Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert. denied, 404

29~

19.

u.s.

1005 (1971).
Hence,

as

we

noted

in

Chiarella,

"[t]he

tippee's

30

obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a
participant after

the fact

in the insider's breach of a

fiduciary duty."

445 U.S.,

at 230,

n.

12.

Tippees may

assume an insider's duty to the corporation's shareholders
not

because they receive

inside

information,

because they receive it improperly. 18

but rather

30

And clearly not all

disclosures are improper simply because people trade as a
result.

The SEC's rules are meant to promote many such

disclosures.

Rather,

for

disclosure

is

improper

insider's

duties

under

assumes

a

fiduciary

Rule

where
Cady,

duty

to

lOb-5
it

would

Roberts.
the

purposes,

the

violate

the

Thus,

a

shareholders

tippee
of

a

corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information

18 The
SEC
itself
has
recognized
that
tippee
liability properly is imposed only in circumstances where
the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that the insider
has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In
Investors Mana~ement Co., the SEC stated that one element
of tippee liab1lity is that the tippee knew or had reason
to know "that [the information] was non-public and had
been obtained improperly by selective revelation or
otherwise."
44
S.E.C.,
at
641
(emphasis
added).
Commissioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee
can be held liable only if he received information in
breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it.
Id., at
650 (concurring in the result). See n. 19, supra.---

31

20.

only when the insider breaches his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee
and

the

tippee

knows of that breach • 19

31 1

As Commissioner

Smith perceptively observed in Investors Management Co.:
"It is important in this typ~ of case to focus
on policing insiders and what they do, which I
think appropriate,
rather than on policing
information per se and its possession, which I
think impracticable.
I believe the emphasis in
the law should continue to be upon the conduct
of corporate insiders and their privies, as it
has been since Strong v. Rep ide, 213 U.S. 419
(1909) and as it was in Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf
and Merrill Lynch, rather than upon a concept-too vague for me to apply with any consistency-of relative informational advantages in the
marketplace."

44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in

the

:t

re~ur

321

32!

33(

~~.

~~

19 Professor Loss has linked
ippee liability to the
concept in the law of restit tion that "' [w]here a
fiduciary in violation of his
uty to the beneficiary
communicates confidential inform -ion to a third person,
the third person, if he had noti e of the violation of
duty, holds upon a constructive tr st for the beneficiary
any profit which he makes thro gh the use of such
information.'"
3 L. Loss, Securiti s Regulation 1451 (2d
ed. 1961)
(quoting Restatement of Restitution §201(2)
(1937)).
Other authorities likewis
have expressed the
view that tippee liability exists o ly where there has
been a breach of trust by an insider
See, e. g., Ross v.
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY I967); A. Jacobs, The
Impact of Rule lOb-5, §167, at 7-4 (1975) (" [T] he better ~
view is that a tipper must know or have reason to know the
,
information is nonpublic and was improperly obtained.");
He.
Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the
~
Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 u. Pa.
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule
lOb-5 restrictions to tippees of corporate insiders can
best
be
justified
on
the
theory
that
they
are
participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary
duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency §312, comment
c (1958) ("A person who, with notice that an agent is } 1 -J..A.
thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives ~
confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed]
.•• a constructive trustee.").

21.

c
Tipping

thus

properly

is

viewed

as

a

means

of

33

indirectly violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain
rule.

Accordingly, the elements of a Rule lOb-5 violation

in a tipping case should be the same as
trading case.
not

impose

in an inside-

Mere possession of inside information does

an

obligation

Chiarella, supra.

to disclose or

abstain.

See

34

Similarly, mere receipt of information

from a corporate insider is not enough to impose such an
obligation.

The recipient or tippee of inside information

thus cannot be "a participant after the fact," Chiarella,
445 U.S., at 230, n. 12, unless the insider or provider of

34

the information has breached his duty to the corporation's
shareholders, i. e., he has a specific relationship to the
shareholders
confidential

of

the

information

corporation

and

he

received

a

result

as

exploits
of

that

relationship for his personal benefit. 20

~

·
~- ~
~ . ~
1_

~

20 The legal conclusion that all trading on nonpublic
inside information by securities analysts does not violate
the antifraud provisions of the securities laws in no way
suggests that knowingly trading on inside information ~
securities analyst Sl is "socially desirable or even that it
is devoid of moral considerations." Dooley, at 55. Nor
does it suggest that it is unreasonable to expect that all
citizens,
including
securities
analysts,
have
an
Footnote continued on next page.
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Because

all

disclosures

information are not

of

confidential

inconsistent with

the duty

corporate
insiders

owe to shareholders, all disclosures will not qualify as
exploitation.

Whether

disclosure

of

material

nonpublic

information is a breach of duty therefore depends in large
part on the purpose of the disclosure. 21

35!

As Commissioner

Smith stated in Investors Management Co.:
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to
insider responsibility by a necessary finding
that the tippee knew the information was given
to him in breach of a duty by a person having a
special relationship to the issuer not to
disclose
the
information,
and
that
the
information must be shown not only to have been

4:14-

36(

~

obligation to disclose promptly in ications of i legal
actions by a corporation to the
roper author'ties-typically the SEC and exchange a thorities in cases
involving
securities.
On
the
contrary,
tradi g on
---=--~,ial nonpublic information is b havior that fal ~
below
standard of conduct ,_
·
· e. ~/~
conclusion does not, however, further analysis very far.
There are "significant distinctions between actual legal
obligations and ethical ideals."
SEC, Report of the
Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 (1963).
2 1An example of a case turning on the court's
determination that the disclosure did not impose any
fiduciary
duties
on
the
recipient
of
the
inside
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d
796 (CA2 1980) • There, the defendant investment banking
firm, representing one of its own corporate clients,
investigated another corporation that was a possible
target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of
negotiations the investment banking firm was given, on a
confidential basis,
unpublished material
information.
Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned,
the firm was charged with relying on the information when
it traded in the target corporation's stock. For purposes
of the decision, it was assumed that the firm knew the
information was confidential, but that
it had been
received in arm's-length negotiations.
See id., at 798.
In the absence of any fiduciary relationship, the Court of
Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on
the investment firm. See id., at 799.

23.

material and non-public,
but also to have
substantially contributed to the trading which
occurred."

36

44 S.E.C., at 651 (concurring in the result).
There
justify an

are

facts

and

inference

that

fiduciary duty.
that

exists

circumstances
the

insider

37

that
has

often

may

breached

his

For example, there may be a relationship

between

the

insider

and

the

recipient

that

suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention
to

benefit

the

particular

recipient.

The

elements

37

of

fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information
certainly

exist

when

an

insider

makes

a

gift

of

confidential information to a trading relative or friend.

~

The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider followed
/\

38

by a gift of the profits to the recipient.
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure may not
always be easy.

And the rules and presumptions that will

govern disclosures under the various situations that will
arise may not be easy for the SEC and the courts to draw.
But some clear lines for the securities industry must be
drawn and the liability for trading may not follow inside
information throughout the entire securities market.

In

38

24.

contrast, the rule set forth by the SEC in this case would
have no limiting principle. 22

39

IV
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth
above, we find that there was no actionable violation by
petitioner. 23

It

is undisputed

that petitioner himself

22without legal limitations, market participants are
forced to rely on the reasonableness of the SEC's
litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, as the
facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing
of the Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later
Chairman) Budge spoke of the various implications of
applying Rule lOb-5 in inside trading cases:
Turning to the realm of possible defendants
in the present and potential civil actions, the
Commission certainly does not contemplate suing
every person who may have come across inside
information.
In the Texas Gulf action neither
tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of
employees have been named as defendants. In my
view, the Commission in future cases normally
should not join rank and file employees or
persons outside the company such as an analyst
or reporter who learns of inside information.
Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of
the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov.
18, 1965) (emphasis added) , reprinted in Budge, The Texas
Gulf Sulphur Case--What It Is and What It Isn't, Corp.
Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).
23 Petitioner contends that he was not a "tippee"
because the information he received constituted unverified
allegations of fraud that were denied by management and
were not "material facts" under the securities laws that
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that
the information he received was not truly "inside"
information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate
purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime.
The
Solicitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 22.
For purposes of deciding this case,
however, we assume the correctness of the SEC's findings,
accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a
tippee of material inside information.

25.

was

a

stranger

to Equity Funding,

with

fiduciary duty to its shareholders. 24
directly or

indirectly,

no

pre-existing

39

He took no action,

that induced the shareholders or

officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence
in him.

There was no expectation by petitioner's sources

that he would keep their information in confidence.

~d petitione~
A

information
breached

about

their

~
h,
t e

~

1\

breached

no

misappropriate

Equity

Cady,

duty

Funding.

Roberts

.
nonpubl1c

when

or

illegally

Unless

the

Nor

obtain
insiders

duty

to

shareholders

.
.
1nformat1on

to

..
pet1t1oner,

he

L--+

passed 1\ on

tQ.e..

40

-inT i

on

in
h

e

to
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24 Judge Wright found that petitioner acquired a
fiduciary duty by virtue of his position as an employee of
a broker-dealer.
See 220 u.s. App. D.C., at 325-327, 681
F.2d, at 840-842.
The SEC, however, did not consider
Judge Wright's alternate theory in its decision, nor did
it present that theory to the Court of Appeals. The SEC
also has not argued Judge Wright's theory in this Court.
See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of such a
duty are therefore not before the Court.
See SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 u.s. 194, 196-197 (1947}.
Footnote(s} 25 will appear on following pages.
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore
is

Reversed.
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CHAMBERS DRAFT

SlWREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-276
RAYMOND L. DIRKS, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[May - , 1983]
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner received material nonpublic information from
"insiders" of a corporation with which he had no connection.
He disclosed this information to investors who relied on it in
trading in the shares of the corporation. The question is
whether petitioner violated the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws by this disclosure.
I

In 1973, petitioner was an officer of a New York brokerdealer firm, providing investment analysis on insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On March 6, petitioner received information from Ronald Secrist, a former
officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that
the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds,
were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent internal
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225--247; the opinion of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S.
App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829-833 (1982).
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by
Equity Funding employees. He urged petitioner to verify
the fraud and disclose it publicly.
Petitioner decided to investigate the allegations. He visited Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and employees of the corporation.
Its senior management denied any wrongdoing, but current
and former corporation employees corroborated the charges
of fraud. Neither petitioner nor his firm owned or traded
any Equity Funding stock, but throughout his investigation
petitioner candidly discussed with a number of investors and
analysts the information he had obtained. Some of these
persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment advisers who liquidated securities
worth more than $16 million. 2
During the entire week that petitioner was in Los Angeles,
he was in touch regularly with William Blundell, the Wall
Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief. Petitioner urged
Blundell to write a story on the fraud allegations. Blundell
discounted the allegations b~cause he did not believe that
such a massive fraud could go undetected. He declined to
write the story, fearing that publishing such damaging rumors supported only by hearsay from current and former employees might be libelous.
·
During the two-week period in which petitioner pursued
his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the
2
Petitioner received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through
his firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how
many of those with whom [petitioner] spoke promised to direct some brokerage business through [petitioner's firm] to compensate [petitioner], or
how many actually did so." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831.
The Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., promised petitioner
about $25,000 in commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually
generated any brokerage business for petitioner's firm. See App. 199,
204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316,
n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5.
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price of Equity Funding stock fell precipitously from $26 per
share to less than $15 per share. This led the New York
Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insurance authorities impounded Equity
Funding's records and uncovered evidence of the fraud.
Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) file a complaint against Equity Funding 3 and only
then, on April 2, did the Wall Street Journal publish a frontpage story based largely on information assembled by petitioner.
Equity Funding immediately went into
receivership. 4
The SEC investigated petitioner's role in the disclosure of
the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative law judge,
the SEC found that petitioner had aided and abetted violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77q(a), 5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
3
As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Petitioner himself voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office beginning on March 27.
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153.
• Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
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U.S. C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule 10l:r-5, 17 CFR §240.10l:r-5
(1982), 7 when he repeated the allegations of fraud to members of the investment community-including clients of his
firm-who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC
concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation
or occupation-come into possession of material 'information
that they know is confidential and know or should know came
from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly disclose
that information or refrain from trading." 21 S.E.C. Docket
1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230 n., 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that petitioner "played an important role in
bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light," 21
S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured him. 8
"Section 10(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
7
Rule 10b-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
8
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E),
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully
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Petitioner sought review in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Without opinion, the court entered judgment against petitioner "for the reasons stated by
the Commission in its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2.
Judge Wright, a member of the panel, subsequently issued
an opinion. Judge Robb concurred in the result, and Judge
Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge
Wright believed that "the obligations of corporate fiduciaries
pass to all those to whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220
U. S. App. D.C. 309, 324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright concluded that, as an employee of a
broker-dealer, petitioner had violated "obligations to the
SEC and to the public completely independent of any obligations he acquired" from sources at Equity Funding. Id., at
325, 681 F. 2d, at 840.
We granted a writ of certiorari, U. S. (1982), because of
the importance to the SEC and to the securities industry of
the question presented by this case. We now reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40

S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that "[a]n affirmative
duty to disclose material information has been traditionally
imposed on corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders," id., at 911, and that a
breach of that duty to shareholders 9 also could be a violation
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties).
9
An insider's duty to the corporation's shareholders not to trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that insiders also have
to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher,
supra, §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. There are good reasons to view the breach of
the duty to shareholders as also a violation of the federal securities laws.
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of Rule 10b-5. 10 The SEC did not, however, limit this obligation to disclose 11 or abstain to these insiders. See id., at
911. Rather, the duty was found to exist whenever two factors were present:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access,
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom
he is dealing. Id., at 912 (footnote omitted).
In Chiarella, we quoted with approval the Cady, Roberts
statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain rule and
adopted the SEC's twin elements for finding a violation of
Rule 10b-5's inside-trading restrictions: "(i) the existence of a
relationship affording access to inside information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that
information by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at
227. The Court agreed that there is no general duty to make
Inside trading violates Rule 10b-5.because it presupposes both investor injury and deception. See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1980). We agree with the Cady, Roberts Commission that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate
the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal
emolument of corporate office." See 40 S.E.C., at 912, n. 15.
0
' Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules.
11
The SEC views the disclosure duty as extending beyond the immediate purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant
corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through
the appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to
the investing public generally and without favoring any special person or
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973).
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disclosure before trading with material nonpublic information, 12 and held that "a duty to disclose under§ lO(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235.
The fraud in an inside-trading case is the "inherent unfairness involved where one [with access by virtue of a special
relationship to the issuer to material information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for personal
gain] takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to the investing public." In re Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968). It
is therefore clear that there is no breach of the Cady, Roberts
duty that insiders have to shareholders unless the insider exploits the information available to him for his personal benefit. Thus, an insider will be liable under Rule lOb--5 for inside trading only where he exploits material nonpublic
information for personal gain and fails to disclose that information before doing so.

III
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, he was not a
fiduciary, [or] he was not a person in whom the sellers [of the
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship,
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general
See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic information obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "honest means," as opposed to "stealth").
12
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duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information." Id., at
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information, however, has created analytical difficulties for
the SEC in policing tippees who trade on inside information.
Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to
both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee
has no such relationships. 13 In view of this absence, it has
been unclear how a tippee acquires the duty to refrain from
trading on inside information.

A
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion, is that:
"In tipping potential traders, [petitioner] breached a
duty which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving confidential information from [Equity Funding]
13

Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing such fiduciary duties is not simply that such
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but also that they have
entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re
VanAlystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady,
Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee.
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F. 2d
228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material information
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such
duties to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the person receiving the information must agree at least implicitly to such an arrangement.
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insiders. Tippees such as [petitioner] who receive nonpublic material information from insiders become 'subject to the same duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [495 F. 2d 228,
237 (CA2 1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395,
410 (SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary duty which he assumes from the insider when the
tippee knowingly transmits the information to someone
who will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presumably, [petitioner's] informants were entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to
light and its perpetrators to justice. However, [petitioner]-standing in their shoes-committed a breach of
the fiduciary duty which he had assumed in dealing with
them, when he passed the information on to traders. 21
S.E.C. Docket, at 1410, n. 42.
The SEC's position in this case differs little from its view
that we rejected as inconsistent with congressional intent in
Chiarella. In that case, the Court of Appeals agreed with
the SEC and affirmed the conviction there by holding that
"'[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United States v. Chiarella, 588
F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here,
the SEC maintains that anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic material information has a fiduciary duty to disclose
before trading. Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that here the petitioner's receipt of inside information from an insider brought the duties of an insider, while Chiarella received the information without the
direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no Cady,
Roberts duty. The SEC still fails to explain, however, why
or how the possession of nonpublic information imposed on
petitioner a fiduciary duty with Equity Funding's sharehold-
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ers when Chiarella's possession did not. 14 As we emphasized
in Chiarella, mere possession of non public information does
not give rise to the Cady, Roberts duty; only a specific relationship does that.
In effect, then, the SEC's theory of tippee liability seems
rooted more in the rejected idea that the antifraud provisions
require equal access to all material nonpublic information
than in the principle set forth in Cady, Roberts and Chiarella
that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be
barred from trading while in possession of such information. 15
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella, however, as repudiating any notion that traders must enjoy equal
information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App.
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chiarella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and,
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code§ 1603, Comment
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
6
' In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal information rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent." 445 U. S. , at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account.
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic information]." Ibid.
14
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D.C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at
235, n. 20 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
We therefore reject the view that a duty to disclose or abstain exists solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information and trades. Imposing such a duty
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts that the SEC itself recognizes is essential. 16 It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, and this often is done by meeting
with and questioning corporate officers and others who may
be viewed as insiders. Such meetings customarily involve
participants who understand their responsibilities and adhere
to them. And information that the analysts obtain normally
may be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a
corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. A different judgment may be made by a
different analyst: different views make a market. 17 In the
The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts') efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information,
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21
S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that "[a]nalysts remain free to obtain
from corporate management corporate information that is not itself material for purposes of filling in the 'interstices in analysis'. . . ." Brief for
Respondent 42 (quoting Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646).
But its rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from
ordering their actions in accord with legal requirements. Unless the parties know where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when
the line is crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959)
(Burger, J., sitting by designation).
17
On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Petitioner is an analyst in a
broker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his
investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance.
Nonetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The
SEC's rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could
16
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very nature of this type of information, and indeed of the
markets themselves, such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or
the public generally.
In effect, the SEC's view would mean that the duty to disclose accompanies the inside information, resting on all those
who possess nonpublic material information. That is the
general duty we rejected in Chiarella. We reaffirm today
that "[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the market." 445
U. S., at 232-233, n. 14.
B

Although there are problems with the SEC's theory of
tippee liability, the prophylactic need for a ban on some
tippee trading is clear. And it is also clear that the tippee's
duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's duty. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445
U. S., at 246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN J., dissenting). Under Cady,
Roberts, not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary
relationship from using undisclosed corporate information to
their personal advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15
U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it unlawful to do indirectly any act
made unlawful by the federal securities acts "by means of any
other person"). Similarly, the transactions of those who
knowingly participate and profit with the fiduciary in such a
breach are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the
trustee himself." Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272
(1951). See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921);
Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the
have wide ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views and
news.
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Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up
opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others
that the trustee could not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at
271. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301,
1308 (CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971).
Hence, as we noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation
has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after
the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445
U. S., at 230, n. 12. Tippees may assume an insider's duty
to the shareholders not because they receive inside information, but rather because they receive it improperly. 18 And
clearly not all disclosures are improper simply because people
trade as a result. The SEC's rules are meant to promote
many such disclosures. Rather, for Rule 10b-5 purposes,
the disclosure is improper where it would violate the insider's
duties under Cady, Roberts. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on
material nonpublic information only when the insider
breaches his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing
the information to the tippee and the tippee knows of that
breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively observed in
Investors Management Co.:
18
The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In Investors Management Co., the SEC stated that one element of tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the information]
was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation
or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith
read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if he received
information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. Id., at 650
(concurring in the result). See n. 19, supra.
19
Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of
restitution that " '[ w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
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"It is important in this type of case to focus on policing
insiders and what they do, which I think appropriate,
rather than on policing information per se and its possession, which I think impracticable. I believe the emphasis in the law should continue to be upon the conduct of
corporate insiders and their privies, as it has been since
Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909) and as it was in
Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf and Merrill Lynch, rather
than upon a concept-too vague for me to apply with any
consistency-of relative informational advantages in the
marketplace." 44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the
result).

c

Tipping thus properly is viewed as a means of indirectly violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. Accordingly, the elements of a Rule 10b-5 violation in a tipping case
should be the same as in an inside-trading case. Mere possession of inside information does not impose an obligation to
disclose or abstain. See Chiarella, supra. Similarly, mere
receipt of information from a corporate insider is not enough
to impose such an obligation. The recipient or tippee of ininformation.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities likewise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge.
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs,
The Impact of Rule 10~, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and
was improperly obtained.''); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10~ restrictions to
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who,
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a constructive trustee.").
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side information thus cannot be "a participant after the fact,"
Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12, unless the insider or provider of the information has breached his duty to the corporation's shareholders, i. e., he has a specific relationship to the
shareholders of the corporation and he exploits confidential
information received as a result of that relationship for his
personal benefit. 2Q
Because all disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders, all disclosures will not qualify as exploitation.
Whether disclosure of material nonpublic information is a
breach of duty therefore depends in large part on the purpose
of the disclosure. 21 As Commissioner Smith stated in I nvestors Management Co.:
20
The legal conclusion that all trading on non public inside infonnation by
securities analysts does not violate the antifraud provisions of the securities laws in no way suggests that knowingly trading on inside infonnation
is "socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations."
Dooley, at 55. Nor does it suggest that it is unreasonable to expect that
all citizens, including securities analysts, have an obligation to disclose
promptly indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authorities-typically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving
securities. On the contrary, trading on material nonpublic infonnation is
behavior that may fall below highly ethical standards of conduct. This
conclusion does not, however, further legal analysis very far. There are
"significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical
ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H. R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 (1963).
21
An example of a case turning on the court's detennination that the disclosure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside
infonnation is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980).
There, the defendant investment banking finn, representing one of its own
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the investment banking finn was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material
infonnation. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned,
the finn was charged with relying on the infonnation when it traded in the
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed
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"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee
knew the information was given to him in breach of a
duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information, and that the information must be shown not only to have been material
and non-public, but also to have substantially contributed to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651
(concurring in the result).
There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty.
For example, there may be a relationship that exists between
the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo
from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of
nonpublic information certainly exist when an insider makes
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider
himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.
· Determining the purpose of any one disclosure may not always be easy. And the rules and presumptions that will
govern disclosures under the various situations that will arise
may not be easy for the SEC and the courts to draw. But
some clear lines for the securities industry must be drawn
and the liability for trading may not follow inside information
throughout the entire securities market. In contrast, the
rule set forth by the SEC in this case would have no limiting
principle. 22
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been
received in arm's-length negotiations. See i d., at 798. In the absence of
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on the investment firm. See i d., at 799.
22
Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous,
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the
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IV
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above,
we find that there was no actionable violation by petitioner. 23
It is undisputed that petitioner himself was a stranger to Equity Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its
shareholders. 24 He took no action, directly or indirectly,
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb-5 in inside trading
cases:
Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside
information.
Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis added),
reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and What It
Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).
23
Petitioner contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information
he received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The Solicitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a
tippee of material inside information.
24
Judge Wright found that petitioner acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue
of his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App.
D.C., at 32fh327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider Judge Wright's alternate theory in its decision, nor did it present that
theory to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge
Wright's theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The
merits of such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1947).
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that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding
to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation by petitioner's sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did petitioner misappropriate or illegally obtain the information about Equity Funding. Unless
the insiders breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to petitioner, he
breached no duty when he passed it on to investors as well as
to the Wall Street Journal.
In this case, we think it also is clear that the Equity Funding employees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the
corporation's shareholders by providing information to petitioner.25 The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have
an apparent purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable information to petitioner. As the facts of this case clearly indi25
In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to believe that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" differs markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact,
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not understand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in
finding that petitioner breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows
himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside information must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); 21 S. E. C., at 1410,
n. 42 ("Presumably, [petitioner's] informants were entitled to disclose the
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its perpetrators to
justice."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id.,
at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside information by any person imposes a
duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation
arises not from the manner in which such information is acquired. . .. ");
220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322-323, 681 F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.).
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cate, the tippees were motivated solely by a desire to expose
the fraud. See supra, at - - . In the absence of a breach of
duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative
breach by petitioner. Seen. 19, supra. As we said in Chiarella, petitioner therefore could not have been "a participant
after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary duty."
445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.

v
We conclude that petitioner, in the circumstances of this
case, had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
therefore is
Reversed.
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Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

//)

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner received material nonpublic information from
"insiders" of a corporation with which he had no connection.
He disclosed this information to investors who relied on it in
trading in the shares of the corporation. The question is
whether petitioner violated the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws by this disclosure.
I

In 1973, petitioner was an officer of a New York brokerealer m
· · g investment analysis Gfilrlsurance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On March 6, petitioner received information from Ronald Secrist, a former
officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that
the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds,
were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent internal
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regulaThe facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth
administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S.
App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829-833 (1982).
by the
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by
Equity Funding employees. He urged petitioner to verify
the fraud and disclose it publicly.
Petitioner decided to investigate the allegations. He visited Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and employees of the corporation.
Its senior management denied any wrongdoing, but current
and former corporation employees corroborated the charges
of fraud. Neither petitioner nor his firm owned or traded
any Equity Funding stock, but throughout his investigation
petitioner candidly discussed with a number of investors and
analysts the information he had obtained. Some of these
persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment advisers who liquidated securities
worth more than $16 million. 2
During the entire week that petitioner was in Los Angeles,
he was in touch regularly with William Blundell, the Wall
Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief. Petitioner urged
Blundell to write a story on the fraud allegations. Blundell
discounted the allegations because he did not believe that
such a massive fraud could go undetected. He declined to
write the story, fearing that publishing such damaging rumors supported only by hearsay from current and former employees might be libelous.
During the two-week period in which petitioner pursued
his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the
2
Petitioner received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through
his firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how
many of those with whom [petitioner] spoke promised to direct some brokerage business through [petitioner's firm] to compensate [petitioner], or
how many actually did so." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831.
The Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc. , promised petitioner
about $25,000 in commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually
generated any brokerage business for petitioner's firm. See App. 199,
204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1404, n. 10; 220 U.S. App. D.C. , at 316,
n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5.
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price of Equity Funding stock fell precipitously from $26 per
share to less than $15 per share. This led the New York
Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insurance authorities impounded Equity
Funding's records and uncovered evidence of the fraud.
Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) file a complaint against Equity Funding 3 and only
then, on April2, did the Wall Street Journal publish a frontpage story based largely on information assembled by petitioner.
Equity Funding immediately went into
receivership. 4
The SEC investigated petitioner's role in the disclosure of
the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative law judge,
the SEC found that petitioner had aided and abetted violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77q(a), 5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Petitioner himself voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office beginning on March 27.
'A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153.
5
Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly"( I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
8
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U.S. C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5
(1982), 7 when he repeated the allegations of fraud to members of the investment community-including clients of his
firm-who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC
concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation
or occupation-come into possession of material 'information
that they know is confidential and know or should know came
from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly disclose
that information or refrain from trading." 21 S.E.C. Docket
1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222,230 n., 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that petitioner "played an important role in
bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light," 21
S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured him. 8
Section 10(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange6

"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
neces!?ary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
7
Rule 101:>-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
8
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E),
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully
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Petitioner sought review in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Without opinion, the court entered judgment against petitioner "for the reasons stated by
the Commission in its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2.
Judge Wright, a member of the panel, subsequently issued
an opinion. Judge Robb concurred in the result, and Judge
Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge
Wright believed that "the obligations of corporate fiduciaries
pass to all those to whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220
U. S. App. D.C. 309, 324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright concluded that, as an employee of a
broker-dealer, petitioner had violated "obligations to the
SEC and to the public completely independent of any obligations he acquired" from sources at Equity Funding. I d., at
325, 681 F. 2d, at 840.
We granted a writ of certiorari, U. S. (1982), because of
the importance to the SEC and to the securities industry of
the question presented by this case. We now reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40

S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that "[a]n affirmative
duty to disclose material information has been traditionally
imposed on corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders," id., at 911, and that a
breach of that duty to shareholders 9 also could be a violation
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties).
9
An insider's duty to the corporation's shareholders not to trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that insiders also have
to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher,
supra, §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. There are good reasons to view the breach of
the duty to shareholders as also a violation of the federal securities laws.
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of Rule 10b--5. 10 The SEC did not, however, limit this obligation to disclose 11 or abstain to these insiders. See id., at
911. Rather, the duty was found to exist whenever two factors were present:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access,
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom
he is dealing. ld., at 912 (footnote omitted).
In Chiarella, we quoted with approval the Cady, Roberts
statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain rule and
adopted the SEC's twin elements for finding a violation of
Rule 10b--5's inside-trading restrictions: "(i) the existence of a
relationship affording access to inside information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that
information by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at
227. The Court agree~hat there is no general duty to make
Inside trading violates Rule 10b-5 because it presupposes both investor injury and deception. See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1980). We agree with the Cady, Roberts Commission that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate
the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal
emolument of corporate office." See 40 S.E.C., at 912, n. 15.
•• Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules.
11
The SEC views the disclosure duty as extending beyond the immediate purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant
corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through
the appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to
the investing public generally and without favoring any special person or
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973).
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A?.isclosure before trading with material nonpublic information, 12 and held that "a duty to disclose under§ lO(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235.
The fraud in an inside-trading case is the "inherent unfairness involved where one [with access by virtue of a special
relationship to the issuer to material information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for personal
gain] takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to the investing public." In re Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968). It
is therefore clear that there is no breach of the Cady, Roberts
duty that insiders have to shareholders unless the insider exploits the information available to him for his personal benefit. Thus, an insider will be liable under Rule lOb-5 for inside trading only where he) s*f3l9its. material non public
information for personal gain and fails to disclose that information before doing so.

III
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, he was not a
fiduciary, [or] he was not a person in whom the sellers [of the
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship,
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general
See 445 U.S., at 233; i d., at 237 (STEVENS, J ., concurring); i d., at
238--239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BURGER, C. J ., dissenting). Cf. id. , at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting)
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic information obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "honest means," as opposed to "stealth").
12
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duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information." I d., at
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information ,...Sewe ~ has created analytical difficulties for
the SEC in policing tippees who trade on inside information.
Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to
both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee
has no such relationships. 13 In view of this absence, it has
been unclear how a tippee acquires the duty to refrain from
trading on inside information.

stat~d

The SEC's position, as
in its opinimf is that:
"In tipping pot:btial traders, [petitioner] breached a
duty which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving confidential information from [Equity Funding]
13
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing such fiduciary duties is not simply that such
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but also that they have
entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady,
Roberts , 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee.
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc ., 495 F. 2d
228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material information
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such
duties to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the person receiving the information must agree at least implicitly to such an arrangement.
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insiders. Tippees such as [petitioner] who receive nonpublic material information from insiders become 'subject to the same duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc., [495 F. 2d 228,
237 (CA2 1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395,
410 (SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary duty which he assumes from the insider when the
tippee knowingly transmits the information to someone
who will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presumably, [petitioner's] informants were entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to
light and its perpetrators to justice. However, [petitioner]-standing in their shoes-committed a breach of
the fiduciary duty which he had assumed in dealing with
them, when he passed the information on to traders. 21
S.E.C. Docket, at 1410, n. 42.
The SEC's position in this case differs little from its view
that we rejected as inconsistent with congressional intent in
Chiarella. In that case, the Court of Appeals agreed with
the SEC and affirmed the conviction there by holding that
"'[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United States v. Chiarella, 588
F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here,
the SEC maintains that anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic material information has a fiduciary duty to disclose
before trading. Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that here the petitioner's receipt of inside information from an insider brought the duties of an insider, while Chiarella received the information without the
direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no Cady,
Roberts duty. The SEC still fails to explain, however, why
or how the possession of nonpublic information imposed on
petitioner a fiduciary duty with Equity Funding's sharehold-
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ers when Chiarella's possession did not. 14 As we emphasized
in Chiarella, mere possession of nonpublic information does
not give rise to the Cady, Roberts duty; only a specific relationship does that.
In effect, then, the SEC's theory of tippee liability seems
rooted ~ in the rejected idea that the antifraud provisions
require e ual access to all material nonpublic information/ @
,
,tha&ffi the principle set forth m a y, o e sand Chiare
~ vvdthat only some persons, under some circumstances, will be
~
barred from trading while in possession of such information. 15
~
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella, however, as repudiating any notion that traders must enjoy equal
~
information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App.
14
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chiarella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and,
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
15
In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal information rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account.
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic information]." Ibid.
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D.C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at
235,n. 20(BLACKMUN~
,J~.~'~d~is~s~e~n~tiEng)h·~~~~~----~-,~~;---:-~~:WQ thereforQ reject e view that a duty to disclose or abw~ ~~
stain exists solely because a person knowingly receives mate~ 1-o
rial nonpublic information and trades. Imposing such a duty
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market ana~flysts that the SEC itself recognizes is essential. 16 It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, and this often is done by meeting
with and questioning corporate officers and others who may
be viewed as insiders. Such meetings customarily involve
participants who understand their responsibilities and adhere
to them. And information that the analysts obtain normally
may be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a
corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. A different jud ent rna be made by a
different analyst: difierm~t v1ews make a mar et. 17
e
16

The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information,
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21
S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that "[a)nalysts remain free to obtain
from corporate management corporate information that is not itself material for purposes of filling in the 'interstices in analysis' .... " Brief for
Respondent 42 (quoting Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646).
But its rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from
ordering their actions in accord with legal requirements. Unless the arties
w ere the line is between perm1ssible an lmperm!SSl e disclosures an uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when
the line is crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959)
(Burger, J., sitting by designation).
17
On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Petitioner is an analyst in a
broker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his
investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance.
Nonetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The
SEC's rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could
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very nature of this type of information, and indeed of the
markets themselves, such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or
the public generally.
In effect, the SEC's view would mean that the duty to disclose accompanies the inside information, resting on all those
who possess nonpublic material information. That is the
general duty we rejected in Chiarella. We reaffirm today
that "[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between parties ... and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the market." 445
U. S., at 232-233, n. 14.
B
Although there are problems with the SEC's theory of
tippee liability, the prophylactic need for a ban on some
tippee trading is clear. And it is also clear that the tippee's
duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's duty. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445
U. S., at 246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN J., dissenting). Under Cady,
Roberts, not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary
relationship from using undisclosed corporate information to
their personal advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15
U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it unlawful to do indirectly any act
made unlawful by the federal securities acts "by means of any
other person"). Similarly, the transactions of those who
knowingly participate and profit with the fiduciary in such a
breach are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the
trustee himself." Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272
(1951). See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921);
Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the
have wide ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views and
news.
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Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up
opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others
that the trustee could not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at
271. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301,
1308 (CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971).
Hence, as we noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation
has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after
the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445
U. S., at 230, n. 12. Tippees may assume an insider's duty
to the shareholders not because they receive inside information, but rather because they receive it improperly. 18 And
clearly not all disclosures are improper simply because people
trade as a result. The SEC's rules are -meaHt o promote
many such disclosures. Rather, for Rule lOb- purposes,
the disclosure is improper where it would violate the insider's
duties under Cady, Roberts. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on
material nonpublic information only when the insider
breaches his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing
the information to the tippee and the tippee knows of that
breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively observed in
Investors Management Co.:
18
The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In Investors Management Co., the SEC stated that one element of tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the information]
was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation
or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith
read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if he received
information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. I d., at 650
(concurring in the result). Seen. 19, supra.
19
Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of
restitution that" '[w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
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"It is important in this type of case to focus on policing
insiders and what they do, which I think appropriate,
rather than on policing information per se and its possession, which I think impracticable. I believe the emphasis in the law should continue to be upon the conduct of
corporate insiders and their privies, as it has been since
Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909) and as it was in
Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf and Merrill Lynch, rather
than upon a concept-too vague for me to apply with any
consistency-of relative informational advantages in the
marketplace." 44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the
result).

c

Tipping thus properly is viewed as a means of indirectly violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. Accordingly, the elements of a Rule 10b-5 violation in a tipping case
should be the same as in an inside-trading case. Mere possession of inside information does not impose an obligation to
disclose or abstain. See Chiarella, supra. Similarly, mere
receipt of information from a .corporate insider is not enough
to impose such an obligation. The recipient or tippee of ininformation.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities likewise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge.
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs,
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7~ (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10b-5 restrictions to
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (195~ ("A person who,
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a constructive trustee.").
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side information thus cannot be "a participant after the fact,"
Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12, unless the insider or provider of the information has breached his duty to the corporation's shareholders, i. e., he has a specific relationship to the
shareholders of the corporation and he exploits confidential
information received as a result of that relationship for his
20
personal benefit.
'K'I~rHQ-P--'~1.-disclosureS"of confidential corpurnt'Erin orma
ion are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to sharealders, all disclosures will not qualify as exploitation.
ether disclosure of material nonpublic information is a
breach of duty therefo~r:e_o~.eperu:l8-i·~~~~t-.Q;~~p.ult:p(lSe'
of th · cl
As Commissioner Smith stated in Investors Management Co.:

one
,
significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical
ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H. R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 (1963).
21
An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the disclosure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co ., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980).
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the investment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned ,
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed

<f-7!)
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"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee
knew the information was given to him in breach of a
duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information, and that the information must be shown not only to have been material
and non-public, but also to have substantially contributed to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651
(concurring in the result).
There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty.
For example, there may be a relationship that exists between
the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo
from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of
nonpublic information certainly exist when an insider makes
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider
hi elf followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure may
ways be easy. AR£i.-th:e-Jml1ss-~Eh:»-e8i:H~~~iinrt-wtltlr-,.,-

that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799.
22
Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous,
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the

cl)'
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IV
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above,
we find that there was no actionable violation by petitioner. 23
It is undisputed that petitioner himself was a stranger to Equity Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its
shareholders. 24 He took no action, directly or indirectly,
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb-5 in inside trading
cases:
Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside
information.
Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis added),
reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and What It
Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).
23
Petitioner contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information
he received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The Solicitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a
tippee of material inside information.
24
Judge Wright found that petitioner acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue
of his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App.
D.C., at 325-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider Judge Wright's alternate theory in its decision, nor did it present that
theory to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge
Wright's theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The
merits of such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 19&-197 (1947).
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that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding
to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation by petitioner's sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did petitioner misappropriate or illegally obtain the information about Equity Funding. Unless
the insiders breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to petitioner, he
breached no duty when he passed it on to investors as well as
to the Wall Street Journal.
In this case, we think it also is clear that the Equity Funding employees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the
corporation's shareholders by providing information to petitioner. 25 The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have
an apparent purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable information to petitioner. As the facts of this case clearly indi~In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to believe that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" differs markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact,
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not understand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in
finding that petitioner breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows
himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside information must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); 21 S.E.C., at 1410,
n. 42 ("Presumably, [petitioner's] informants were entitled to disclose the
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its perpetrators to
justice."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id.,
at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside information by any person imposes a
duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation
arises not from the manner in which such information is acquired .... ");
220 U.S. App. D.C., at 322-323, 681 F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.).
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cate, the tipp
were motivated solely by a desire to expose
the fraud. See supra, at--. In the absence of a breach of
duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative
breach by petitioner. Seen. 19, supra. As we said in Chiarella, petitioner therefore could not have been "a participant
after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary duty."
445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.

v
We conclude that petitioner, in the circumstances of this
case, had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
therefore is
Reversed.
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RAYMOND L. DIRKS, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[May-, 1983]

/

Powell

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic information from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation.
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure.
I

In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer
firm and provided investment analysis of insurance company
securities to institutional investors. 1 On March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of
Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that the assets
of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, were vastly
overstated as the result of fraudulent corporate practices.
Secrist also stated that various regulatory agencies had failed
'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S.
App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829-833 (1982).
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to act on similar charges made by Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the fraud and disclose it
publicly.
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and employees of the corporation.
Its senior management denied any wrongdoing, but current
and former corporation employees corroborated the charges
of fraud. Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any
Equity Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he
openly discussed with a number of clients openly investors
and investors the information he had obtained. Some of
these persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securi-ties, including five investment advisers who liquidated securities worth more than $16 million. 2
During the week that Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in
touch regularly with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to
write a story on the fraud allegations. Blundell discounted
the allegations because he did not believe that such a massive
fraud could go undetected. He declined to write the story,
fearing that publishing such damaging rumors supported only
by hearsay from current and former employees might be
libelous.
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of
2

Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his
firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate [him], or how many actually
did so." 220 U.S. App. D.C., at316, 681 F. 2d, at831. The Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any brokerage business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at
1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5.
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Equity Funding stock fell precipitously from $26 per share to
less than $15 per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insurance authorities impounded Equity Funding's
records and uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April2, did
the Wall Street Journal publish a front-page story based
Equity Fundlargely on information assembled by Dirks.
ing immediately went into receivership. 4
The SEC investigated Dirks' role in the disclosure of the
fraud. After a hearing by an administrative law judge, the
SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted violations of
§17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S. C. §77q(a), 6
§ lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. ,
As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office beginning on March 27.
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for
Petitioner 15; App. 14~153.
5
Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
8
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§78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1982), 7
when he repeated the allegations of fraud to members of the
investment community who later sold their Equity Funding
stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of
their motivation or occupation-come into possession of material 'information that they know is confidential and know or
should know came from a corporate insider,' they must either
publicly disclose that information or refrain from trading."
21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230 n. 12
(1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to
light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured
him. 8
Section 10(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange6

"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
7
Rule 10b-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
8
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E),
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully
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Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Without opinion, the court entered judgment against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the
Commission in its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2.
Judge Wright, a member of the panel, subsequently issued
an opinion. Judge Robb concurred in the result, and Judge
Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge
Wright believed that "the obligations of corporate fiduciaries
pass to all those to whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220
U. S. App. D.C. 309, 324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright concluded that, as an employee of a
broker-dealer, Dirks had violated "obligations to the SEC
and to the public completely independent of any obligations
he acquired" from sources at Equity Funding. I d., at 325,
681 F. 2d, at 840.
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a
writ of certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1982). We now reverse.
II
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an
"affirmative duty of disclosure . . . when dealing in securities." Id., at 911, and n. 13. 9 The SEC found that, not only
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties).
9
The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to
trade on inside infonnation differs from the common-law duty that officers
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which confidential infonnation is one. See 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. We agree with the Cady,
Roberts Commission that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was
to eliminate the idea that use of inside infonnation for personal advantage
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did breach of this duty recognized at common law satisfy the
elements for a violation of Rule 101>-5, 10 but that individuals
other than insiders could H&'l~ the galiga~ to disclose material nonpublic information 11 before trading or to abstain from
trading altogether:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access,
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom
he is dealing. Id., at 912 (footnote omitted).
In Chiarella, we quoted with approval the Cady, Roberts
statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain rule and
adopted the SEC's twin elements for finding a violation of
Rule 101>-5's inside-trading restrictions: "(i) the existence of a
relationship affording access to inside information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that
information by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at
227. In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to
disclose or abstain, the Court found that there is no general
was a normal emolument of corporate office."

See 40 S.E.C., at 912,

n. 15.
10
Rule 10b--5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules.
11
The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through the
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973). As used in this
opinion, "nonpublic information" will refer to information that has not been
so disclosed.

J.L

~~
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duty to disclose before trading on material nonpublic information, 12 and held that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235.
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule
lOI:Hi. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462,
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception."
I d., at 473. The fraud in an inside-trading case is the "inherent unfairness involved where one "takes advantage" of "information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936
(1968). Thus, an insider will be liable under Rule 101:Hi for
inside trading only where he makes "secret profits" from material nonpublic information, Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at
916, n. 31, and fails to disclose that information before doing
so.
III
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not a
fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship,
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general
12

See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239--240 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic information obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "honest means," as opposed to "stealth").
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duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information." I d., at
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC in
policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such
relationship. 13 In view of this absence, it has been unclear
how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from
trading on inside information.
A
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is
that a tippee inherits the Cady, Roberts obligation to shareholders when he receives inside information from an insider:
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty
18
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they
have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the
business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for
corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady,
Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee.
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F. 2d
228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material information
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such
a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the ~ receiving tb& i~ nt1:H!~e at l~i~r:...to il.lcHL..aB-~ange-

~t.

----------~~----------~
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which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders.
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material
information from insiders become 'subject to the same
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee
knowingly transmits the information to someone who
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presumably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its
perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing in
their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he
passed the information on to traders." 21 S.E.C.
Docket, at 1410, n. 42.
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed
Chiarella's conviction by holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate
insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.'" United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who
knowingly receives nonpublic material information has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 14
Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that
Dirks receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt ofnonpublic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary
14
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We again decline to accept the view that a duty to disclose
or abstain exists solely because a person knowingly receives
material nonpublic information from an insider and trades.
Imposing such a duty could have an inhibiting influence on
the role of market analysts that the SEC itself recognizes is
essential. 15 It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and
analyze information," 21 S.E.C., at 1406/6 and this often is
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain;
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders.
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chiarella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and,
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule 101:H> by
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
16
The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information,
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21
S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that "[a]nalysts remain free to obtain
from corporate management corporate information that is not itself material for purposes of filling in the 'interstices in analysis'. . . ." Brief for
Respondent 42 (quoting Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646).
But its rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from
ordering their actions in accord with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to where the line is between permissible and
impermissible disclosures and uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts
can be sure when the line is crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840,
845 (CA2 1959) (Burger, J., sitting by designation).
16
On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a broker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. Nonetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's
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done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and
others who may be viewed as insiders. And information
that the analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation's securities.
The analyst's judgment in this respect is made available in
market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. In the
very nature of this type of information, and indeed of the
markets themselves, such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or
the public generally.
In effect, then, the SEC's theory of tippee liability appears
rooted in the rejected idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information. This is a significant departure from
_the principle set forth in Cady, Roberts and Chiarella that
only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred
from trading while in possession of ~A!nformat10n. 17
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have
wide ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views and news.
Despite the unusualness, however, of Dirks' "find," the central role that
he played in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in
general can play in-'p~ eePpellaie Bb:uot.I.Y:ei fup- e¥ideRee e& 1JJ:F9Rgdoing:, BAel.lkl be a.ppt:eoiated. Dirks' careful investigation brought to light a
massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity Funding fraud
was exposed, the information in the trading market was grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone undetected
longer. The SEC should be wary of using Rule 10b-5 to shield corporations from the socially beneficial scrutiny of securities analysts performing
their normal roles.
17
In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal information rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of securities trading, Congress has expressly'\ ~emt~ted many
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account.
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informa-
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Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion that traders must enjoy equal information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected.
Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other than a
mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions
in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322,
681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 235, n. 20
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
The SEC's view would mean that the duty to disclose accompanies the inside information, resting on all those who
possess nonpublic material information. That is the general
duty we rejected in Chiarella. We reaffirm today that "[a]
duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between parties ... and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the market." 445 U. S., at
232-233, n. 14.
B

Although there are problems with the SEC's theory of
tippee liability, the prophylactic need for a ban on some
tippee trading is clear. Under Cady, Roberts, not only are
insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from using
undisclosed corporate information to their personal advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider
for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information
for their personal gain. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it
unlawful to do indirectly any act made unlawful by the federal securities acts "by means of any other person"). Similarly, the transactions of those who knowingly participate
and profit with the fiduciary in such a breach are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee himself."
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson
tional advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic information]. " Ibid.
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v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88
U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in
Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others that the trustee could
not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. See SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert.
denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the tippee's duty to
disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's
duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445 U. S., at
246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
As we noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has
been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the
fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at
230, n. 12. Tippees may assume an insider's duty to the
shareholders not because they receive inside information but
rather because t.hey-reeli¥e it tmproperly. 18 And or Rule
101:H5 purposes, the insider's disclosure is improper where it
would violate his duty under Cady, Roberts. Thus, a tippee
assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the
insider breaches his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach. 19 As Commis8
' The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In Investors Management Co., the SEC stated that one element of tippee liability is that the tippee kne~ or had reason to know "that [the information]
was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation
or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith
read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if he received
information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. Id., at 650
(concurring in the result).
19
Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of
restitution that "'[w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive

L---------
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sioner Smith perceptively observed in Investors Management Co.:
"It is important in this type of case to focus on policing
insiders and what they do, which I think appropriate,
rather than on policing information per se and its possession, which I think impracticable. I believe the emphasis in the law should continue to be upon the conduct of
corporate insiders and their privies, as it has been since
Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909) and as it was in
Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf and Merrill Lynch, rather
than upon a concept-too vague for me to apply with any
consistency-of relative informational advantages in the
marketplace." 44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the
result).

c

Tipping thus properly is viewed as a means of indirectly violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. Accordingly, the elements of a Rule lOb-5 violation in a tipping case
should be the same as in an inside-trading case. Mere receipt of information from a corporate insider is not enough to
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities likewise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge.
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs,
The Impact of Rule 10l:Hi, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10l:Hi restrictions to
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who,
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a constructive trustee.").
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impose an obligation to disclose or abstain. The recipient or
tippee of inside information thus cannot be "a participant
after the fact," Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12, unless the
insider or provider of the information has breached his duty
to the corporation's shareholders, and the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach. 20
All disclosures of c.onfidential corporate information are not
inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In
contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, the more
typical situation in which there will be a question whether
disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty is when
insiders disclose information to analysts. See n. 16, supra.
In some situations, both the insider and the analyst recipient
will act in good faith, and yet release of the information may
affect the market. For example, it may not be clear-either
to the corporate insider or to the recipient analyst-whether
00

We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside infonnation is "socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations." Dooley,
at 55. Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authoritiestypically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities.
Depending on the circumstances, and even where pennitted by law, one's
trading on material nonpublic infonnation is behavior that may fall below
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238
(1963).

At oral argument, the following exchange took place:
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the
law to go to the SEC first?
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the infonnation has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside infonnation . .. or
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. Thus, it is clear that Rule
lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to tell the SEC about the
fraud before trading.
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the information will be viewed as material nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly think the information already has been disclosed or that it is not material
enough to affect the market. Whether disclosure is a breach
of duty therefore depends in large part on the purpose or
good faith of the insider who made the disclosure. Absent
an improper purpose, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is
no derivative breach. 21
As Commissioner Smith stated in
Investors Management Co.:
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee
knew the information was given to him in breach of a
duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information, and that the information must be shown not only to have been material
and non-public, but also to have substantially contributed to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651
(concurring in the result).
There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty.
For example, there may be a relationship that exists between
21
An example of a case turning on the court's detennination that the disclosure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA21980).
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the investment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned,
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799.
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the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo
from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of
nonpublic information certainly exist when an insider makes
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider
himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a question
of fact, will not always be easy. But it is essential, we think,
to have a guiding principle, and we believe that there must be
a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty before the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule
adopted by the SEC in this case would have no limiting
principle. 22
IV
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above,
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 23 It
22

Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous,
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule 10b--5 in inside-trading
cases:
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside information." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).
23
Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that

82-276--0PINION
18

DIRKS v. SEC

is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders. 24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation
by Dirks sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the
information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street
Journal.
We also think it is clear that the Equity Funding employ-ees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the corporation's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 25 The
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The Solicitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a
tippee of material inside information.
24
Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D.C.,
at 325--327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 1~197 (1947).
25
In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to believe that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" differs markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and
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tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have an apparent
purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable information to
Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra,
at 1-2. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by
the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. See
n. 19, supra. Dirks therefore could not have been "a participant after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty." Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.

v
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case,
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that
- he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is
Reversed.

that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact,
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not understand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders.
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside information must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); 21 S.E.C., at 1410, n. 42
("Presumably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the [Equity
Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its perpetrators to justice."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in the Court of Appeals, at 47--50; id., at
51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside information by any person imposes a
duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation
arises not from the manner in which such information is acquired .... ");
220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322-323, 681 F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.).
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic information from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation.
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure.
I
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula' The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S.
App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829--833 (1982).

82-276-0PINION
DIRKS v. SEC

2

tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the
fraud and disclose it publicly.
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and employees of the corporation.
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but the corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud. Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity Funding
stock, but throughout his investigation he openly discussed
the information he had obtained with a number of clients investors. Some of these persons sold their holdings of Equity
Funding securities, including five investment advisers who
liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch regularly
with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe that such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to write the
story. He feared that publishing such damaging rumors
might be libelous.
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur2

Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his
firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate [Dirks], or how many actually did so." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston
Company Institutional Investors, Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in
commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any brokerage business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at
1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5.
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on information assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immediately went into receivership. 4
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the exposure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted
violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77q(a), 5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S. C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule lOb--5, 17 CFR §240.10b--5
3
As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office beginning on March 27.
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for
Petitioner 15; App. 14~153.
• Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
6
Section lO(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of
the investment community who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into possession
of material 'information that they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading." 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230
n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played an
important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud
to light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured
him. 8
Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment
any facility of any national securities exchange-

.

"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
7
Rule lOb-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
8
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E),
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties).
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against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge
Robb concurred in the result, and Judge Tamm dissented;
neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to
whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D.C. 309,
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of receiving the information. !d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840.
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a
writ of certiorari.-- U. S. - - (1982). We now reverse.
II

In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an
"affirmative duty of disclosure . . . when dealing in securities." !d., at 911, and n. 13. 9 The SEC found that, not only
did breach of this common-law duty also establish the elements of a Rule 10b--5 violation, '0 but that individuals other
9

The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady,
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree that "[a] significant purpose
of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office."
See 40 S.E.C., at 912, n. 15.
10
Rule lOir-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on
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than corporate insiders could be obligated to disclose material
nonpublic information 11 before trading or to abstain from
trading altogether. !d., at 912. In Chiarella, we accepted
the two elements set out initially in Cady Roberts for establishing a Rule 10b-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness
of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227.
In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose
or abstain, the Court found that there is no general duty to
disclose before trading on material nonpublic information, 12
and held that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise
from the mere possession of nonpublic market information."
I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235.
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule
10b-5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462,
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception."
!d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules.
11
The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through the
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973). As used in this
opinion, "nonpublic information" will refer to information that has not been
so disclosed.
2
' See 445 U.S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic information obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "honest means," as opposed to "stealth").

82-276-0PINION

DIRKS v. SEC

7

the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage" of "information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone."
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43
S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable under
Rule 101H> for inside trading only where he fails to disclose
material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus
makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 916, n.
31.

III
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not a
fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship,
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information." I d., at
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC in
policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such
relationship. 13 In view of this absence, it has been unclear
13
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they
have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the
business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for
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how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from
trading on inside information.

A
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is
that a tippee inherits the Cady, Roberts obligation to shareholders whenever he receives inside information from an
insider:
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty
which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders.
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material
information from insiders become 'subject to the same
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee
knowingly transmits the information to someone who
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presumably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its
perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing in
their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty
corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady,
Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee.
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F. 2d
228, 237 (CA21974) (investment banker had access to material information
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such
a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship
at least must imply such a duty.
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which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he
passed the information on to traders." 21 S.E.C.
Docket, at 1410, n. 42.
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed
Chiarella's conviction, holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 14
In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases
appear rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information. This is a significant departure from
14

Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt ofnonpublic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain;
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders.
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chiarella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and,
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
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the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some persons,
under some circumstances, will be barred from trading while
in possession of material nonpublic information. 15 Judge
Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating
any notion that all traders must enjoy equal information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other than a
mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions
in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322,
681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 235, n. 20.
We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the
relationship between parties ... and not merely from one's
ability to acquire information because of his position in the
market." 445 U. S., at 232-233, n. 14.
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence
on the role of market analysts that the SEC itself recognizes
is essential. 16 It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out
In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal information rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account.
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic information]." Ibid.
16
The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information,
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21
S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain
16
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and analyze information," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, 17 and this often
is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers
and others who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to
the market worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's
judgment in this respect is made available in market letters
or otherwise to clients of the firm. In the very nature of this
type of information, and indeed of the markets themselves,
such information cannot be made simultaneously available to
all of the corporation's stockholders or the public generally.
B

The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'interstices in analysis'.... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors
Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646). But this rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA21959) (Burger, J.,
sitting by designation).
17
On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a broker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. N onetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views.
Despite the unusualness, of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to
withhold from the public is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity
Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market was
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone
undetected longer.
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that such tippee always are free to trade on the information.
The need for a prophylactic ban on some tippee trading is
clear. Not only must insiders be forbidden by their fiduciary
relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15
U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it unlawful to do indirectly "by
means of any other person" any act made unlawful by the federal securities laws).
Similarly, the transactions of those
who knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach
are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee
himself." Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See
Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v.
Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others that the
trustee could not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 ·F. 2d 1301, 1308
(CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the
tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of
the insider's duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella,
445 U. S., at 246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we
noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed
as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the
insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, n.
12.
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but
rather because it has been made available to them improperly.18 And for Rule 10b--5 purposes, the insider's disclosure

(

;

18

The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In In-

'
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is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively observed in Investors Management Co.: "It is important in this
type of case to focus on policing insiders and what they do,
which I think appropriate, rather than on policing informavestors Management Co., supra, at--, the SEC stated that one element
of tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the
information] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective
revelation or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it.
Id., at 650 (concurring in the result).
19
Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of
restitution that "'[w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities likewise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge.
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs,
The Impact of Rule 10l:Hi, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and
was improperly obtained.''); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10l:Hi restrictions to
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who,
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a constructive trustee.'').
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tion per se and its possession, which I think impracticable."
44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the result). Tipping thus
properly is viewed as a means of indirectly violating the
Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 20

c
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether
the insiders "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case,
the more typical situation in which there will be a question
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. Seen. 16,
supra. In some situations, both the insider and the analyst
20
We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is ever
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations."
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authoritiestypically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities.
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following exchange took place:
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the
law to go to the SEC first?
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the information has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading.
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recipient will act in good faith, and yet release of the information may affect the market. For example, it may not be
clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient analyst-whether the information will be viewed as material
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on
the purpose or good faith of the insider who made the disclosure. Absent an improper purpose, there has been no
breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the
insider, there is no derivative breach. 21
As Commissioner
Smith stated in Investors Management Co.:
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee
knew the information was given to him in breach of a
duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information, and that the information must be shown not only to have been material
and non-public, but also to have substantially contributed to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651
(concurring in the result).
21
An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the disclosure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980).
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the investment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned,
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id. , at 798. In the absence of
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id. , at 799.
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There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty.
For example, there may be a relationship that exists between
the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo
from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of
nonpublic information certainly exist when an insider makes
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider
himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a question
of fact, will not always be easy for courts. But it is essential,
we think, to have a guiding principle for those whose daily
activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC's insidetrading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach of
the insider's fiduciary duty before the tippee inherits the
duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule adopted by
the SEC in this case would have no limiting principle. 22
IV
22
Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous,
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOI:Hi in inside-trading
cases:
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside information." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).
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Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above,
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 23 It
is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders. 24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the
information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street
Journal.
We also think it is clear that the Equity Funding employees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the corporation's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 25 The
28
Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The Solicitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a
tippee of material inside information.
24
Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D.C.,
at 32&-327, 681 F . 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 19&-197 (1947).
26
In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to be-
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tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have an apparent
purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable information to
Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra,
at 1-2. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by
the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. See
n. 19, supra. Dirks therefore could not have been "a participant after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty." Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.

v
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case,
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that
he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is
Reversed.
lieve that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" differs markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact,
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not understand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders.
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside information must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly,
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from
improper private use of the information"); Brief on behalf of the SEC in the
Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at
52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which
such information is acquired .. . ."); 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322-323, 681
F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.).
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic information from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation.
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure.
I
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S.
App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829-833 (1982).
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the
fraud and disclose it publicly.
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and employees of the corporation.
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud.
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of
clients and investors. Some of these persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch regularly
with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging
rumors might be libelous.
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur2
Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his
firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate Dirks, or how many actually
did so." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any brokerage business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at
1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F . 2d, at 831, n. 5.
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on information assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immediately went into receivership. 4
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the exposure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted
violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77q(a), 5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S. C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5
As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office beginning on March 27.
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153.
5
Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
6
Section 10(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
3
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of
the investment community who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into possession
of material 'information that they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading." 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230
n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played an
important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud
to light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured
him. 8
Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment
any facility of any national securities exchange"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
7
Rule 10b--5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
8
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E),
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties).
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against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to
whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D.C. 309,
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of receiving the information. I d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840.
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a
writ of certiorari.-- U. S. - - (1982). We now reverse.
II
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an
"affirmative duty of disclosure . . . when dealing in securities." !d., at 911, and n. 13. 9 The SEC found not only did
breach of this common-law duty also establish the elements of
a Rule 10b-5 violation, 10 but that individuals other than cor9

The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady,
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree, that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office." See 40 S.E.C., at 912, n. 15.
10
Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on
·
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porate insiders could be obligated either to disclose material
nonpublic information 11 before trading or to abstain from
trading altogether. !d., at 912. In Chiarella, we accepted
the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for establishing a
Rule 10b--5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information
by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227. In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose or abstain, the Court found that there is no general duty to disclose before trading on material non public information, 12 and
held that "a duty to disclose under§ 10(b) does not arise from
the mere possession of nonpublic market information." I d.,
at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235.
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule
10b--5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc: v. Green, 430 U. S. 462,
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception."
!d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage" of "information intended to be available only for a corwhich the SEC rested its decisio11 in this case, and we will refer to it when
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules.
11
The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through the
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973).
12
See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic information obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "honest means," as opposed to "stealth").
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porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone."
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43
S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable under
Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose
material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus
makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 916,
n. 31.
III
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not a
fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship,
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions ·based on material, nonpublic information." I d., at
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC in
policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such
relationships. 13 In view of this absence, it has been unclear
13
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they
have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the
business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for
corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill
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how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from
trading on inside information.
A

The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is
that a tippee inherits the Cady, Roberts obligation to shareholders whenever he receives inside information from an
insider:
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty
which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders.
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material
information from insiders become 'subject to the same
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee
knowingly transmits the information to someone who
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presumably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its
perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing in
their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he
passed the information on to traders." 21 S.E.C.
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady,
Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee.
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F. 2d
228, 237 (CA21974) (investment banker had access to material information
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such
a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship
at least must imply such a duty.
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Docket, at 1410, n. 42.
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as ·
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed
Chiarella's conviction, holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 14
In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders. This conflicts
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading
Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an ilfSider, carried
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt of nonpublic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain;
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders.
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chiarella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and,
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "(i)t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
14
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while in possession of materia~nonpublic information. 15
Judge Wright correctly read our ppinion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected.
Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is
extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S.
App. D.C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445
U. S., at 235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to
disclose] arises from the relationship between parties ...
and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the market." 445 U. S., at 232-233,
n. 14.
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 16
•

15
In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal information rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in
§ ll(a)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account.
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic information]." Ibid.
16
The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information,
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21
S.E.C. , at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'in-

"
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It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, 17 and this often is done by
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market
worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment
in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally.
B

The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean
terstices in analysis' .... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors
Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646). But this rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is
crossed. Cf. Adlerv. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840,845 (CA21959) (Burger, J.,
sitting by designation).
17
On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a broker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. N onetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views.
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to
withhold from the public, is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity
Funding fraud w~ exposed, the information in the trading market was
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone
undetected longer.
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that such tippees always are free to trade on the information.
The need for a prophylactic ban on some tippee trading is
clear. Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary
relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15
U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it unlawful to do indirectly "by
means of any other person" any act made unlawful by the federal securities laws).
Similarly, the transactions of those
who knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach
are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee
himself." Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See
Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v.
Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others that the
trustee could not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308
(CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the
tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of
the insider's duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella,
445 U. S., at 246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we
noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed
as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the
insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230,
n. 12.
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but
rather because it has been made available to them improperly.18 And for Rule 10b-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure
18
The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In Investors Management Co., supra, the SEC stated that one element of
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the
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is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively observed in Investors Management Co.: "It is important in this
type of case to focus on policing insiders and what they do
. . . rather than on policing information per se and its possession .... " 44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the result).
Tipping thus properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly
violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 20
infonnation] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective
revelation or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if
he received infonnation in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it.
I d., at 650 (concurring in the result).
19
Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of
restitution that " '[ w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential infonnation to a third person, the third
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
infonnation."' 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities likewise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge.
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F . Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs,
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a
tipper must know or have reason to know the infonnation is nonpublic and
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Infonnation, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10b-5 restrictions to
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who,
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential infonnation from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a constructive trustee.").
We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside infonnation is ever
2l)
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c
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether
the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case,
the more typical situation in which there will be a question
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. Seen. 16,
supra. In some situations, both the insider and the analyst
recipient will act in good faith, and yet release of the information may affect the market. For example, it may not be
clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient analyst-whether the information will be viewed as material
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations."
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authoritiestypically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities.
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following exchange took place:
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the
law to go to the SEC first?
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the information has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading.
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nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on
the purpose or good faith of the insider who made the disclosure. Absent an improper purpose, there has been no
breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the
insider, there is no derivative breach. 21
As Commissioner
Smith stated in Investors Management Co.:
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee
knew the information was given to him in breach of a
duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information, and that the information must be shown not only to have been material
and non-public, but also to have substantially contributed to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651
(concurring in the result).
There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty.
For example, there may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the
21

An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the disclosure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co ., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA21980).
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the investment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned,
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id. , at 798. In the absence of
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on the investment firm. See i d., at 799.
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latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient.
The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic
information certainly exist when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The
tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a question
of fact, will not always be easy for courts. But it is essential,
we think, to have a guiding principle for those whose daily
activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC's insidetrading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach of
the insider's fiduciary duty before the tippee inherits the
duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule adopted by
the SEC in this case would have no limiting principle. 22
IV
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above,
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 23 It
22

Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous,
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule 10b-5 in inside-trading
cases:
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside information." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).
23
Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that
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is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders.24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the
information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street
Journal.
We also think it is clear that the Equity Funding employees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the corporation's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 25 The
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The Solicitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a
tippee of material inside information.
24
Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D.C.,
at 325-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1947).
26
In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to believe that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" differs markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and
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tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have an apparent
purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable information to
Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra,
at 1-2. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by
the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. See
n. 19, supra. Dirks therefore could not have been "a participant after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty." Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.

v
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case,
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that
he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is
Reversed.

that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact,
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not understand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders.
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside information must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly,
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in
the Court of Appeals, at 47--50; i d. , at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at
52-54; i d., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which
such information is acquired.... "); 220 U. S. App. D.C. , at 322-323, 681
F . 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.).
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic information from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation.
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure.
I
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer
firm ~ specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 22~247; the opinion of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S.
App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829-833 (1982).
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the
fraud and disclose it publicly.
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and employees of the corporation.
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud.
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of
clients and investors. Some of these persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch regularly
with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging
~ might be libelous.
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur2
Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his
firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate Dirks, or how many actually
did so." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any brokerage business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at
1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5.
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on information assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immediately went into receivership. 4
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the exposure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted
violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§77q(a), 5 § lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S. C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5
3

As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud . Dirks himself
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office beginning on March 27.
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153.
5
Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails , directly or indirectly"( I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
6
Section lO(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of
the investment community who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into possession
of material 'information that they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading." 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230
n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played an
important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud
to light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured
him. 8
Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment
any facility of any national securities exchange"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
7
Rule 10b-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
8
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E),
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties).
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against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to
whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D.C. 309,
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of receiving the information. I d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840.
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a
writ of certiorari.-- U. S. - - (1982). We now reverse.
II

In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an
"affirmative duty of disclosure . . . when dealing in securities." Id., at 911, and n. 13. 9 The SEC found not only did
breach of this common-law duty also establish the elements of
a Rule 10b-5 violation, 10 but that individuals other than cor9

The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady,
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree, that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office." See 40 S.E.C., at 912, n. 15.
10
Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on
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porate insiders could be obligated either to disclose material
nonpublic information 11 before trading or to abstain from
trading altogether. !d., at 912. In Chiarella, we accepted
the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for establishing a
Rule 10b-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information
by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227. In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose or abstain, the Court found that there is no general duty to disclose before trading on material non public information, 12 and
held that "a duty to disclose under§ 10(b) does not arise from
the mere possession of nonpublic market information." I d.,
at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235.
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule
10b-5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462,
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception."
!d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage" of "information intended to be available only for a corwhich the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules.
11
The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through the
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973).
12
See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic information obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "honest means," as opposed to "stealth").
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porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone."
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43
S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable under
Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose
material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus
makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 916,
n.31.
III
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside .
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not a
fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship,
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information." I d., at
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information has created analytical difficulties for the SE ~ in
policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike msiders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such
relationships. 13 In view of this absence, it has been unclear
13
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they
have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the
business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for
corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill
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how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from
trading on inside information.
A
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is
that a tippee inherits the Cady, Roberts obligation to shareholders whenever he receives inside information from an
insider:
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty
which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders.
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material
information from insiders become 'subject to the same
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee
knowingly transmits the information to someone who
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presumably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its
perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing in
their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he
passed the information on to traders." 21 S.E.C.
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady ,

Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee.
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F . 2d
228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material information
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such
a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship
at least must imply such a duty.
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Docket, at 1410, n. 42.
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed
Chiarella's conviction, holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 14
In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders. This conflicts
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading
1
' Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt of nonpublic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain;
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders.
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chiarella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and,
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
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while in possession of material" non public info"rmation. 15
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected.
Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is
extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S.
App. D.C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445
U. S., at 235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to
disclose] arises from the relationship between parties ...
and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the market." 445 U. S., at 232-233,
n. 14.
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 16
5
' In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal information rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account.
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic information]." Ibid.
6
' The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information,
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21
S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'in-

"

82-276---0PINION
DIRKS v. SEC

11

It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, 17 and this often is done by
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market
worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment
in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally.

B

The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean
terstices in analysis' . ... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors
Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646). But this rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans , 267 F . 2d 840, 845 (CA21959) (Burger, J. ,
sitting by designation).
17
On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a broker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. N onetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views.
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to
withhold from the public, is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity
Funding fraud Wl!S exposed, the information in the trading market was
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone
undetected longer.

'·
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that such tippees always are free to trade on the information.
The need for a prophylactic ban on some tippee trading is
clear. Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary
relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15
U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it unlawful to do indirectly "by
means of any other person" any act made unlawful by the federal securities laws);
Similarly, the transactions of those
who knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach
are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee
himself." Mosserv. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See
Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v.
Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others that the
trustee could not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308
(CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the
tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of
the insider's duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella,
445 U. S., at 246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we
noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed
as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the
insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230,
n. 12.
·
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but
rather because it has been made available to them improperly.18 And for Rule 10lr-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure
18
The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In Investors Management Co., supra, the SEC stated that one element of
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the
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is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively observed in Investors Management Co.: "It is important in this
type of case to focus on policing insiders and what they do
... rather than on policing information per se and its possession .... " 44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the result).
Tipping thus properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly
violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 20
information] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective
revelation or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it.
Id. , at 650 (concurring in the result).
19
Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of
restitution that " '[ w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities likewise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge.
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F . Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs,
The Impact of Rule 10b--5, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10b--5 restrictions to
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty.''). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who,
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] . .. a constructive trustee. ").
'lJJ We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is ever

~
I
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I
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c
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether
the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case,
the more typical situation in which there will be a question
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. Seen. 16,
supra. In some situations, both the insider and the analyst
recipient will act in good faith, and yet release of the information may affect the market. For example, it may not be
clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient analyst-whether the information will be viewed as material
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral. considerations."
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authoritiestypically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities.
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238
(1963). r ihe SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following exchange"tbok place:
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the
law to go to the SEC first?
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the information has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information .. . or
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOJ:r-5 does not impose any obligation simply to
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading-J
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nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on
the purpose or good faith of the insider who made the disclosure. Absent an improper purpose, there has been no
breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the
insider, there is no derivative breach. 21
As Commissioner
Smith stated in Investors Management Co.:
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee
knew the information was given to him in breach of a
duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information, and that the information must be shown not only to have been material
and non-public, but also to have substantially contributed to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651
(concurring in the result).
There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty.
For example, there may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the
21
An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the disclosure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA21980).
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the investment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned,
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799.
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latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient.
The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic
information certainly exist when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The
tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a question
of fact, will not always be easy for courts. But it is essential,
we think, to have a guiding principle for those whose daily
activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC's insidetrading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach of
the insider's fiduciary duty before the tippee inherits the
duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule adopted by
the SEC in this case would have no limiting principle. 22
IV
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above,
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 23 It
22

Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous,
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb-5 in inside-trading
cases:
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside information." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).
23
Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that
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is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders.24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the
information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street
Journal.

We also think it is clear that the Equity Funding employees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the corporation's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 25 The
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The So-"
licitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a
tippee of material inside information.
24
Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D.C.,
at 32&-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1947).
""In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to believe that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" differs markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and
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tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have an apparent
purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable information to
Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra,
at 1-2. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by
the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. See
n. 19, supra. Dirks therefore could not have been "a participant after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty." Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.

v
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case,
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that
he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is
Reversed.

that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact,
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not understand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders.
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside information must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly,
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in
the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at
52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which
such information is acquired . . .. "); 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322-323, 681
F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.).

\.
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IV
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above ,
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 23 It
is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders. 24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that inreasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous,
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule 10b-5 in inside-trading
cases:
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside information." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-Wbat It Is and
Wbat It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).
Zl Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The Solicitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
We need not decide, however, whether the information constituted "material facts," or whether information concerning corporate crime is properly
characterized as "inside information." For purposes of deciding this case,
we assume the correctness of the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of
Appeals, that petitioner was a tippee of material inside information.
24
Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D. C.,
at 325-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery
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RAYMOND L. DIRKS, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic information from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation.
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure.
I

In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S.
App. D. C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829-833 (1982).
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by
Equity'""F'un<rlng employees. He urged Dirks to verify the
fraud and disclose it publicly.
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and employees of the corporation.
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud.
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of
clients and investors. Some of these persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch refQ!larly ""2
with William Blundell, the Wall StreetJournal's Los Angeles )
bureau cTiier Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging
hearsay might be libelous.
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur-

---

'Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his
firm. See 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate Dirks, or how many actually
did so." 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston '
Company Institutional Investors, Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in
commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any brokerage business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S. E. C. Docket,
at 1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5.

'·
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and
uncovered evidence of the fraud . Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on information assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immediately went into receivership. 4
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the exposure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted
violations of§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77q(a), 5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U. S. C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5
3
As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself
. voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's r egional office beginning on March 27.
'A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153.
• Sehion 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
• Section 10(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of
the investment community who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into possession
o( matenal 'information that ffiey- know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading." 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222,
230 n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive
fraud to light," 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only
censured him. 8
Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment
any facility of any national securities exchange"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
7
Rule 10b-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not rrlisleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
8
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E),
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties).
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against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to
whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D. C. 309,
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of receiving the information. !d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840.
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a
writ of certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1982). We now reverse.
II

In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S. E. C. 907 (1961), the SEC recogllizea Ulat fl1eCommon law
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an
"affirmative duty of disclosure .. . when dealing in securities." !d., at 911, and n. 13. 9 The SEC found that not only
did breach of this common-law duty also establish the elements of a Rule 10b-5 violation, 10 but that individuals other
• The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher
Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady,
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree, that "[a] significant purposeortl1eEXchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office." See 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15.
10
Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on
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than corporate insiders could be obligated either to disclose
material nonpublic information 11 before trading or to abstain
from trading altogether. !d., at 912. In Chiarella, we accepted the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for establishing a Rule 10b-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness
of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227.
In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose
or abstain, the Court foundthat there is no general duty to
disclose before trading on material nonpublic iriformation, 12
and held that "a auty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise
from the mere possession of nonpublic market iriforma"t10n."
I d., ~y arises rather from the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235.
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule
10b-5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462,
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception."
!d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage" of "information intended to be available only for a corwhich the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules.
11
The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through the
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973).
12
See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic information obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "honest means," as opposed to "stealth").

.,

..

82-276-0PINION

DIRKS v. SEC

7

porate purpose and not for the ~ersonal benefit of an,y~ne."
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, enner-&-smith, Inc., 43
S. E. C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable
under Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose material nonpublic information before trading on it and
thus makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at
916, n. 31.
III
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not
a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of
the securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship,
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information." Id., at
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC
and courts in policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties
to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical
tippee has no such relationships. 13 In view of this absence, it

I
'·

I

'
3
' Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant
working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply
that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information
solely for corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938,
942 (CA2 1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 633, 645
(1971); In re Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969);
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has been unclear how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts
duty to refrain from trading on inside information.
A

The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is
that a tippee "inherits" the Cady, Roberts obligation to
shareholders whenever he receives inside information from
an insider:
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty
which he had assumed as a result'Ofknowingly receiving
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders.
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material
information from insiders become 'subject to the same
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee
knowingly transmits the information to someone who
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presumably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclqse the
[Equity FUirali1gJ fraud m order to bring it to light alli:I
its perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing
in their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he
passed the information on to traders." 21 S. E. C.
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S. E. C. 933, 937
(1968); Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at 912. When such a person breaches
his fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than
a tippee. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material
information when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential,
and the relationship at least must imply such a duty.

-
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Docket, at 1410, n. 42.
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed
Chiarella's convktion, holding that "'[a]nyone--corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 14
In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders. This conflicts
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading
"Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt ofnonpublic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain;
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders.
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chiarella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and,
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i)t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).

...
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while in possession of material non public information. 16
Ju~ Wright corr~ctly read our opinion in Chia~lla as repudiating any notion that all traders must enJOY 'equal information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D.
C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at
235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to disclose]
arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of
his position in the market." 445 U. S., at 232-233, n. 14.
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 16
In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal information rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent." 445 U . S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in
§ ll(a)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(l), against
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account.
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic information]." Ibid.
6
' The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information,
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21
S. E. C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'interstices in analysis' . . .. " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors
Management Co., 44 S. E. C., at 646). But this rule is inherently impre-

~
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It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information," 21 S. E. C., at 1406/ 7 and this often is done by
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market
worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment
in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such
information cam'l.ot be made simultaneously available to all of
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally.

B

The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean
that such tippees always are free to trade on the information.
The need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear. Not only
cise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to
where the line is betweer< permissible and impermissible disclosures and
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959) (Burger, J.,
sitting by designation).
17
On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a broker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. Nonetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider--<:ould have
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views.
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to
withhold from the public, is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity
Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market was
grossly inaccurate. ~ Dirks' efforts '\~e fraud might well have gone
undetected longer.
IT""'
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are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their
advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b)
(making it unlawful to do indirectly "by means of any other
person" any act made unlawful by the federal securities
laws). Similarly, the transactions of those who knowingly
participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee himself."
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson
v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88
U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in
Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others that the trustee could
not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. See SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert.
denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the tippee's duty to
disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's
duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445 U. S., at
246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we noted in
Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's
breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but
rather because it has been made available to them improperly . 18 And for Rule 10b-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure
8
' The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In Investors Management Co., supra, the SEC stated that one element of
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the
information] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective
revelation or otherwise." 44 S. E . C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if

82-276---0PINION
DIRKS v. SEC

13

is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively observed in Investors Management Co.: "It is important in this
type of case tQ focus on J20licing insider_s and what they do
... rather than on policing information per se and its possession .. . . " 44 S. E. C., at 648 (concurring in the result).
Tipping thus properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly
violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 20
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it.
I d., at 650 (concurring in the result). ·
19
Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of
restitution that "'[ w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
information."' 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities likewise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge .
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs,
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10b-5 restrictions to
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who,
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a constructive trustee.").
20
We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is ever
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations."

"
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In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether
the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case,
the more typical situation in which there will be a question
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. See n. 16,
supra. In some situations, the insider will act consistently
with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, and yet release of the
information may affect the market. For example, it may not
be clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient
analyst-whether the information will be viewed as material
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authoritiestypically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities.
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following exchange took place:
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the
law to go to the SEC first?
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what
has come to be !mown as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the information has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading.
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As Commissioner Smith stated in Investors Management Co.:
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee
knew the information was given to him in breach of a
duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information, and that the information must be shown not only to have been material
and non-public, but also to have substantially contributed to the trading which occurred." 44 S. E. C., at 651
(concurring in the result).

The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not
exist when the information is transmitted for a proper purpose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when
the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate
21
An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the disclosure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA21980).
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the investment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned,
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799.
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business justification for ransmitting t
We
think the SEC is unduly co cerned. In
the insider's 12urpo1W in aking a pa icular disclosure is
fraudulent, the SEC and the courts ar not re uired to read
the arties' in s. Scienter
re evan m etermming whether the tipper ha violate his Ca y, Roberts
,....""----::Jr.::u-;,.. , but to determine whethe the disclosure itself "deceive[s], manipulate[s], or\ defrau [s]" shareholders, Aaron
v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 68() (1980 oACourts -shmild ocus on
/ whether the-insidm;yFe.<t~v~~ a di ect or indirec personal
benefit from the disclosure, s~ch a
~ pecuniary gain or
a reputational benefit that will' translate into future earnings.
Cf. Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 324, 348 (1979) ("The theory ... is that the insider, by
giving the information out selectively, is in effect selling the
information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information,
or other things of value for himself.... "). There are ac s
and circumstances that often ~ justify such an inference.
For example, there may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the
latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient.
The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic
information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip
and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by
'·
a gift of the profits to the recipient.
Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be
easy for courts. But it is essential, we think, to have a guiding principle for those whose daily activities must be limited
and instructed by the SEC's inside-trading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach of the insider's fiduciarj (
duty before the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or ab- \
stain. In contrast, the rule adopted by the SEC in this case ------....
would have no limiting principle. 22
22

Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the

(
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duced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the
information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street

Journal.

&_

,

We..al.se-tJH.n t Js clear that thE?tEquity Funding employees did-Iwt violatw ~heir Cady, Roberts duty to the corporation's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 25 The
tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did.the-~pparent
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1947).
u In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider wh en he has reason to believe that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" differs markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact,
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not understand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders.
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside information must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly,
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding)'s shareholders to refrain from
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in
the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at
52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which
such information is acquired .... "); 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 322-323, 681
F . 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.).

'·
'

I
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purpose ~e to make a gift of valuable information t o
Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud . See supra,
at 1-2. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by
the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. See
n. 19, supra. Dirks therefore could not have been "a participant after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty." Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.

v
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case,
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that
he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is

Reversed.

.
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RAYMOND L. DIRKS, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[June-, 1983)

JUSTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic information from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation.
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure.

I
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the

Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401. 1402-1406
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Comt of Appeals, 220 U. S.
App. D. C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d824, 829-833 (1982).

.·
'·

82-27G-OPINION
2

DIRKS u. SEC

tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the
fraud and disclose it publicly.
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and employees of the corporation.
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud.
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of
clients and im·estors. Some of these persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million.~
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was.in touch regularly
with William Blundell, the Wall Stteet Jow'1zal's Los Angeles
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging
hearsay might be libelous.
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur' Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his
firm. See 21 S. E. C. Docket. at 1-JO:Z. n. 3. But ''[i]t is not clear ho\\'
many of those with whom Dirks ;;poke promised to direct some brokerage
business through [Dirks' firm I to compensate Dirks. or how many actually
did so." 220 U. S. App. D. C .. at 316. 681 F. :Zd, at 831. The Boston
Company Institutional Investors. Inc .. promised Dirks about $25,000 in
commissions. but it is unclear \\'hether Boston actually generated any brokerage business for his firm. ·see App. 199, 20+-205; 21 S. E. C. Docket,
at 1-10-1. n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D. C .. at 316, n. 5. 681 F. 2d. at 831, n. 5.
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against
Equity Funding :• and only then, on April 2, did the Wall
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on information assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immediately went into receivership.'
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the exposure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted
violations of§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77q(a), ' § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U. S. C. § 78j(b)," and SEC Rule 10lr5, 17 CFR § 240.10lr5
'As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office beginning on March 27.
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105count indictment against 22 persons. including many of Equity Funding's
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153.
• Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly"( I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
''(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice. or course of business \\"hich
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the pu1·chaser."
.; Section lO(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person. directly or indirectly. by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of

82-276---0PINION
4

DIRKS v. SEC

(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of
the investment community who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into possession
of material 'information that they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading." 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222,
230 n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's) massive
fraud to light," 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1-H2,' the SEC only
censured him. 9
any facility of any national securities exchange-

.

"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
'Rule lOb-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person. directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any 'untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busines!" which operates
or would operate as a fraud ot· deceit upon any person, in connection \\ith
the purchase or sale of any security."
' Jt:STICE BLACKm: ;-.;';; dissenting opinion minimizes the role Dirks
played in making public the Equity Funding fraud. See poiil, at 3 and 11.
n. 15. The dissent would re\\Tite the history of Dirks' extensive investigative efforts. See. e. ,q .. 21 S. E. C., at 1412 ("It is clear that Dirks played
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's) massive fraud to light,
and it is also true that he reported the fraud allegation to [Equity

I
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Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment
against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to
whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D. C. 309,
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of receiving the information. /d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840.
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a
writ of certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1982). We now reverse.
II

In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S. E. C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an
"affirmative duty of disclosure ... when dealing in securities." /d., at 911, and n. 13. 10 The SEC found that not only
Funding's] auditors ·and sought to have the information published in the
Wall Street Journal."); 681 F. 2d, at 829 (Wright, J.) ("Largely thanks to
Dirks one of the most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered
and exposed, while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed
opportunities to investigate Equity Funding.").
• Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E),
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions. including censure, on
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer ,,·ho has '\\illfully
aided [or) abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties).
"' The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to
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did breach of this common-law duty also establish the elements of a Rule lOb-5 violation, 11 but that individuals other
than corporate insiders could be obligated either to disclose
material nonpublic information 12 before trading or to abstain
from trading altogether. !d., at 912. In Chia1·ella, we accepted the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for establishing a Rule lOb-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness
of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading ·without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227.
In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose
or abstain, the Court found that there is no general duty to
disclose before trading on material non public information, Ia
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets. of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher
Cyclopedia of the Laws of Pri\'ate Corporations ~* 8-18, 900 (1975 ed. and
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §~ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady,
Robel'ts Commission recognized, and we agree. that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office." See 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15.
"Rule lOb-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three pro\'isions on
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules.
"The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through the
appropriate public media. designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or
group." In re Faberge, file., -15 S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973).
"' See 445 U. S., at 233: hi .. at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at
238-239 (BRENNAN. J .. concurring in the judgment); id . , at 239-2-10 (BeRGER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id .. at 252. n. 2 (BLACKMCN, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic information obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "bon-
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and held that "a duty to disclose under § lO(b) does not arise
from the mere possession of non public market information."
I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235.
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction," however, come \\rithin the ambit of Rule
10b-5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462,
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception."
I d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage" of "information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone."
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43
S. E. C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable
under Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose material nonpublic information before trading on it and
thus makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at
916, n. 31.

III
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be
no duty to disclose where the person \Vho has traded on inside
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not
a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of
the securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship,
we recognized, Would "depar[t] radically from the established
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, non public information." I d., at
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC
est means," as opposed to ":'tealth").
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and courts in policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties
to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical
tippee has no such relationships. 11 In view of this absence, it
has been unclear how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts
duty to refrain from trading on inside information.

A
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case. is
that a tippee "inherits" the Cady. Roberts obligation to
shareholders whenever he receives inside information from
an insider:
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty
which he had assumed as a result of kno'Ningly receiving
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders.
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material
information from insiders become 'subject to the same
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. J1e1Till Lynch,
"Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter. accountant, lawyer, or consultant
working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply
that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are giYen access to information
solely for corporate ·purposes. See SEC v. Jlonarch F11nd. 608 F. 2d 938.
942 (CA2 1979); In 1·e Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 633, 645
(1971); In1·e Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969):
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. Inc .. 43 S. E. C. 933, 937
(1968): Cady, Robe11s. 40 S. E. C.. at 912. When such a person breaches
his fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than
a tippee. See Shapim v. Jie1·ril/ Lunch. Pierce, Fennel' & Smith. Inc.,
495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (inYestment banker had access to material
information when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such a dut~· to be imposed. howeYer. the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential,
and the relationship at least must imp!~· such a duty.
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Pierce, Fenne1· & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee
knowingly transmits the information to someone who
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presumably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and
its perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing
in their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty
which he had assumed in dealing \Vith them, when he
passed the information on to traders." 21 S. E. C.
Docket, at 1410, n. 42.

This view differs little from the view that we rejected as
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed
Chiarella's conviction, holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who
kno'Wingly receives nonpublic material information from an
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading.,;;
,., Apparently, the 'SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, caniecl
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information ,,·ithout
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt of non public information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain;
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders.
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia-
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In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders. This conflicts
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading
while in possession of material non public information.,,;
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D.
C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, -145 U. S., at
235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that ''[a] duty [to disclose]
arises from the relationship between parties ... and not
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of
his position in the market." -145 U. S., at 232-233, n. 14.
rella. the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not
"inside" information. but rather "market" information, i. e., "information
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and,
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "(i]t is clear that ~ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 4-15 U. S., at
2-11. n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code 1603, Comment
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
"In Chiarella. we noted that formulation of an absolute equal information rule ''should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.'' -1-15 U. S .. at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in
§ ll(a}(1) of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a}(l}, against
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account.
See id., at 233, n. 16. We obsen·ed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their posse:;sion of [nonpublic information]." Ibid.

*

f
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Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because
son knowingly receives material nonpublic information from
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 17
It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information," 21 S. E. C., at 1406, 1" and this often is done by
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market

"The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts') efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their) initiatives to ferret out and analyze infonnation,
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21
S. E. C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'interstices in analysis' .... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors
Management Co., 44 S. E. C., at 646). But this rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to
where the line is between permissible and impennissible disclosures and
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959) (Burger, J.,
sitting by designation).
'' On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a broker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. Nonetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider~ould have
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views.
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' ''find," the central role that he played
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to
withhold from the public, is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity
Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market was
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' eff01ts, the fraud might well have gone
undetected longer. See n. 8, snpra.
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worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment
in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally.

B
The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean
that such tippees always are free to trade on the information.
The need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear. Not only
are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their
advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b)
(making it unlawful to do indirectly "by means of any other
person" any act made unlawful by the federal securities
laws). Similarly, the transactions of those who knowingly
participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee himself."
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson
v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jacksou v. Ludeling, 88
U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in
Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for devious dealings in ·the name of the others that the trustee could
not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. See SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert.
denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the tippee's duty to
disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's
duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, -!45 U. S., at
246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we noted in
Chia1·ella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's
breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.
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Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but
rather because it has been made available to them improperly.19 And for Rule lOt-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure
is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach. 20 As Commissioner Smith perceptively ob•• The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In Investors Management Co., supra, the SEC stated that one element of
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the
information) was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective
revelation or otherwise." 44 S. E. C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it.
!d., at 650 (concurring in the result).
c'll Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of
restitution that "'( w ]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities likewise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge.
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs,
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7-1 (1975) (''(T)he better view is that a
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer. Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 798, 818. n. 76 ( 1973) ("The extension of rule lOb-5 restrictions to
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who.
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served in Investors Management Co.: "[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee knew the information was given
to him in breach of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information . . . . "
44 S. E. C., at 651 (concurring in the result). Tipping thus
properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly violating the
Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule.~
1

c
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal. receives confidential information from the agent. may be [deemed] ... a constructive trustee.").
"We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is ever
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations."
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authoritiestypically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities.
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law. one's
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the follo~ing exchange took place:
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the
law to go to the SEC first?
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe ,,·hat
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the information has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading.
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the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case,
the more typical situation in which there will be a question
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. See n. 16,
supra. In some situations, the insider will act consistently
with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, and yet release of the
information may affect the market. For example, it may not
be clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient
analyst-whether the information will be viewed as material
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on
the purpose of the disclosure. This standard was identified
by the SEC itself in Cady, Roberts: a purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate "use of inside information for personal advantage." 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15. See n. 10,
supra. Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent
some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is
no derivative breach. 22 As Commissioner Smith stated in In""An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the disclosure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980).
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the investment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned,
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been

I
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vestors Management Co.: "It is important in this type of case
to focus on policing insiders and \Vhat they do ... rather than
on policing information per se and its possession .... " 44
S. E. C., at 648 (concurring in the result).
The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not
exist when the information is transmitted for a proper purpose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when
the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate
business justification for transmitting the information. We
think the SEC is unduly concerned. In determining whether
the insider's purpose in making a particular disclosure is
fraudulent, the SEC and the courts are not required to read
the parties' minds. Scienter in some cases is relevant in
determining whether the tipper has violated his Cady, Roberts duty. u But to determine whether the disclosure itself
"deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]" shareholders,
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 686 (1980), the initial inquiry is
whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider.
This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i. e.,
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799.
:!:l Scienter-"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelde1·, 425 U. S. 185, 193, n. 12 (1976)-is
an independent element of a Rule lOb-5 violation. See Aaron v. SEC, 446
U. S. 680, 695 (1980). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion. see post, at p.
7, n. 10, motivation is not irrelevant to the issue of scienter. It is not
enough that an insider's conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a violation may be found only where there is "intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting
the price of securities." Emst & Emst v. Hochfelder, supra, at 199. The
issue in this case, however, is not whether Secrist or Dirks acted with
scienter, but rather whether there was any deceptive or fraudulent conduct at all, i. e., whether Secrist's disclosure constituted a breach of his
fiduciary duty and thereby caused injury to shareholders. See n. 27,
ir({'ra. Only if there was such a breach did Dirks, a tippee, acquire a _fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain.
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whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal
benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.
Cf. 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15; Brudney, Inside1·s, Outsiders,
and Infor-mational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 324, 348 (1979) ("The theory ... is
that the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is
in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for himself.... "). There are objective facts and circumstances
that often justify such an inference. For example, there
may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention
to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist
when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to
the recipient.
Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be
easy for courts. But it is essential, we think, to have a guiding principle for those whose daily activities must be limited
and instructed by the SEC's inside-trading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach of the insider's fiduciary
duty before the. tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule adopted by the SEC in this case
would have no limiting principle. 2'1
"Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous,
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commi~sioner (and later Chairman) Budge
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb-5 in inside-trading
cases:
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential
civil actions. the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every
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IV
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above,
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. ~5 It
is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders. ~ 6 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain
the information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside information." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).
2.1 Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information
he received was not truly "inside" information. i. e., intended for a confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The Solicitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
We need not decide·. however, whether the information constituted "material facts," or whether information concerning corporate crime is properly
characterized as "inside information." For purposes of deciding this case,
we assume the correctness of the SEC's findings, accepted by the CoUlt of
Appeals, that petitioner was a tippee of material inside information.
'~ Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D. C.,
at 325-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC. however, did not consider
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision. nor did it present that theory
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21. n. 27. The merits of
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Che11e1·y
Co1p., 332 U. S. 194, 19&-197 (1947).

I
I
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breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street

Journal.
It is clear that neither Secrist nor the other Equity Funding employees violated their Cady, Roberts duty to the corporation's shareholders by providing information to Dirks.:1•
" In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to believe that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" differs markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact,
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not understand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders.
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside information must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly,
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in
the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at
52-54; id., at 55 ("(T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which
such information is acquired .... "); 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 322-323, 681
F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.).
The dissent argues that "Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding
shareholders by transmitting material nonpublic information to Dirks with
the intention that Dirks would cause his clients to trade on that information." Post, at 12. By perceiving a breach of fiduciary duty whenever
inside information is intentionally disclosed to securities traders. the dissenting opinion effectively would achieve the same result as the SEC's theory below, i. e., mere possession of inside information while trading \\'Ould
be viewed as a Rule lOb--5 violation. But Chiarella made it explicitly clear
there is no general duty to forgo market transactions "based on material,
nonpublic information." 455 U. S., at 233. Such a duty would "depar[t]
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific rela-
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The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose to
make a gift of valuable information to Dirks. As the facts of
this case clearly indicate, the tippers were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra, at 1-2. In the absence
of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was
no derivative breach by Dirks. See n. )!!!, supra. Dirks
therefore could not have been "a participant after the fact in
[an] insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." Chiarella, 445
U. S., at 230, n. 12.

v
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case,
tionship bet\\·een two parties.'' Ibid. See p. 7. s11pra.
Moreo,·er, to constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5, there must be fraud.
See Er·nst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U. S. 185, 199 (1976) (statutory
words "manipulati\'e," "device,·· and ·•contrivance ... connot[e I intentional
or willful conduct designed to deceiL'e or defraud investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the price of securities") (emphasis added). There is no
evidence that Secrist's disclosure was intended to or did in fact "decei\'e or
defraud" anyone. Secrist certainly intended to convey relevant information that management was unlawfully concealing, and-so far as the record
shows-he believed that persuading Dirks to investigate was the best way
to disclose the fraud. Other efforts had pro\'ed fruitless. Under any objecti\·e standard, Secrist received no direct or indirect personal benefit
from the disclosure.
The dissenting opinion focuses on shareholder "losses." ''injury," and
"damages.·· but as the court noted in Fridrich \'. Bmd(ord. 5-12 F. 2d 307,
318 (CA6 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1053 (1977). there is no clear causal
connection between inside trading and outsiders' losses: ''Investors must
be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open market without complete or always accurate information." In one sense. as market values
fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect information. there always are winners and loset·s: but those ,,·ho have "lost" ha,·e
not necessarily been defrauded. On the other hand. inside trading for personal gain is fraudulent, and is a violation of the federal securities laws.
See Dooley. Sllpm, at 39-H. 70. Thus. there is little legal significance to
the dissent's argument that Secrist and Dirks created new "\'ictims" by disclosing the information to persons who traded. In fact, they prevented
the fraud from continuing and victimizing many more investot·s.
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had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that
he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is
Reversed.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-276

RAYMOND L. DIRKS, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[June-, 1983)

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic information from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation.
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure.
I

In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent
corporate practices. · Secrist also stated that various regula1

The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth

by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the

Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401 , 1402-1406
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S.
App. D. C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829--833 (1982).
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the
fraud and disclose it publicly.
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and employees of the corporation.
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud.
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of
clients and investors. Some of these persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch regularly
with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging
hearsay might be libelous.
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur' Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his
firm. See 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "(i]t is not clear how
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate Dirks, or how many actually
did so." 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston
Company Institutional Investors , Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in
commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any brokerage business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S. E. C. Docket,
at 1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5.
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on information assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immediately went into receivership. 4
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the exposure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted
violations of§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77q(a), 5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S. C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule 10h-5, 17 CFR §240.10h-5
3
As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office beginning on March 27.
'A federal grand jury in Los Angeles ubsequently returned a 105count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153.
5
Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busine s which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
6
Section 10(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any_ person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of
the investment community who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into possession
of material 'information that they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading." 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222,
230 n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive
fraud to light," 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1412,Hthe SEC only
censured him. 9
any facility of any national ecurities exchange"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
7
Rule lOb-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
' JUSTICE BLACKMON's dissenting opinion minimizes the role Dirks
played in making public the Equity Funding fraud. See post, at 3 and 11,
n. 15. The dissent would rewrite the history of Dirks' extensive investigative efforts. See, e. g., 21 S. E. C., at 1412 ("It is clear that Dirks played
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light,
and it is also true that he reported the fraud allegation to [Equity
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Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment
against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to
whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D. C. 309,
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of receiving the information. !d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840.
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a
writ of certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1982). We now reverse.
II

In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S. E. C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an
"affirmative duty of disclosure ... when dealing in securities." I d., at 911, and n. 13. 10 The SEC found that not only
Funding's] auditors and sought to have the information published in the
Wall Street Journal."); 681 F. 2d, at 829 (Wright, J.) ("Largely thanks to
Dirks one of the most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered
and exposed, while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed
opportunities to investigate Equity Funding.").
9
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E),
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties).
10
The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to
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did breach of this common-law duty also establish the elements of a Rule lOb-5 violation, 11 but that individuals other
than corporate insiders could be obligated either to disclose
material nonpublic information 12 before trading or to abstain
from trading altogether. I d., at 912. In Chiarella, we accepted the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for establishing a Rule lOb-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness
of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227.
In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose
or abstain, the Court found that there is no general duty to
disclose before trading on material nonpublic information, 13
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher
Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady,
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree, that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office." See 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15.
11
Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules.
12
The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through the
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973).
13
See 445 U.S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at
238--239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpu,blic information obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "hon-
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and held that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise
from the mere possession of non public market information."
I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235.
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule
10b-5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462,
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception."
I d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage" of "information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone."
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43
S. E. C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable
under Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose material nonpublic information before trading on it and
thus makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at
916, n. 31.
III
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not
a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of
the securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship,
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, non public information." I d., at
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC
est means," as opposed to "stealth").
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and courts in policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties
to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical
tippee has no such relationships. ~ In view of this absence, it
has been unclear how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts
duty to refrain from trading on inside information.
1

A
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is
that a tippee "inherits" the Cady, Roberts obligation to
shareholders whenever he receives inside information from
an insider:
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty
which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders.
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material
information from insiders become 'subject to the same
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
"Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant
working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply
that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information
solely for corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938,
942 (CA2 1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 633, 645
(1971); In re Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969);
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S. E. C. 933, 937
(1968); Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at 912. When such a person breaches
his fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than
a tippee. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner· & Smith, Inc.,
495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material
information when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential,
and the relationship at least must imply such a duty.
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Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee
knowingly transmits the information to someone who
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presumably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and
its perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing
in their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he
passed the information on to traders." 21 S. E. C.
Docket, at 1410, n. 42.
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed
Chiarella's conviction, holding that" '[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.'" United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 15
Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt ofnonpublic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain;
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders.
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia15
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In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders. This conflicts
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading
while in possession of material non public information. 16
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D.
C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at
235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to disclose]
arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of
his position in the market." 445 U. S., at 232-233, n. 14.
rella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and,
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 by
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
'"In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal information rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. 78k(a)(1), against
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account.
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiar·ella that "[t]he exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic information]." I bid.

*
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Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a
son knowingly receives material nonpublic information from
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 17
It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information," 21 S. E. C., at 1406/8 and this often is done by
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market
" The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information,
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21
S. E. C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'interstices in analysis' .... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors
Management Co., 44 S. E. C., at 646). But this rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959) (Burger, J.,
sitting by designation).
1
Dirks is an analyst in a bro' On its facts, this case is the unusual one.
ker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. Nonetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views.
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to
withhold from the public, is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity
Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market was
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone
undetected longer. See. n. 8, supra.
·
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worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment
in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally.
B

The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean
that such tippees always are free to trade on the information.
The need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear. Not only
are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their
advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b)
(making it unlawful to do indirectly "by means of any other
person" any act made unlawful by the federal securities
laws). Similarly, the transactions of those who knowingly
participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee himself."
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson
v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88
U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in
Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others that the trustee could
not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. See SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert.
denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the tippee's duty to
disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's
duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445 U. S., at
246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we noted in
Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's
breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.
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Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but
rather because it has been made available to them improperly.19 And for Rule lOb-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure
is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach. 20 As Commissioner Smith perceptively ob19
The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In Investors Management Co ., supra, the SEC stated that one element of
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the
information] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective
revelation or otherwise." 44 S. E. C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it.
/d ., at 650 (concurring in the result).
'"' Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of
restitution that" '[w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities likewise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge.
See, e. g. , Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs,
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule lOb-5 restrictions to
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they
are participating in the insider's breach of his fidudary duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who,
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served in Investors Management Co.: "[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee knew the information was given
to him in breach of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information .... "
44 S. E. C., at 651 (concurring in the result). Tipping thus
properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly violating the
Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 21

c
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a constructive trustee.").
2
' We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is ever
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations."
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authoritiestypically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities.
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following exchange took place:
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the
law to go to the SEC first?
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the information has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.
Thus, it is clear that Rule 101>--5 does not impose any obligation simply to
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading.
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the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case,
the more typical situation in which there will be a question
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. See n. 16,
supra. In some situations, the insider will act consistently
with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, and yet release of the
information may affect the market. For example, it may not
be clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient
analyst-whether the information will be viewed as material
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on
the purpose of the disclosure. This standard was identified
by the SEC itself in Cady, Roberts: a purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate "use of inside information for personal advantage." 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15. See n. 10,
supra. Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent
some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is
no derivative breach. 22 As Commissioner Smith stated in In22

An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the disclosure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980).
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the investment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned,
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been
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vestors Management Co.: "It is important in this type of case
to focus on policing insiders and what they do ... rather than
on policing information per se and its possession .... " 44
S. E. C., at 648 (concurring in the result).
The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not
exist when the information is transmitted for a proper purpose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when
the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate
business justification for transmitting the information. We
think the SEC is unduly concerned. In determining whether
the insider's purpose in making a particular disclosure is
fraudulent, the SEC and the courts are not required to read
the parties' minds. Scienter in some cases is relevant in
determining whether the tipper has violated his Cady, Roberts duty. 23 But to determine whether the disclosure itself
"deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]" shareholders,
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 686 (1980), the initial inquiry is
whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider.
This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i. e.,
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799.
23
Scienter-"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 193, n. 12 (1976)-is
an independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation. See Aaron v. SEC, 446
U. S. 680, 695 (1980). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, see post, at p.
7, n. 10, motivation is not irrelevant to the issue of scienter. It is not
enough that an insider's conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a violation may be found only where there is "intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting
the price of securities." Ernst & Ernst v. H ochfelder, supra, at 199. The
issue in this case, however, is not whether Secrist or Dirks acted with
scienter, but rather whether there was any deceptive or fraudulent conduct at all, i. e., whether Secrist's disclosure constituted a breach of his
fiduciary duty and thereby caused injury to shareholders. See n. 27,
infra. Only if there was such a breach did Dirks, a tippee, acquire a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain.
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whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal
benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.
Cf. 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15; Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders,
and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 324, 348 (1979) ("The theory ... is
that the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is
in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for himself.... "). There are objective facts and circumstances
that often justify such an inference. For example, there
may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention
to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist
when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to
the recipient.
Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be
easy for courts. But it is essential, we think, to have a guiding principle for those whose daily activities must be limited
and instructed by the SEC's inside-trading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach of the insider's fiduciary
duty before the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule adopted by the SEC in this case
would have no limiting principle. 24
24

Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous,
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb--5 in inside-trading
cases:
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every

82-276-0PINION
18

DIRKS v. SEC

IV
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above,
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 25 It
is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders. 26 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain
the information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside information." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).
:!5 Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The Solicitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
We need not decide, however, whether the information constituted "material facts," or whether information concerning corporate crime is properly
characterized as "inside information." For purposes of deciding this case,
we assume the correctness of the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of
Appeals, that petitioner was a tippee of material inside information.
26
Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D. C.,
at 325-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's
theory in this Court. See Bt:ief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1947).
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breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street
Journal.

It is clear that neither Secrist nor the other Equity Funding employees violated their Cady, Roberts duty to the corporation's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 27
In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to believe that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" differs markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact,
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not understand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders.
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside information must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly,
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in
the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at
52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which
such information is acquired .... "); 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 322-323, 681
F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.).
The dissent argues that "Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding
shareholders by transmitting material nonpublic information to Dirks with
the intention that Dirks would cause his clients to trade on that information." Post, at 12. By perceiving a breach of fiduciary duty whenever
inside information is intentionally disclosed to securities traders, the dissenting opinion effectively would achieve the same result as the SEC's theory below, i. e., mere possession of inside information while trading would
be viewed as a Rule 10b--5 violation. But Chiarella made it explicitly clear
there is no general duty to forgo market transactions "based on material,
nonpublic information." 455 U. S., at 233. Such a duty would "depar[t]
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific rela27
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The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose to
make a gift of valuable information to Dirks. As the facts of
this case clearly indicate, the tippers were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra, at 1-2. In the absence
of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was
no derivative breach by Dirks. See n. 19, supra. Dirks
therefore could not have been "a participant after the fact in
[an] insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." Chiarella, 445
U. S., at 230, n. 12.

v
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case,
tionship between two parties." Ibid. Seep. 7, supra.
Moreover, to constitute a violation of Rule 10b--5, there must be fraud.
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 199 (1976) (statutory
words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance ... connot[e] intentional
or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the price of securities") (emphasis added). There is no
evidence that Secrist's disclosure was intended to or did in fact "deceive or
defraud" anyone. Secrist certainly intended to convey relevant information that management was unlawfully concealing, and-so far as the record
shows-he believed that persuading Dirks to investigate was the best way
to disclose the fraud. Other efforts had proved fruitless. Under any objective standard, Secrist received no direct or indirect personal benefit
from the disclosure.
The dissenting opinion focuses on shareholder "losses," "injury," and
"damages," but as the court noted in Fridrich v. Br·adford, 542 F. 2d 307,
318 (CA6 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1053 (1977), there is no clear causal
connection between inside trading and outsiders' losses: "Investors must
be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open market without complete or always accurate information." In one sense, as market values
fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect information, there always are winners and losers; but those who have "lost" have
not necessaril~ been defrauded. On the other" hand, inside trading for personal gain is raudulent, and is a violation of the federal securities laws.
See Dooley, supra, at 39-41, 70. Thus, there is little legal significance to
the dissent's argument that Secrist and Dirks created new "victims" by disclosing the information to persons who traded. In fact, they prevented
the fraud from continuing and victimizing many more investors.

.
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had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that
he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is
Reversed.
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RAYMOND L. DIRKS, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
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APPEALS FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic information from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation.
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure.
I
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula1
The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 22~247 ; the opinion of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S. E . C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S.
App. D. C. 309, 314-318, 681 F . 2d 824, 82~33 (1982) .
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the
fraud and disclose it publicly.
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and employees of the corporation.
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud.
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of
clients and investors. Some of these persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch regularly
with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging
hearsay might be libelous.
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur2

Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his
firm. See 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate Dirks, or how many actually
did so." 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston
Company Institutional Investors, Inc. , promised Dirks about $25,000 in
commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any brokerage business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S. E. C. Docket,
at 1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5.
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on information assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immediately went into receivership. 4
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the exposure of the fraud. Mter a hearing by an administrative
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted
violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77q(a), 5 § lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U. S.C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5
3
As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office beginning on March 27.
'A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153.
• Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
• Section 10(b) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of
the investment community who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into possession
of material 'information that they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading." 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222,
230 n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive
fraud to light," 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1412, 8 the SEC only
censured him. 9
any facility of any national securities exchange"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
7
Rule 10b-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
8
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion minimizes the role Dirks
played in making public the Equity Funding fraud. See post, at 3 and 11,
n. 15. The dissent would rewrite the history of Dirks' extensive investigative efforts. See, e. g., 21 S. E. C., at 1412 ("It is clear that Dirks played
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light,
and it is also true that he reported the fraud allegation to [Equity
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Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment
against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to
whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D. C. 309,
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of receiving the information. I d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840.
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a
writ of certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1982). We now reverse.
II

In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S. E. C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an
"affirmative duty of disclosure . . . when dealing in securities." I d., at 911, and n. 13. 10 The SEC found that not only
Funding's] auditors and sought to have the information published in the
Wall Street Journal."); 681 F. 2d, at 829 (Wright, J.) ("Largely thanks to
Dirks one of the most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered
and exposed, while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed
opportunities to investigate Equity Funding.").
9
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E),
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties).
10
The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to
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did breach of this common-law duty also establish the elements of a Rule lOb-5 violation, 11 but that individuals other
than corporate insiders could be obligated either to disclose
material nonpublic information 12 before trading or to abstain
from trading altogether. Id., at 912. In Chiarella, we accepted the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for establishing a Rule lOb-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness
of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227.
In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose
or abstain, the Court found that there is no general duty to
disclose before trading on material nonpublic information, 13
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher
Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady,
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree, that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office." See 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15.
11
Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules.
12
The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through the
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973).
3
' See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at
238-239 (BRENNAN, J ., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic information obtained through the exercise of"diligence or acumen" and "bon-
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and held that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise
from the mere possession of nonpublic market information."
I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235.
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule
10l:H>. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462,
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception."
I d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage" of "information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone."
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43
S. E. C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable
under Rule 10l:H> for inside trading only where he fails to disclose material nonpublic information before trading on it and
thus makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at
916, n. 31.
III
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not
a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of
the securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship,
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, non public information." I d., at
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC
est means," as opposed to "stealth").
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and courts in policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties
to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical
tippee has no such relationships. 14 In view of this absence, it
has been unclear how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts
duty to refrain from trading on inside information.

A
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is
that a tippee "inherits" the Cady, Roberts obligation to
shareholders whenever he receives inside information from
an insider:
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty
which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders.
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material
information from insiders become 'subject to the same
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
"Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant
working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply
that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information
solely for corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938,
942 (CA2 1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 633, 645
(1971); In re Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969);
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S. E. C. 933, 937
(1968); Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at 912. When such a person breaches
his fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than
a tippee. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material
information when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential,
and the relationship at least must imply such a duty.
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Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee
knowingly transmits the information to someone who
will probably trade on the basis thereof.... Presumably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and
its perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing
in their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he
passed the information on to traders." 21 S. E. C.
Docket, at 1410, n. 42.
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed
Chiarella's conviction, holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.'" United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading.' 5
Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt of nonpublic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain;
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders.
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia16
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In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders. This conflicts
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading
while in possession of material nonpublic information. 16
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D.
C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at
235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to disclose]
arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of
his position in the market." 445 U. S., at 232-233, n. 14.
rella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and,
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code§ 1603, Comment
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
16
In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal information rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in
§ ll(a)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account.
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic information]." Ibid.
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Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely ~use a~
son knowingly receives material nonpublic information from
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 17
It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information," 21 S. E. C., at 1406, 18 and this often is done by
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market
17
The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information,
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21
S. E. C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'interstices in analysis' .... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors
Management Co., 44 S. E. C., at 646). But this rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959) (Burger, J.,
sitting by designation).
18
On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a broker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. Nonetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views.
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to
withhold from the public, is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity
Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market was
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone
undetected longer. Seen. 8, supra.
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worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment
in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally.
B

The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean
that such tippees always are free to trade on the information.
The need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear. Not only
are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their
advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b)
(making it unlawful to do indirectly "by means of any other
person" any act made unlawful by the federal securities
laws). Similarly, the transactions of those who knowingly
participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee himself."
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson
v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88
U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in
Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others that the trustee could
not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. See SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert.
denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the tippee's duty to
disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's
duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445 U. S., at
246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we noted in
Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's
breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.
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Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but
rather because it has been made available to them improperly.'9 And for Rule lOb-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure
is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach. 20 As Commissioner Smith perceptively ob19
The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In Investors Management Co., supra, the SEC stated that one element of
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the
information] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective
revelation or otherwise." 44 S. E. C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it.
I d., at 650 (concurring in the result).
Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of
restitution that " '[w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities likewise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge.
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs,
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and
was improperly obtained.''); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10b-5 restrictions to
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty.''). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who,
21)
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served in Investors Management Co.: "[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee knew the information was given
to him in breach of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information . . . . "
44 S. E. C., at 651 (concurring in the result). Tipping thus
properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly violating the
Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 21

c
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a constructive trustee.").
21
We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is ever
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations."
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authoritiestypically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities.
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following exchange took place:
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the
law to go to the SEC first?
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the information has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading.
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the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case,
the more typical situation in which there will be a question
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. See n. 16,
supra. In some situations, the insider will act consistently
with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, and yet release of the
information may affect the market. For example, it may not
be clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient
analyst-whether the information will be viewed as material
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on
the purpose of the disclosure. This standard was identified
by the SEC itself in Cady, Roberts: a purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate "use of inside information for personal advantage." 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15. See n. 10,
supra. Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent
some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is
no derivative breach. 22 As Commissioner Smith stated in In22

An example of a case turning on the court's detennination that the disclosure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA21980).
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the investment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned,
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been
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vestors Management Co.: "It is important in this type of case

to focus on policing insiders and what they do ... rather than
on policing information per se and its possession.... " 44
S. E. C., at 648 (concurring in the result).
The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not
exist when the information is transmitted for a proper purpose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when
the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate
business justification for transmitting the information. We
think the SEC is unduly concerned. In determining whether
the insider's purpose in making a particular disclosure is
fraudulent, the SEC and the courts are not required to read
the parties' minds. Scienter in some cases is relevant in
determining whether the tipper has violated his Cady, Roberts duty. 23 But to determine whether the disclosure itself
"deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]" shareholders,
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 686 (1980), the initial inquiry is
whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider.
This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i. e.,
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799.
23
Scienter-"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 193, n. 12 (1976~is
an independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation. See Aaron v. SEC, 446
U. S. 680, 695 (1980). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, see post, at p.
7, n. 10, motivation is not irrelevant to the issue of scienter. It is not
enough that an insider's conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a violation may be found only where there is "intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting
the price of securities." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra, at 199. The
issue in this case, however, is not whether Secrist or Dirks acted with
scienter, but rather whether there was any deceptive or fraudulent conduct at all, i. e., whether Secrist's disclosure constituted a breach of his
fiduciary duty and thereby caused injury to shareholders. See n. 27,
irifra. Only if there was such a breach did Dirks, a tippee, acquire a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain.
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whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal
benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.
Cf. 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15; Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders,
and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 324, 348 (1979) ("The theory ... is
that the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is
in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for himself.... "). There are objective facts and circumstances
that often justify such an inference. For example, there
may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention
to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist
when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to
the recipient.
Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be
easy for courts. But it is essential, we think, to have a guiding principle for those whose daily activities must be limited
and instructed by the SEC's inside-trading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach of the insider's fiduciary
duty before the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule adopted by the SEC in this case
would have no limiting principle. 24
24
Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous,
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb-5 in inside-trading
cases:
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every
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IV
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above,
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 25 It
is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders.26 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain
the information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside information." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965).
25
Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The Solicitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
We need not decide, however, whether the information constituted "material facts," or whether information concerning corporate crime is properly
characterized as "inside information." For purposes of deciding this case,
we assume the correctness of the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of
Appeals, that petitioner was a tippee of material inside information.
26
Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D. C.,
at 32fh327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 19~197 (1947).
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breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street
Journal.
It is clear that neither Secrist nor the other Equity Funding employees violated their Cady, Roberts duty to the corporation's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 27
In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to believe that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders.
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" differs markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact,
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not understand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders.
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside information must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly,
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in
the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at
52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which
such information is acquired .... "); 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 322-323, 681
F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.).
The dissent argues that "Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding
shareholders by transmitting material non public information to Dirks with
the intention that Dirks would cause his clients to trade on that information." Post, at 12. By perceiving a breach of fiduciary duty whenever
inside information is intentionally disclosed to securities traders, the dissenting opinion effectively would achieve the same result as the SEC's theory below, i. e., mere possession of inside information while trading would
be viewed as a Rule lOb-5 violation. But Chiarella made it explicitly clear
there is no general duty to forgo market transactions "based on material,
nonpublic information." 455 U. S., at 233. Such a duty would "depar[t]
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific rela27
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The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose to
make a gift of valuable information to Dirks. As the facts of
this case clearly indicate, the tippers were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra, at 1-2. In the absence
of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was
no derivative breach by Dirks. See n. 20, supra. Dirks
therefore could not have been "a participant after the fact in
[an] insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." Chiarella, 445
U. S., at 230, n. 12.

v
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case,
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that
tionship between two parties." Ibid. Seep. 7, supra.
Moreover, to constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5, there must be fraud.
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 199 (1976) (statutory
words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance ... connot[e] intentional
or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the price of securities") (emphasis added). There is no
evidence that Secrist's disclosure was intended to or did in fact "deceive or
defraud" anyone. Secrist certainly intended to convey relevant information that management was unlawfully concealing, and-so far as the record
shows-he believed that persuading Dirks to investigate was the best way
to disclose the fraud. Other efforts had proved fruitless. Under any objective standard, Secrist received no direct or indirect personal benefit
from the disclosure.
The dissenting opinion focuses on shareholder "losses," "injury," and
"damages," but in many cases there may be no clear causal connection between inside trading and outsiders' losses. In one sense, as market values
fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect information, there always are winners and losers; but those who have "lost" have
not necessarily been defrauded. On the other hand, inside trading for personal gain is fraudulent, and is a violation of the federal securities laws.
See Dooley, supra, at 39-41, 70. Thus, there is little legal significance to
the dissent's argument that Secrist and Dirks created new "victims" by disclosing the information to persons who traded. In fact, they prevented
the fraud from continuing and victimizing many more investors.
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals thereReversed.
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While serving as an officer of a broker-dealer, petitioner, who specialized
in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors, received information from a former officer of an insurance company that its assets were vastly overstated as the result of
fraudulent corporate practices and that various regulatory agencies had
failed to act on similar charges made by company employees. Upon petitioner's investigation of the allegations, certain company employees corroborated the fraud charges, but senior management denied any
wrongdoing. Neither petitioner nor his firm owned or traded any of the
company's stock, but throughout his investigation he openly discussed
the information he had obtained with a number of clients and investors,
some of whom sold their holdings in the company. The Wall Street
Journal declined to publish a story on the fraud allegations, as urged by
petitioner. After the price of the insurance company's stock fell during
petitioner's investigation, the New York Stock Exchange halted trading
in the stock. State insurance authorities then impounded the company's
records and uncovered evidence of fraud. Only then did the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against the company,
and only then did the Wall Street Journal publish a story based largely
on information assembled by petitioner. After a hearing concerning petitioner's role in the exposure of the fraud, the SEC found that he had
aided and abetted violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, including § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and SEC Rule 10b-5, by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of
the investment community who later sold their stock in the insurance
company. Because of petitioner's role in bringing the fraud to light,
however, the SEC only censured him. On review, the Court of Appeals
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Syllabus
entered judgment against petitioner.
Held:
L Two elements for establishing a violation of§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
by corporate insiders are the existence of a relationship affording access
to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure. A duty to disclose or abstain does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic
market information. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222.
There must also be "manipulation or deception" to bring a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction within the ambit of
Rule 10b-5. Thus, an insider is liable under the Rule for inside trading
only where he fails to disclose material nonpublic information before
trading on it and thus makes secret profits. Pp. 5-7.
2. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the
corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such relationships. There must be a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty before the
tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain. Pp. 7-16.
(a) The SEC's position that a tippee who knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an insider invariably has a fiduciary
duty to disclose before trading rests on the erroneous theory that the
antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders. A
duty to disclose arises from the relationship between parties and not
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in
the market. Pp. ~11.
(b) A tippee, however, is not always free to trade on inside information. His duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's duty. Tippees must assume an insider's duty to the shareholders
not because they receive inside information, but rather because it has
been made available to them improperly. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material
nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach. Pp.
11-13.
(c) In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it is necessary to determine whether the insider's "tip"
constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. Whether disclosure
is a breach of duty depends in large part on the personal benefit the insider receives as a result of the disclosure. Absent an improper purpose, there is no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach
by the insider, there is no derivative breach. Pp. 14-16.
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Syllabus
3. Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, petitioner had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that he
obtained, and thus there was no actionable violation by him. He had no
pre-existing fiduciary duty to the insurance company's shareholders.
Moreover, the insurance company's employees, as insiders, did not violate their duty to the company's shareholders by providing information
to petitioner. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by the
insiders, there was no derivative breach by petitioner. Pp. 16-18.
220 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 681 F. 2d 824, reversed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and WHITE, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL,
JJ., joined .
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